Mifflin v. Bingham
Syllabus & Case Posture
Mifflin et al. v. Bingham.
Deposition.— Witness.
A cross-examination of a wiiness, under a rule of court, does not preclude the party from taking any legal exceptions, at the trial, to the competency of the witness.
A deposition of a going witness, taken under a rule of court, cannot be read on the trial, unless a subpcsnahsB been taken out, and, if possible, served on the witness.
What interest will exclude a witness.
The plaintiffs, being disappointed in their evidence, voluntarily suffered a nonsuit. The following points, however, were resolved in the course of the trial; to illustrate which, it is necessary to relate the leading circumstances of the case. The plaintiffs were *owners of a privateer called [-*073 the Rattlesnake, commanded by Captain McCullough. This privateer, *- having taken a valuable prize, during the late war with Great Britain, carried her into Martinique, where the defendant resided as agent for the United States. At the time of her arrival, the defendant was exceedingly embarrassed on account of certain pecuniary engagements which he had entered into for the public ; and, in order to relieve himself, he applied' to Captain McCullough for the use of the proceeds of the prize, offering to pay the amount, by bills of exchange drawn on his correspondents in Philadelphia. To this proposal, McCullough agreed; and, on delivering to the defendant the portion of the prize that belonged to the owners, the bills of exchange were drawn, and regularly accepted ; but when they became due, they were paid in continental money, which, at that time, had depreciated to the rate of three paper dollars for one hard dollar. The plaintiffs, at first, believing this transaction between McCullough and the defendant, to have been on a public foundation, did not complain of the loss which it occasioned; but settled with the captain and crew for their respective shares of the prize, and allowed the bills of exchange, in McCullough’s accounts, as a specie charge. Afterwards, however, it was suggested to them, that the whole was a private speculation for the defendant’s emolument; and that no part of their funds, which had been thus transferred to him, was carried into his accounts with the United States. Under this persuasion, they brought the present aU’on to recover the difference between the value of their effects put into the hands of the defendant, and the depreciated amount of the continental money, in which the bills of exchange were paid — alleging that those effects had been obtained from McCullough under false pretences.
Opinion of the Court — McKean, Chief Justice.
Primary OpinionMcKean, Chief Justice.
There are two ways of proving a witness to be interested in a cause — first, by examining him on his voir dire ; or, secondly, by showing his interest from other evidence, either parol or written. But both these ways cannot be pursued at the same time ; for the election of the one conclusively bars any subsequent recourse to the other, The defendant’s cross-examination under the rule in this case, is not, however, upon the same footing with an examination upon the voir dire; and therefore, we do not think that he is now precluded from the advantage of any legal exception to the competency of the witness.
*With respect to the admission of testimony, the law has been -so well established, and is so perfectly understood, that it needless to enter minutely into the doctrine. The whole, indeed, may be reduced to a short rule ; if the witness speaks under an interest, it is fatal to his competency ; if he is liable to an influence, it taints his credibility. On the present occasion, we are of opinion, that Captain McCullough, at the time of taking the deposition, was not an interested witness ; and therefore, if there was no other objection, we should certainly allow the plaintiffs the benefit of his testimony : for, in the authority cited from Atk. 15, Lord Hardwicke can only mean, that a witness, who has been once interested, shall be presumed to be so still, unless the contrary is proved by a release, or other satisfactory evidence.
The plaintiffs, however, have failed in another respect. A subpoena ought certainly to have been taken out, and, if possible, served upon the witness ; for, it was his, and not their province, to determine whether he would attend or not. The rule never was meant, indeed, to direct an useless thing — such as issuing a subpoena for a witness actually residing in London, or any other distant country ; though even this was heretofore required, in strict practice. But, in the present instance, Captain McCullough was known to be here, a few days ago, his family always resides here, and he may himself, probably, be within a very short distance of the city at this moment. The plaintiffs having taken it upon themselves, not only to decide for the witness, that he would not attend, but also for the court, that they would not insist upon the rule, have acted in their own wrong ; and, upon this objection, we are of opinion, that the deposition ought not to be read in evidence,
II. The defendant’s counsel offered his books to prove, that in his account with the United States, at the time of the transaction between him and McCullough, there was a considerable balance in his favor.
For the plaintiffs, Ingersoll and Sergeant. For the defendant, Tilghman Lewis and Wilson.
But it was objected, for the plaintiffs, that the books of a party are only evidence of goods sold and delivered, or work done ; and that, therefore, they were inadmissible to the present purpose, which was to show that the money was advanced upon a contract different from that which the plaintiffs alleged.
To this, it was answered that although the books of a party are only evidence to charge in the eases mentioned, yet, that they might well be received to establish a matter collateral to the cause.
And by McKean, Chief Justice. — This is a point, that I do not remembei to have ever occurred before. The books are not offered to prove a charge against the plaintiffs, but only to determine a collateral question, whether a third person was the defendant’s debtor, at a particular period. How can this be accomplished, but by the evidence of uhe books, fairly and regularly kept ? To make it a charge, other vouchers of the entry might be necessary ; but for *this purpose, if it is of any importance to the cause nohh (which I do not think), I can conceive no other mode of proceeding. [*277
The defendant, thinking, however, that he could accomplish his object in another way, did not call for a decision of the court; bat waived the reading of the books,
See Vincent v. Huff, 4 S. & R. 298; Shannon v. Commonwealth, 8 Id. 444; Davis v. Barr, 9 Id. 138; Evans v. Eaton, Peters C. C. 338.
s. p. Wallace v. Mease, 4 Yeates 520. And it has been held, that if the party who takes the deposition does not choose to read it at the trial, it cannot be read by the opposite party, without complying with the rule as to subpoenaing the witness; Gordon v. Little, 8 S. & R. 583. But where the witness resides out of the jurisdiction of the court, his deposition may be read, without a subpoena having been taken out. Ranken v. Cooper, 2 Bro. 13: and see Parker v. Parr, 1 Id. 252. As to the practice of the circuit court of the United States, in this respect, see Browne v. Galloway, Peters C. C. 294; Penns v. Ingham, 2 W. C. C. 487; Banert v. Day, 3 Id. 243.
In the Juniata Bank v. Brown, 5 S. & R. 226; it was held, that in an action between A. & B., the books of original entries of O. were not evidence, to show a collateral fact; as that A. was chargedbv C. as a partner in a certain firm.