McCall v. Marine Insurance
Syllabus & Case Posture
McCall et al. v. Marine Insurance Company.
Ma/rine insurance. — Loss hy iloehade.
If a policy insures against “ unlawful arrests, restraints and detainments of ail kings, princes,” &e., the qualification, “unlawful,” extends in its operation as well to “restraints and detainments ” as to “ arrests and in such case, a detainment by a force lawfully blockading a port, Is not a peril insured against, by a policy containing a warranty of neutrality.
Error to the Circuit Court for the district of Maryland. This was an action on a policy underwritten by the defendants, upon all kinds of lawful goods and merchandise, on board the ship Cordelia, on a voyage from the Island of Teneriffe, to Surabaya, and at and from *thence to Philadelphia, warranted American property. L
The ship sailed on the voyage, on the 5th of April 1811, having on board a cargo of lawful goods, the property of the plaintiffs, of the value of $15,000, and pursued the voyage until the 18th of July following, when, being in a place called Madura Bay, within about twelve hours’ sail of Surabaya, she was boarded by an officer of a British frigate, forming one of a squadron, then actually blockading the port of Surabaya, and all the other ports of the islands of Java and Madura. The frigate took possession of the Cordelia, and conducted her to the admiral commanding the blockading squadron, who, on the next day, dismissed the Cordelia, after indorsing her papers, and warning the master not to enter the port of Surabaya, or any other port in the island of Java, or of the island of Madura, on pain of capture.
On the same day, the Cordelia made another attempt to enter Surabaya, but was chased by the same British frigate, and taken possession of a second time. After being detained two days, the Cordelia was again released, and the master was ordered to depart instantly from the coast of Java, and the neighborhood of Surabaya, upon penalty of capture, and impressment of his men. The master, finding it impracticable to pursue his voyage further, resolved to return to Philadelphia, where he arrived on the 19th of November 1811. At the time of sailing on the voyage from Teneriffe, the blockade of Java was unknown to the parties.
Opinion of the Court — Story, J.,
Primary OpinionStory, J.,
after stating the facts of the case, the opinion of the court, as follows : — The court below, at the trial, held that the plaintiff, under the circumstances, was not entitled to abandon as for a total loss ; and the correctness of that opinion remains for the decision of this court.
Whether the turning away of a ship from the port of destination, in consequence of a blockade, be, in any case, a good cause for abandonment, so as to entitle the assured to recover from the underwriter, as for a total loss, by the breaking up of the voyage ; and if so, whether the doctrine could apply to a policy, with a warranty of neutrality, the legal effect of such warranty being to compel the party to abandon the voyage, if it cannot be pursued consistent with neutrality, are questions of great importance, upon which the court do not think it necessary to express any opinion, because this cause may well be decided upon an independent ground.
The loss of the voyage, in the case at bar, was occasioned (if at all) by the arrest and restraint of the British blockading squadron. The right to blockade an enemy’s port with a competent force, is a right secured to every belligerent by the law of nations. No neutral can, after knowledge of such blocakde, lawfully enter, or attempt to enter, the blockaded port. It would be a violation of neutral character, which, according to established usages, would subject the property engaged therein to the penalty of confiscation. In such a case, therefore, the arrest and restraint of neutral ships attempting to enter the port, is a lawful arrest and restraint by the blockading squadron. It would follow, therefore, from this consideration, that the arrest and restraint, on account of which a recovery is now sought, is not a risk within the policy, against which the underwriter has engaged to indemnify the plaintiff.
*But it is contended by the counsel for the plaintiff, in order to escape from this conclusion, that the word “ unlawful,” in the policy, is confined in its operation to arrests, and does not extend to “ restraints and detainments.” To this construction, the court cannot assent. The grammatical order of the words and the coherence of the sentence require a different construction. It is not against every “ unlawful arrest ” that the underwriter undertakes to indemnify, but against “ unlawful arrests, &c., of all kings, princes and people,” which have always been held to mean the arrests of kings, princes or people, in their sovereign and national capacity, and not as individuals. The necessary connection of the sentence, therefore, requires that “arrests, restraints and detainments,” should be coupled together ; and if so, the qualification of unlawful must be annexed to them all. The intent of the parties also urges to the same conclusion ; for every arrest is a restraint and detainment; and it would be strange, if tbe party could, under the allegation of a restraint, recover a loss from which the underwriter is expressly exempted by an unambiguous exception in the policy. On the whole, the court are of opinion, that the judgment of the circuit court must be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.