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South Carolina v. Gaillard

101 U.S. 433 1879-10 2,473 Words
Full Case Caption
South Carolina v. Gaillard
Official & Parallel Citations
101 U.S. 433 Β· 25 L. Ed. 937
Court & Volume
Supreme Court of the United States Β· 101 U.S.

Syllabus & Case Posture

South Carolina v. Gaillard.

1. The act of the General Assembly of South Carolina, passed June 9, 1877, entitled β€œ An Act to provide the mode of proving bills of the bank of the -State tendered for taxes, and the rules of evidence applicable thereto,” created no new contract between the State and the tax-payer or bill-holder, but merely provided a new remedy which formed no part of the contrait created by the charter of the bank.

2. After that act was repealed, a party could not institute a proceeding to avail himself of the remedy which it furnished, and all suits then pending thereunder terminated, there being no saving clause as to them.

Error to the Supreme Court of the State of South Carolina.

The facts of this case are as follows: β€”

In December, 1812, the State of South Carolina established a bank in the name and for the benefit of the State, and pledged the faith of the State to supply any deficiency in the funds specially set apart as its capital, and to make good any losses arising from such deficiency. The bank was authorized to issue notes and bills for circulation, and by sect. 16 it was provided β€œ that the bills or notes of the said corporation originally made payable, or which have become payable on demand in gold and silver coin, shall be receivable at the treasury of this State, either at Charleston or Columbia, and by all tax collectors, and other public officers in payment of taxes and other moneys due the State.” The original charter was extended from time to time, and the bank continued in successful operation until the late civil war. At'the close of the war it stopped business, and in- 1868 the charter was repealed and provision made for winding up its affairs. Under the operation of this law a large amount of the circulating notes was surrendered to the State and bonds of the State taken in exchange therefor. The time for presenting bills to be exchanged expired Jan. 1, 1869, and only such bills as were issued prior to Dec. 20, 1860, the date of the adoption of the ordinance of secession by South Carolina, could be presented at all. A considerable amount of bills issued before the repeal of the charter are still outstanding.

Opinion of the Court β€” Mr. Chief Justice Waite,

Primary Opinion

Mr. Chief Justice Waite,

after stating the facts, delivered the opinion of the court.

No question is raised in this case as to whether or not the act of 1877 impaired the obligation of the contract of the State, which is contained in the bills of the bank, or the charter. By accepting the act and bringing suit under it,' Trenholm conceded its validity. He contends, however, that when he tendered his bills in payment of his taxes, and so far complied with the provisions of that act as to allow the bills to be deposited with the clerk of the court to abide the result of any proceeding that might be instituted in regard to them, the State entered into a new contract with him, by which it agreed to accept his bills in payment of his taxes if he established their validity in the way provided. It is the obligation of this- alleged new contract which he claims has been impaired by the act of 1878.

We cannot find from the record that this question was presented in this precise form to the Supreme Court of the State, but it was undoubtedly involved in the case, and must have been decided directly or indirectly. No other question has been argued here.

As we look upon the act of. 1877, it does no more than provide a way of determining whether bills offered in payment of taxes are binding on the State. It provides a remedy in case a county treasurer shall wrongfully refuse to accept a bill that is offered him. It is, in fact, what its title says it is, β€œ An Act to prescribe the mode of proving bills of tne bank of the State tendered for ta;',es, and the rules of evidence applicable thereto.” It makes no offer of a new contract to a tax-payer or bill-holder, but simply says to him, if your bills are any time refused when offered in payment of taxes, you may proceed in a certain way to compel their acceptance if they are genuine and valid. There is no new contract, but a new way of enforcing an old one.

By the act of 1878 the remedy thus given has been taken away, with no saving in favor of tenders already made, except to give those who have made such tenders the right to pay their taxes under protest, without penalty, in sixty days, and sue to recover back what they have thus paid. They have still all their old remedies unless they have been taken away by the act of 1878, which is not the question here. All we have to decide is, whether that act has taken away from Trenholm the remedy he had under the one of 1877.

The new remedy formed no part of the charter contract of the State. Passed, as the act was, long after the charter was granted, and long after all the outstanding bills of the bank were issued, the State was restrained by no contract obligation from taking away or changing the remedy it- then gave. All the cases in this court, where the question has arisen, agree in holding that β€œ the States may change the remedy, provided no substantial right secured by the contract is impaired.” It is enough if the contract is β€œ left with the same force and effect, including the substantial means of enforcement, which existed when it was made. The guaranty of the Constitution gives it protection to that extent. Walker v. Whitehead, 16 Wall. 314; Tennessee v. Sneed, 96 U. S. 69.

We agree with the Supreme Court of the State that the β€œ proceeding ” contemplated by the act of 1877 was not β€œ instituted ” when the repeal took place. The tender and deposit of the bills laid the foundation for the authorized proceeding, but did not institute it. This is clear from the language. The bills- are to be deposited β€œ to abide the decision of- the court in any proceeding which may le instituted,” thus implying that when the deposit was made proceedings had not been instituted. These proceedings may be β€œ by mandamus or otherwise to compel the reception of the bills.” The taxes are not paid by the tender. If the acceptance of the tender Β‘can be enforced, then the payment will be complete, but not before. This tender was made when a special remedy for its enforcement was allowed. Before Trenholm availed himself of that remedy it was taken away, and he was remitted to such as he had before this act, or such as were substituted on the repeal, if that rightfully took away those which existed when the charter contract was made. But whether this be so or not is unimportant, because it is well settled that if a statute giving a special remedy is repealed without a saving clause in favor of pending suits, all suits must stop where the repeal finds them. If final relief has not been granted before the repeal went into effect, it cannot be after. Railroad Company v. Grant, 98 U. S. 398, and cases there cited. The simple question in this case is, whether this repeal was valid and constitutional as against Trenholm and his rights. We think it was.

Judgment affirmed.

Precedents Cited (3)

Cited By Later Decisions (3)

Public Domain Federal Judicial Work (17 U.S.C. Β§ 105) Β· Harvard Law School Caselaw Access Project (CAP).