Respublica v. Sparhawk
Syllabus & Case Posture
Respublica v. Sparhawk.
War powers.
During the war of the revolution, congress had a right to direct the removal of any articles that were necessary to the continental army, or useful to the enemy, and in danger of falling into their hands; and one, whose property, so removed, was afterwards captured by the enemy, was held not to be entitled to compensation from the commonwealth.
Tnis was an appeal from the comptroller-general’s decision, on the trial of which, by consent of the attorney-general, Sparhawk was considered as plaintiff. There was a verdict and judgment nisi for the commonwealth, when IngersoU obtained a rule to show cause why a new trial should not be granted.
The ease was this : Congress, perceiving that it was the intention of the British army to possess themselves of Philadelphia, and being informed that considerable deposits of provisions, &c., were made in that city, entered into a resolution, on the 11th of April 1777, that “a committee should be appointed to examine into the truth of their information ; and, if it was found true, to take effectual measures, in conjunction with the Pennsylvania board' of war, to prevent such provisions from falling into the hands of the enemy.”
On the 13th of the same month, the Pennsylvania boarpl of war, in aid of this resolution, addressed a circular letter to a number of citizens in each ward of the city, requesting them “ to obtain from every family a return of the provisions, &c., then in possession, and the number of persons that composed the families, respectively, in order that proper measures might bo pursued for removing any unnecessary quantity of supplies to a place of security.” At the same time, it was mentioned, that “ this proceeding was not intended to alter or divest the property in the articles removed; but on the contrary, that the same should be, at all times, liable to the order of the respective owners, provided they we^e not exposed to be taken by the enemy.”
Opinion of the Court — McKean, Chief Justice.
Primary OpinionThe Chief Justice, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court as follows :
McKean, Chief Justice.
On the circumstances of this case, two points arise : 1st, Whether the appellant ought to receive any compensation, or not ? And 2d, Whether this court can grant the relief which is claimed ?
Upon the first point, we are to be governed by reason, by the law of nations, and by precedents analogous to the subject before us. The transaction, it must be remembered, happened flagrante bello; and many things are lawful in that season, which would not be permitted in a time of peace. The seizure of the property in question, can, indeed, only be justified under this distinction ; for, otherwise, it would clearly have been a trespass ; which, from the very nature of the term, transgressio, imports to go beyond what is right. 5 Bac. Abr. 150. It is a rule, however, that it is better to suffer a private mischief, than a public inconvenience ; and the rights of necessity, form a part of our law.
*Of this principle, there are many striking illustrations. If a road be out of repair, a passenger may lawfully go through a private inclosure. 2 Black. Com. 36. So, if a man is assaulted, he may fly through another’s close. 5 Bac. Abr. 173. In time of war, bulwarks may be built on private ground (Dyer 8; Brook., Trespass, 213; 5 Bac. Abr. 175); and the reason assigned is particularly applicable to the present case, because it is for the public safety (20 Vin. Abr., Trespass, B. a, § 4, fo. 476). Thus, also, every man may, of common right, justify the going of his servants or horses, upon the banks of navigable rivers, for towing barges, &c., to whomsoever the right of the soil belongs. 1 Ld. Raym. 725. The pursuit of foxes through another’s ground is allowed, because the destruction of such animals is for the public good. 2 Buls. 62; Cro. Jac. 321. And, as the safety of the people is a law above all others, it is lawful to part affrayers, in the house of another man. Kelyng 46; 5 Bac. Abr. 177; 20 Vin. Abr. fo. 407, § 14. Houses may be razed, to prevent the spreading of fire, because for the publio good. Dyer 36; Rud. L. and Eq. 312; See Puff. lib. 2; c. 6, § 8; Hutch. Mor. Philos, lib. 2, c. 16. We find, indeed, a memorable instance of folly recorded in the 3 vol. of Clarendon’s History, where it is mentioned, that the Lord Mayor of London, in 1666, when that city was on fire, would not give directions for, nor consent to, the pulling down forty wooden houses, or to the removing the furniture, &c., belonging to the lawyers of the temple, then on the circuit, for fear he should be answerable for a trespass ; and in consequence of this conduct, half that great city was burnt.
We are clearly of opinion, that congress might lawfully direct the removal of any articles that were necessary to the maintenance of the continental army, or useful to the enemy, and in danger of falling into their hands; for they were vested with the powers of peace and war, to which this was a natural and necessary incident: and having done it lawfully, there is nothing in the circumstances of the case, which, we think, entitles the appellant to a compensation for the consequent loss.
With respect to the second point: This court ha» authority to confirm or alter any proceedings that come properly before the comptroller-general; but if he had no jurisdiction, we can have none. It appears, then, that his power is expressly limited to claims “ for services performed, moneys advanced, or articles furnished,” by order of the legislature, or the executive council. And, as he has no right to adjudge a compensation from the state for damages, which individuals may have suffered in the course of our military operations, we are of opinion, that we could grant no relief, even if the aj>pellant was entitled to it.
Bv the Court. — Let the rule be discharged ; and the judgment for the commonwealth be made absolute.