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Maryland Insurance v. Roy

11 U.S. 26 1812-02-22 2,038 Words
Full Case Caption
MARYLAND INSURANCE COMPANY v. LE ROY, BAYARD & M'EVERS
Official & Parallel Citations
7 Cranch 26 · 11 U.S. 26 · 3 L. Ed. 257
Court & Volume
Supreme Court of the United States · 11 U.S.

Syllabus & Case Posture

MARYLAND INSURANCE COMPANY v. LE ROY, BAYARD & M'EVERS.

Msent.,..Marshall, chief justice.

The discharge omtheiiliability, in fiase of taking go, not authopoUcy%e-e pends) not on any supposed increase of risk, but whoiiy oñ the de■Fnañre'd from.6 the contact Theconse-8' quences of of the extract are immaterial The discharge to,¡ts legal ef11 ^ charge ofithe underwriters; attLhesnoimporuñee to - tary deviation, ^“s^sanc [¡0°„ ¿ deviation in any case; muftbe strictly com- ‘ major proLe-Wit.

ERROR to the Circuit Court for the district of Maryland, in an action of covenant brought by Le Roy and others, against thé Maryland Insurance Company, up0H a policy of insurance upon the Ship John, from York to five ports on the coast of “Africa, be“tween Castle D’Minina and Cape Lopez, including those “ports, and at and from them, or either of them, back to New York with liberties as per order for insurance.”

•» /» » 0 The order, of insurance was as follows, viz: «At « what rate will you insure three thousand five hundred “ dollars upon freight of the ship John of New York, “valued at-that sum, at and from New York to Castle “ Elmina, on the gold coast of Africa, with liberty “for tlie vessel to touch at the Cape de Verd Islands for “ ^1C Purchase °f stock, such as hogs, goats and poultry “ and taking in water ?

« Mso, nine thousand dollars on the American ship « John, valued at this sum; and eleven thousand eight «hundred dollars on cargo by said ship consisting of “wine, rum, beef, geneva, dry goods, tobacco, mo«lasses, &c. at and from New York to five ports on the .«coast of Africa, between Castle D’Elreina and « Lopez, including, those ports, with liberty of touching « and trading at all, or any of said' ports, «and forwards, and at and from her last port on the «coast, to New York, with liberty. of touching at the «Capede Verds on her return passage, for stock and «take in water. It is understood that the captain re«turning to one or more ports that he had touched and «traded at before, shall not be considered a deviation, «The John was ready and expected to sail the 13th «inst¿ There are no cantraband goods on board, and «the ship is armed with eight carriage guns, with am«munition in proportion, and is an excellent vessel and •f captain Lawrence, who commands her, is a native of «New York, well asquainted on the coast of «and has been at most of the places it is intended the «vessel is to stop at,.and is a careful experienced'sea- « man.”

Opinion of the Court — Johnson J.

Primary Opinion

Johnson J.

delivered the opinion of the Com í as follows :

In deciding on this cause the Court will confine itself to the' case made out on the 7th exception. Its decision on the point presented by that exception disposes of the case finally.

The opinion prayed for was, that, by taking in, at Fogo, an additional cargo, not sanctioned by the contract of insurance, the insurers were discharged from their liability under the policy.. The charge, delivered by the Court, was, that the • subsequent liability of the underwriters must depend upon the question, whether any increase of risk resulted from the shipping of that additional cargo.

, In this charge, this Court are of opinion, that 'the Court below err$d.

The discharge of the underwriters from their liability in such cases, depends, not upo» any supposed increase of risk, but d,'holly on the departure of the insured from' the contract of insurance. The consequences of such violation of the contract aré immaterial to its legal effect, as it is, per se, a discharge of the underwriters, and the law attaches no importance to the degree in cases of voluntary deviation $ necessity alone can sanction a deviation in any case; and that deviation must be strictly commensurate with the vis major producing it. The case of Rayne and Bell has been cited as supporting a contrary doctrine.

Without being understood to acquiesce in the corred» nessofthat decision, it may be remarked that the question was not, in that case, whether the lading, taken in at Gibralier, was within the terms of the policy, as in the present. — - but what acts were lawful .to he dope during the delay occasioned-by a justifiable cause of deviation. On the contrary, the case of Sheriff (ind Potts was a case of voluntary departure from the stipulations of the policy, and the decision supports the opinion we now give. It may also bereraarked, that, in the case óf Rayne and Bell the notice which Lord Ellenborough takes of. the case of Sheriff and Potts, virtually admits the doctrine upop which this Court founds its decision.

The terms of this policy so far as connected- with this decision, are, « with liberty of touching at the Cape do ,*e Verd islands, on her outward passage, for stock, and «to take in water.’* Touching, in its nautical sense, is known to be the most restrictive word that can be adopted in such a case. Construing the license according to the subject matter, and in its necessary connection with the offer on the freight, it could mean no more than permission to provision the vessel with live stock, súch as is usual on a voyage, and may be. procured at the Cape de Verds,

It might, indeed, admit of a doubt whether any of the larger animals used for food, were included within the policy. The words of the first offer certainly were intended to confine the .permission to the smaller animals. Stock is a term of the most general import: In its present extended, application, it would include a great variety of subjects that never could have entered into contemplation of the parties.

In what sense was the term used ? Is the question to be decided: not what uses it might have beeti applied to in other contracts, or between other parties. The general want of precision in the language of maritime con-: tracts, is an endless source of litigation among mercantile men. . Courts of justice are therefore obliged to resort to such reasons as the nature, object and terms of the contract present, to determine the precise extent, of the obligation of the parties.

We feel no inclination to add to the number of causes: which vitiate a policy j but the amount of the premium depends upon such a variety of considerations, (as often suggested by caprice as by judgment,) that the-contract,, whatever it is, must be substantially adhered to.

Judgment reversed*

Cited By Later Decisions (3)

Public Domain Federal Judicial Work (17 U.S.C. § 105) · Harvard Law School Caselaw Access Project (CAP).