Farrel v. McClea
Syllabus & Case Posture
*Farrel v. McClea.
Master of vessel.
The master of a vessel is liable for the payment of the wages of the mate, although the latter may have been shipped by the owners, if he has served on board, with the consent of the master.
This was an action brought by the plaintiff to recover his wages, as mate of a vessel, of which the defendant was master, and one Sadlier was owner. On the trial, it appeared, that the defendant, having cited the plaintiff to show his cause of action, acknowledged before the judge, at his chambers, that he was master of the vessel, during the time for which the wages were claimed; but then he insisted, that he had never engaged the jilaintiff, who, as he said, was shipped on a contract with the owner. To prove the time of service, the following certificate, subscribed by the defendant was read :
“Philadelphia, 12th January 1787.
“These are to certify to whom it may concern, that Joshua Farrel was mate on board the -, from the 16th June to the 16th August 1786, making two months. Given under my hand. Robert McClea.
Opinion of the Court — Shippen, President,
Primary OpinionShippen, President,
in delivering the, charge of the court, adverted to the nature of the evidence on which the case was established, and instructed the jury to take the whole together, unless they should think, that there were circumstances in the defendant’s confession, which rendered the part in his own favor inconsistent or improbable.
But, even admitting the fact, that the plaintiff had been shipped by the owner, his Honor stated, that the master was liable; for the law gave the plaintiff a three-fold remedy to recover his wages; and unless by some positive act or word, he had released (as he might do) one of those remedies, a mere compliance with the solicitation of the owner to embark, cannot defeat them. He said, there was no distinction, in this respect, between the mate and a common mariner; they were alike subject to the orders of the master, who could equally refuse to receive either; or, when received, was equally empowered to dismiss them; for his appointment as master gave him the sole, undoubted and exclusive right of choosing every seaman under him, whatever courtesy he might be inclined to show to the recommendation of those by whom he was himself employed.
With regard to the case of repairs, the president observed, that it was not strictly analogous to that of seamen’s wages, but stood on this footing: If a vessel is in port, where the owners reside, and they, without the interposition of the master, employ carpenters, &c., to repair her, the master is not liable; no t merely because he does not employ them, but, because he is not answerable for their conduct, when employed. But if a vessel is repaired in a foreign port, then, indeed, a similitude arises between the cases, and the master is as liable for those repairs, as for the wages of his sailors, because the workmen, as well as the sailors, are, in the latter instance, employed by him, and equally subject to his control and dismission.
The opinion of the court was, conclusively, that, if the mate had served on board the vessel, the master’s having admitted him to do so, rendered him liable for the payment of the wages.
And the jury,- accordingly, found a verdict for the plaintiff,
See Atkyns v. Burrowes, 1 Peters Adm. 244; Smith v. Leard, Hopkinson’s Adm, Cases, 199.
And see Bayley v. Grant, 1 Salk. 33; s. c. 12 Mod. 440; Hook v. Moreton, 1 Ld. Raym. 397; Brande v. Haven, Gilp. 592.