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Primer v. Kuhn

1 U.S. 452 1789-09 2,111 Words
Full Case Caption
Primer, Plaintiff in error, v. Kuhn
Official & Parallel Citations
1 Dall. 452 · 1 U.S. 452
Court & Volume
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · 1 U.S.

Syllabus & Case Posture

Primer, Plaintiff in error, v. Kuhn.

Bet-off.

The assignee of a bond given by an insolvent, who obtained his discharge after the bond became due, may set oil the bond against the price of goods purchased by him of the obligor, although the latter had no notice of the assignment, at the time of the purchase of the goods.

Kuhn v. Primer, ante, p. 226, reversed.

Error from the Common Pleas of Philadelphia county. On the trial of the cause below (see ante, p. 225), a bill of exceptions was taken to the opinion of the court, in the following words :

“ Trespass sur le ease, in the common pleas, Philadelphia county; and now, the 6th day of February 1788, upon the trial of this cause, the counsel for the defendant, under the pleas of non assumpsit, payment and defalcation, and in order to maintain the same issue, offered to give in evidence a certain bond or obligation of the said Ludwig Kuhn Sprout obligation), assigned Sprout assignment), entered into by the said plaintiff, before his discharge under the insolvent act, and prayed that the moneys thereon # , *due might be defalked against the said Ludwig Kuhn’s demand, J which, it was argued, had commenced after his said discharge. To this the counsel for the plaintiff objected, and prayed the court not to admit the same obligation and assignment thereof in evidence ; to which the court assented, and overruled the testimony. Whereupon, the said counsel for the defendant did, then and there, on behalf of said defendant, except to the said opinion of the court, and did, then and there, request of the said court to put their seals to this bill of exceptions, which was granted accordingly.”

Opinion of the Court — McKean, Chief Justice.

Primary Opinion

On the 3d of October, the Chief Justice, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court to the following effect:

McKean, Chief Justice.

As a dischax-ge under the insolvent laws, while it exempts the person from futui’e molestation, leaves the effects of the defendant for ever liable to the demands of his creditors, the discharge obtained by the defendant in error can have no operation in the decision of this cause.

A question has been made, whether the plaintiff in error might have de-falked his bond, under the English statutes ; the first of which takes notice-of mutual debts, &c. The judges there, were, indeed, of opinion, that only debts of the same dignity could be set off ; but for this, I can discover nc good and satisfactory reason ; and a remedy was afterwards provided by a subsequent statute, which declares, that debts of different n :»tures may be defalked.

The true ground, however, for the decision of this cause, arises from the construction of the several acts of assembly for the relief *of insolv- r*4gg ent debtors, for the assigning of bonds, and for defalcation ; and the L iast of these acts says, that “ if two or more dealing together (which words are not to be found in either of the English statutes) be indebted to each other, upon bonds, &c.,” when an action is commenced, the defendant may plead payment, and give his bond, &c., in evidence against the plaintiff’s demand.

If’then, the obligee could have defalked the bond in question (of which, we think, no doubt can reasonably be entertained), and he has legally assigned all his right and interest in it to the plaintiff in error, why should not the assignee be entitled to the same advantage, since the act for the assignment of bonds has placed him on the same footing.

There is another clause in the defalcation act, which provides, that where a plaintiff and defendant have accounts to produce one against another, they may refer them, and the report of the referees shall have the effect of a verdict; now, although the words are confined to the case of accounts, yet the construction of the act has liberally extended the right and benefit of such a reference, to every other cause of action. For the sake of justice, and to prevent an odious multiplication of suits, we think, that the same liberality should be exercised in the case before us; and are unanimously of opinion, that the judgment of the court below ought to be reversed.

Judgment reversed.

See Boinod v. Pelosi, 2 Dall. 43; Jacoby v. Guier, 6 S. & R. 448; Wilmarth v. Mountford, 8 Id. 124; Richter v. Selin, Id. 425; Marshal v. Sheridan, 10 Id. 268.

Precedents Cited (1)

Public Domain Federal Judicial Work (17 U.S.C. § 105) · Harvard Law School Caselaw Access Project (CAP).