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Lewis v. Maris

1 U.S. 278 1788-04 6,297 Words
Full Case Caption
Lewis, appellant, v. Maris, appellee
Official & Parallel Citations
1 Dall. 278 · 1 U.S. 278
Court & Volume
Pennsylvania High Court of Errors and Appeals · 1 U.S.

Syllabus & Case Posture

APRIL SESSIONS, 1788.

Lewis, appellant, v. Maris, appellee.

Probate of will.

A will, not written by the testator, nor subscribed by him, but proved by one witness only, to have been put in writing according to his direction, is not admissible to probate, under the act of 1705.

Tras was an apjieal from the decree of the register of wills, and two justices of the court of common pleas of the county of Montgomery, who admitted an instrument, bearing date the 25th of the tenth 'month, 1786, purporting to bo the last will and testament of one Jephtha Lewis, the father of the appellant, to be proved as a good will and testament in writing, although it had neither been written nor subscribed by the supposed testator ; upon the deposition of John Evans, a scrivener, that it was drawn at his request, and conformable to his instructions, but never read to him, after it was written. This instrument contained a devise of real estate, and a legacy of 400i. for the use of a school, in the township of Gwyned, and county of Montgomery ; and upon the validity of that legacy, the present controversy arose. It was proved by several persons, that the deceased, in the year 1784, had talked of leaving money to a school; that about three months before his déath, he asked one of the deponents to be a trustee for that purpose ; that some months before his death, he remarked to another, what .better could a man do with his money than to leave it to such a use ? that ho declared he did not intend all his estate for his child ; that he spoke repeatedly of John Evans’s making his will; that for fear it should come to the knowledge of his family, he desired it to be left with John Evans ; that being indisposed, when it was drawn, he desired John Evans to call upon him again with it; that when John Evans called with it again, he was too far gone to read and attend to it; and that the disposition of the real estate contained in the paper produced, was the same which the deceased had, be-*2791 ^ore desired *his brother to mention to John Evans : but J John Evans was the only witness who proved any instructions to have been given in respect to the legacy of 400i. It appeared, likewise, that the same scrivener had drawn another will for the deceased, in the year 1779, which was left in similar circumstances, without the subscription of the testator, or any other attestation than that of the drawer ; but this circumstance was made no use of in the argument.

Wilcox and W M. Smith, for the appellants.

Opinion of the Court — McKean, Chief Justice.

Primary Opinion

The court took time to consider of their judgment, which was, the next day, delivered by the Chief Justice.

McKean, Chief Justice.

This cause comes before us upon an appeal from the register of wills, and two justices of the court of common pleas, of the county of Montgomery ; and it is agreed, that there is but one question for the determination of the court ; to wit, whether a will, not written by the testator, nor subscribed by him, but put into writing by his direction, and proved to be so only by the person who drew it, ought to be established as a good and perfect will and testament ?

The disposition of property by will, was certainly the first mode of conveyance used among men; and some authors, in tracing its antiquity, have informed us, that Noah made a will, devising the whole world to his sons, according to their respective proportions. The convenience of the thing having rendered it universal, custom, at length, became a law for its support; and different solemnities or forms were prescribed by different legislatures, in order to fix the authenticity of a testamentary writing. Thus, by the Roman law, it was originally requisite that a will should be in writing, *287] subscribed by the testator, if he could write, *before seven witnesses, J and if he could not write, then published by him in the presence of eight witnesses ; but this number was properly reduced to two, in the time of Justinian. By the civil and ecclesiastical laws, as they jmevail in England, the ablest writers concur in saying, that two witnesses are required, and that two are sufficient to prove a will. The statute of 32 Hen. VIII, c. 1 (which is merely explained by the 34 & 35 of the same reign), enables a man, by his will in writing, to dispose of all his socage lands, and two-thirds of his lands held incapite ; which, by the subsequent operation of the 12 Gar. II, c. 24, extends to all his real estate. It is incontrovertibly settled, however, that neither the statute of Henry VIII., nor the statutes by which it is ex ■ plained, made any alteration in respect to testaments of goods and chattels ; and therefore, they are still regulated, as they always were, by the civil and ecclesiastical law, which, as it has. been already remarked, requires the attestation of two witnesses.

As this, then, was the established rule in England, and as by the charter from Charles the Second to William Penn, the laws of England relating to property, were to be the laws of the province, until altered by the legislature of Pennsylvania, we must now inquire, whether any act of our legislature has substituted another mode of proof ?

It is contended, on the part of the appellees, that the law enacted in the year 1705, has placed wills of real estate, and testaments of personal property, upon the same footing ; and that any proof which would be sufficient to convince a jury of a fact in issue, is, by that law, made competent to the probate of a last will and testament. It has been argued, likewise, by the same counsel, that, even in England, from the passing of the statute of 32 Hen. VIII, c. 1, until the passing of the statute of frauds, 29 Car. II, c. 3, the positive testimony of witnesses was not required, but that any common-law evidence, founded upon circumstances, was sufficient to prove a will of lands. On this point, there is, perhaps, no express adjudication to be met with in our books ; yet there are cases in which the necessity of two witnesses to a will of lands, seems strongly to be implied. God. Orph. Leg. 15; Dyer 72; Plowd. 345. But the cause before the court must finally depend upon a proper construction of the act of assembly; which has declared, that “ wills, &c., being proved by two or more credible witnesses, on their solemn affirmation, or by other legal proof, shall be good and available in law ;” and as all testamentary writings, whether for the disposal of real or personal estate, are subject, in this respect, to one rule, the whole dispute rests upon the words, or other legal proof.

In the construction of statutes, the same principle should be observed, which prevails with respect to wills ; and the intent and meaning of the legislature in the former, ought to be as carefully sought after, and as faithfully pursued, as the intent and meaning of the testator, in the latter. What then was the intention of the assembly in passing this act ? The appellees *2881 a^eSe’ ^at ^ was t0 a<^ra^ common-law evidence in the case of wills; - and that other *legal proof is an alternative, opposed to the number of witnesses. But to this, it has been answered, that less proof than two witnesses could not, consistently with the reason and nature of the subject, be intended; and that other legal proof is put in opposition to solemn affirmation, in order to admit the attestation of an oath — whether administered upon the Gospels to a Christian, or upon the Pentateuch, to a Jew; whether with the solemnity of an uplifted hand, according to some sectaries; or with the ceremonial of. the hand placed beneath the thigh, as it is practiced by the Gentoo nations.

This appears, upon the whole, to be the genuine exposition of the act; and the adverse doctrine is pregnant with so much absurdity and inconvenience, that it ought not to be imputed to the legislature, nor ought it to receive the sanction of the court. Besides, we find, that this very act requires the testimony of two or more witnesses to the probate of a nun-cupative will, and likewise to the revocation of a will; and every principle which could make it necessary in those instances, must, cl fortiori, operate in the case before us : For, it could not be designed, that greater solemnity should be observed in a verbal-testament, or in repealing, than in making, a last will and testament — an act of the most serious and important nature, not only as it affects the testator, but as it affects the peace and welfare of posterity.

In short, from the uniform tenor of the acts of assembly, from the practice of the courts, and from the other analogous sections of the same law, it is evident, that the legislature meant to require two witnesses, in proof of every testamentary writing, whether for the disposition of real or personal estate. This opinion, in which the court unanimously concur, we are happy to deliver ; for, it would be dangerous indeed, were the idea tolerated for a moment, that a notary, or any individual, could alone, according to the opposite construction, prove the validity of the will which he had written. By such means the very purpose of wills might be defeated, and the fullest, scope given to foul and fraudulent impositions.

Bryan, Justice.- — The witness, on the present occasion, is indubitably a man of fair and upright character, and therefore, it is the more particularly to be observed, that the opinion of the court is founded upon the indispensable necessity of having two witnesses to the probate of every will.

By the Court. — Let the sentence and proceedings of the .Register’s Court be reversed,

In Eyster v. Young, 3 Yeates 511, the principal witness proved that he made notes from the instructions of the testator, which were read over to him, and after-wards put into form, and the will thus made was in part read to the testator, who became insensible, before the reading was finished. Two other witnesses proved that they were present when the instructions were given, and together confirmed the testimony of the first. This was ruled to be sufficient to establish the will; the court saying, “ circumstances may supply the want of one witness, where they go directly to the immediate act of disposition.”

In Hock v. Hock, 6 S. & R. 47, it is laid down by Judge Gibson, in delivering the opinion of the court, that “ each of the witnesses must separately depose to all facts necessaiy to complete the chain of evidence so that no link in it may depend in the credibility oi but one.....Circumstantial proof cannot be made by two or more witnesses, alternating with each other as to the different parts of the aggregate of circumstances, which are to make up the necessary sum of proof; the evidence of each not going to the whole.” And see Hight v. Wilson, ante, p. 94, and the cases there cited.

The act of 3d April 1833, § 6 (P. L. 249), provides, that, “ every will shall be in writing, and unless the person making the same shall be prevented by the extremity of his last sickness, shall be signed by him, at the end thereof, or by some person in his presence, and by his express directions; and in all cases, shall be proved by the oaths or affirmations of two or more credible witnesses, otherwise, such will shall be of no effect.” That the testator was prevented from signing, by the extremity of his last sickness, must be proved by the witnesses. Grabill v. Barr, 5 Penn. St. 441; Greenough v. Greenough, 11 Id. 489; Barr v. Graybill, 13 Id. 396; Snyder v. Bull, 17 Id. 64, 60. And the extremity of the sickness must be such, as not only to render the party incapable of signing, but also of directing it to be done, by another for him. Ruoffl’s Appeal, 26 Penn. St. 219; Thomas v. Thomas, 27 Id. 485. The testator’s hand, however, may be steadied by another, in the act of signing. Vandruff v. Rinehart, 29 Penn. St. 232; Cozzens’ Will, 61 Id. 196. The act of 27th January 1848 (P. L. 16), authorizes the execution of a will by the testator making his mark. And a will may be so executed .though he be able to sign his name. Main v. Ryder, 84 Penn. St. 217. In such ease, the addition of a wrong name will not vitiate the execution. Long v. Zook, 13 Penn. St. 400. A will written and signed, in lead pencil, mi’ be admitted to probate. Myers v. Vanderbilt, 64 Penn. St. 610. But not, it seems, a will written on a slate. Reed v. Woodward, 11 Phila. 641.

Public Domain Federal Judicial Work (17 U.S.C. § 105) · Harvard Law School Caselaw Access Project (CAP).