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Penman v. Wayne

1 U.S. 241 1788-03 3,713 Words
Full Case Caption
Penman et al. v. Wayne
Official & Parallel Citations
1 Dall. 241 · 1 U.S. 241
Court & Volume
Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas · 1 U.S.

Syllabus & Case Posture

Penman et al. v. Wayne.

Arrest of freeholder.

Under the act of 1724-5, the court has a right to inquire into the circumstances of the arrest of a freeholder under a capias, and to relieve him, if they think he was intended by the act to be exempted, although the plaintiff may have made an affidavit, previous to issuing the writ, that the defendant had not been resident in the state for two years.

A rule had been obtained to show cause why the capias, which issued in this case, should not be quashed, the defendant being a freeholder in the county of Chester. It appeared, that, with the praecipe for the writ an affirmation of one Rumford Davis was filed in the prothonotary’s office, setting forth, that “ the defendant had not been resident in this state for two years before the date of the writand it was contended, that this was sufficient, under the act of assembly, to repel the defendant’s claim of privilege. (1 Sm. Laws, 164).

The question, therefore, was, whether the court could, notwithstanding the affirmation filed before the writ issued, inquire into the matter of residence, in order to determine, on all the circumstances of the case, whether the defendant was within the exceptions of the act ? It was twice argued, on the 21st and 33d of May, by Sergeant, for the plaintiff, and Lewis, for the defendant; and the substance of both arguments was as follows.

For the plaintiff.

Opinion of the Court — Shippen, President.

Primary Opinion

The President now delivered the opinion of the court:

Shippen, President.

We have found some difficulty in obtaining a satisfactory idea of the meaning of the second section of this act. It would , seem, by the former part, that the exception upon *which the capias is J grounded, ought to be made appear to the justice who grants the writ; but, in the latter part, when the disjunction of the clause occurs, the expression is general, if the plaintiff can make appear from records or otherwise, without saying to whom he shall make his allegation appear.' At first, indeed, I thought, this might also relate to the justice who grants the writ; but on a further consideration of the subject, I am convinced, that unless the legislature intended something more, it would never have been provided by the third section, that the court shall stay all proceedings against the defendant, until they examine his circumstances ; for, it would have been useless and nugatory to direct that examination, if they were, nevertheless, bound by the contents of the affidavit.

Besides, upon the principles of common justice, it is material, that the court should have the power of making an inquiry into the facts ; for, .though the plaintiff’s opinion is taken, in the first instance, to ascertain whether there is a sufficient estate left for the payment of his demand ; yet it would be unreasonable, to deprive the defendant of his privilege, if he could after-wards show, that, independent of a trifling mortgage or judgment, an ample security was left for his adversary’s debt. Nor is the equity of the case less applicable upon the question of residence ; for, an occasional absence of a month, or a week, might with safety bo made the foundation of the affidavit required by the act; and, yet, who will say, that, in law or reason, this ought to work a disfranchisement of the defendant ?

The law is explicit, that if the court find the defendant is such as by the act is intended to be exempted, the writ shall be abated ; and this, surely, also implies something beyond a more inquiry, whether an affidavit has been previously filed. If he is such “ as by the act is intended to be exempted,” is a sentence materially to be regarded in the clause ; for, otherwise, it would have been sufficient to say, that if no affidavit is filed, nor any mortgage or judgment is produced, the defendant shall be discharged from the action.

It is e rident, upon the whole, that the legislature did not mean to subject a citizen of large estate to the process of a capias, on account of a short absence from the state ; and therefore, we are of opinion, that thty have left a controlling power in the court to inquire into the circumstances of the case, and to relieve a defendant from an arrest, if we think he was intended to be exempted, although the words, that he has not been resident, may be inserted in the plaintiff’s affidavit.

The defendant was, accordingly, allowed to controvert the fact, of his not being resident in the state for two years before the writ issued,

This case came before the court again, in the following September term, when the defendant having produced evidence to establish his residence, the rule to show cause why the writ should not be quashed, was made absolute. See the case, post, p. 348, Where, however, the plaintiff has made an affidavit that he had demanded security of the defendants, before issuing the writ, counter-evidence will not be admitted. Filler v. Harman, 2 Yeates 280; See also, Barnard v. Field, post, p. 348; Fitter v. La Bruere 1 S. & R. 363; Jack v. Shoemaker, 3 Binn. 280.

Public Domain Federal Judicial Work (17 U.S.C. § 105) · Harvard Law School Caselaw Access Project (CAP).