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Railway Co. v. Renwick

102 U.S. 180 1880-10 1,195 Words
Full Case Caption
Railway Company v. Renwick
Official & Parallel Citations
102 U.S. 180 · 26 L. Ed. 51
Court & Volume
Supreme Court of the United States · 102 U.S.

Syllabus & Case Posture

Railway Company v. Renwick.

The second section of the act of the General Assembly of Iowa, entitled “ An Act in relation to riparian owners on the Mississippi and Missouri Rivers,” approved March 18, 1874, is not in conflict with any statute of the United States. Where, therefore, the owner of lands on the Mississippi had made an embankment in front of them, and at its outer end beyond low-water mark erected, without the direction or consent of the Secretary of War, a stone pier or crib, this court affirms the judgment of the Supreme Court of that State, declaring that under that section a railway^company cannot construct its road over the embankment between high and low water mark, unless the damages to such owner shall first be-ascertained and paid.

.Motion to dismiss a writ of error to the Supreme Cour; of the State of Iowa, coupled with a motion under Rule 6 to affirm the judgment.

This was, a proceeding; under the. statute of Iowa, by the Davenport and Northwestern Railway Company for the assessment of damages sustained by its appropriating lands for the construction of its road. Among others is a' strip situate in the city of Davenport between high and low water mark on the Mississippi River. It fronts certain lots, on which were erected a steam saw-mill, a planing-mill, and other houses. Renwick and others were in possession of the lots, and they or those under whom they claimed had made an embankment extending therefrom into the river, and erected at the end of it a stone pier, without having obtained the consent or direction of the Secretary of War. A boom was thus formed for holding logs in front of and convenient to the mill. The line of the railroad passes over this embankment between high and low water mark.

The railway company- was authorized by law to construct its road, and the city of Davenpprt gave its consent to laying the tracks within-its limits.

A judgment, rendered against the company by the Scott Circuit Court for the damages aforesaid, was affirmed by the Supreme Court. This writ of error, was then sued out.

Opinion of the Court — Mb. Chief Justice Waite

Primary Opinion

Mb. Chief Justice Waite

delivered the-.'opinion of the court.

Although the Supreme Court of Iowa decided that Congress, under the power to regulate commerce, had jurisdiction over the Mississippi River, and having exercised that power in the way specified in sect. 5254, Rev. Stat., all State legislation in conflict therewith was void, still the question remains, whether, if a riparian proprietor improves his property with a view to its use in connection with the river, without complying with this act of Congress, a railroad company, under the power of eminent domain granted by the State, can appropriate his improvements to its own use without his consent and without making him'compensation. This, we think, is a Federal question giving us jurisdiction, but it is a question on which we do not cáre to hear argument. The controversy is not between the public and the riparian owner as to his right to keep, up his improvements. The public does not complain, but the railroad company wants the improvements. In the hands of the company they .will be just as much a nuisance, so far as the public is concerned,' as they can be if kept up by the owner. As between these two parties the improvements are. the property of the riparian proprietor, and if the company wants them for its own use it must make compensation. So the ¡court below has decided, and to our minds its decision was clearly right. While in Iowa it has been held that the State owns the lands lying along, the river between high and low water mark, care was taken in the act of March 18, 1874, to provide that it should not be lawful for any person or corporation to construct or operate any railroad or other obstruction between the shore and the river without compensation to the shore owners. The second section of the act is good, eve'n though the first may conflict with what Congress had before doné.

The motion to dismiss is denied, but that to affirm granted.

Judgment affirmed.

Cited By Later Decisions (5)

Public Domain Federal Judicial Work (17 U.S.C. § 105) · Harvard Law School Caselaw Access Project (CAP).