Hamilton v. Callender's executors
Syllabus & Case Posture
Hamilton, Executor, v. Callender’s executors.
Satisfaction.
k. mortgaged lands to B., and after Ms death, his-exeeutora sold part of the mortgaged premises to C., who assumed payment of the principal and interest, and gave Ms bond to B., for the interest due; no receipt was given on the mortgage, for the amount of this bond, and it did not appear, that it was accepted by B. as satisfaction: Held, that the bond was not a payment pro tanto, so as to discharge the executors of A.
This action being referred by consent, the following report was made : “ The referees, upon full consideration of all the circumstances, are doubtful as to the law upon one point, and have agreed to make their award special, subject to the opinion of the court.
“ The case submitted to them appeared to be as follows : On the 16th of March 1773, Robert Callender was indebted to James Hamilton in the sum of 2120?. sterling, for which he gave to the said James Hamilton, a bond and warrant of attorney, and a mortgage upon an estate in the county of Cumberland. It appeared, that interest ivas paid thereon to March 1776, and that -receipts for such payments are indorsed on the mortgage.
“ Robert Callender died, and some time after, his executors sold part of the mortgaged premises to Mark Bird, who undertook to pay off the principal sum, together with the interest that should become due, after the date of his purchase.
Opinion of the Court — McKean, Chief Justice.
Primary OpinionAfter considering the case and arguments, the chief justice, at the present term, delivered the opinion of the court.
McKean, Chief Justice.
The case appears to be this : That the testa tor of the defendants gave a mortgage to the testator of the plaintiff, on four several tracts of land. The heirs of the mortgagor sold the equity of redemption of three of these tracts to Mark Bird, who, afterwards (on the 3d day of May 1783), executed a bond for 651i. to the mortgagee ; and this bond being for the amount of the interest then due upon the mortgage, also bore interest. No receipt, however, for the bond, for the interest, nor, indeed, any minute of the proceeding, was entered upon the mortgage ; m/r h as -any express proof been offered, that the bond (upon which there has not been anything paid) was accepted as a satisfaction pro tanto of the mcney due on the mortgage. The three tracts of land conveyed to Mark Bird have been sold, in order to satisfy the mortgage ; but proving insufficient, the question now arises, on the circumstances which I have stated, whether the bond given by Mark Bird is to be taken, either in Aw or equity, as a payment, discharge or recompense for so much of the mortgage-money ?
The court, having maturely considered the case, are of opinion, that the bond is not a payment pro tanto of the mortgage-money : for which opinion they will content themselves with declaring the general prineijiles, and referring to the authorities whence those ¡irinciples are deduced.
1. First, then, one judgment cannot be pleaded in bar of another, which is of equal nature and dignity, no more than one bond or obligation can be pleaded in bar of another. Cro. Eliz. 817; 2 Bac. Abr. 552.
2. In the second place, a bond, which is no satisfaction of another bond, cannot be deemed a satisfaction of a mortgage, which is a security of a higher nature. To render it a satisfaction, it ought to better the plaintiff’s case, in point of safety, and expedite the time of payment; for a bond with sureties will not be a satisfaction of one without, unless the time of payment *424] *shortened. 1 Str. 427; 1 Brownl. 47, 71; Hob. 68, 69; 1 Mod. 225; 2 Id. 186; Cro. Jac. 579; Cro. Car. 85, 86; 3 Lev. 55; 1 Salk. 124; 1 Burr. 9; 2 Wils. 87.
3. And in the third place, as there is no entry of the bond in question upon the mortgage, showing that it was received in payment or satisfaction of the interest then due, nor any proof that it was so intended by the parties, a presumption naturally arises, that the bond was merely taken as a collateral or supplementary security ; and no debt or duty can be extinguished, but by a security of a higher nature than the first.
For these reasons, we decide the question submitted by the referees to the court, in favor of the plaintiff, and direct judgment to be accordingly entered upon the report,
See Musgrove v. Gibbs, ante, p. 216, and the cases cited in the note.
The receipt of a security of equal degree, either from the debtor, or from a stranger, is no extinguishment of the original cause of action. Oliphant v. Church, 19 Penn. St. 318. Whether it is to operate as a satisfaction, by substitution, depends on the intention of the parties. Reed v. Defebaugh, 24 Id. 495. The transfer of a chose in action to a creditor is presumed to be a collateral security, not a satisfaction, unless so expressed. Leas v. James, 10 S. & E. 307; Stone v. Miller, 16 Penn. St. 450; League v. Waring, 85 Id. 244 And see Bank v. Cheney, 10 W. N. C. 137.