The Pitt
Syllabus & Case Posture
*The Pitt: McNutt, Claimant.
Navigation laws. — Continuity of voyage.
The non-intercourse act of the 18th of April 1818, c. 65, prohibits the coming of British vessels to the ports of the United States, from a British port closed against the commerce of the United States, either directly, or through an open British port; but it does not prohibit the coming of such vessels from a British closed' port, through a foreign port (not British) where the continuity of the voyage is fairly broken.
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Delaware. This was an allegation of forfeiture, in the district court of Delaware, against the British sloop Pitt, under the non-intercourse act of April 18th, 1818, c. 65, the first section of which provides, “ that from and after the 30th of September next, the ports of the United States shall be and remain closed against every vessel, owned, wholly or in part, by a subject or subjects of his Britannic majesty, coming or arriving from any port or place in a colony or territory of his Britannic majesty, that is, or shall be, by the ordinary laws of navigation and trade, closed against vessels owned by citizens of the United States ; and such vessel that, in the course of the voyage, shall have touched at, or cleared out from, any port or place in a colony or territory of Great Britain, which shall, or may, by the laws of navigation and trade aforesaid, be open to vessels owned by citizens of the United States, shall, nevertheless, be deemed to *kave come from the port or place in the colony or territory of Great Britain, closed as aforesaid against vessels owned by citizens of the United States, from which such vessel cleared out and sailed, before touching and clearing out from an intermediate and open port or place as aforesaid ; and every such vessel, so excluded from the ports of the United States, that shall enter, or attempt to enter, the same, in violation of this act, shall, with her tackle, apparel and furniture, together with the cargo on board such vessel, be forfeited to the United States.”
The vessel in question, belonging to British subjects in the island of Jamaica, departed from the port of Kingston, in that island, on the 16th of August 1818, with a cargo belonging to the same owners, and a clearance for San Bias, and arrived at Old Providence, a small Spanish island on the coast of Honduras, on the 22d of the same month. At this island, the cargo was discharged, and another taken in, consisting principally of Caraccas cocoa, fustic and Spanish hides. She sailed from thence, on the 6th of September following, with orders to come to anchor off the light-house at Cape Henlopen, the western cape of the Delaware bay, and there wait instructions from the agents of the owners at Philadelphia. The vessel arrived off Fenwick’s island, about 30 miles south of the Delaware, on the 29th of September 1818, when a pilot boarded her, and delivered to the master written instructions from the agents of the ownei’S, not to enter the Delaware, but to proceed to Halifax or Bermuda. But the master *sta^ec^ that his bread and water were insufficient for the voyage, and proceeded, off the capes of the Delaware, to procure a supply of those articles, but was compelled (as alleged) by stress of weather, on the 1st of October, 1818, to put into the Whorekiln roads, opposite to Lewiston, where the vessel was seized by the officers of the revenue for a breach of the act before mentioned.
The district court pronounced a decree of condemnation, which was reversed in the circuit court, and the case was then brought by appeal to this court.
Opinion of the Court — JOHNSON, Justice,
Primary OpinionJOHNSON, Justice,
delivered the opinion of the court. —This vessel, with her cargo, was condemned in the district court of Delaware, for a violation of the act of April 1818, entitled, “ an act concerning navigation.” That decree having been reversed in the circuit court, the cause is now brought up by appeal to this court.
Several grounds, in support of the latter adjudication, have been insisted 011 *n argument 5 but *the court deem it unnecessary to advert to more than one, as that will dispose of the case finally, and fix the most important point which it presents, to wit, the correct construction of the first section of the act in question. We are unanimously of opinion, that the construction insisted on by the claimant’s counsel, is the only correct construction. It is perfectly clear, that the case of this vessel is not literally comprised within the provisions of this act; for it only prohibits a voyage from a closed port of Great Britain to a port of the United States ; and the purport and effect of the latter part of the first clause, amounts to no more than a declaration, that the continuity of such voyage shall not be broken by the act of touching at, or clearing out from, any port of a colony or territory of Great Britain 'which may be open to American shipping.
But it has been contended, in behalf of the appellants, that although not within the letter, it is within the mischief intended to be obviated by the statute, and, therefore, subject to the penalty. If, by this argument, it be intended to maintain, that acts done in fraud of a.law, are acts in violation of the law, the principle may be conceded ; but we fully concur in the views of the policy of this law, as explained by the claimant’s counsel, and are satisfied, that the latter provisions of the first clause were solely intended to guard against the effects which the permission of a general trade at one or more of the British colonial ports, may have had in defeating the policy of the act altogether. The legislature had not in view a fair *unaffected trade through the ports of any other nation. It is obvious, that attempts might have been made to evade the law, by an affected trade through an intermediate port; and it is not to be supposed, that this government, or its courts, would have failed to check such an attempt; but we are fully satisfied, that this was not such a case. The evidence of fairness is full and unequivocal. There was time, even upon ordinary calculation, to have completed the voyage from Jamaica to Old Providence, and thence to Philadelphia, before the prohibition was by law to take effect, as is proved by the fact of her having arrived in the Delaware, at a time which left it doubtful whether she was, or was not, within the period specified for its suspension. The cargo, too, was taken in at the port of Old Providence, and was of a description well known to belong to the trade of that port, from its having been the depot of captures, and probably of a covered trade from the continent of South America. Everything conspires to exempt the vessel from the charge of fraudulent intention, and therefore, leaves no ground for the condemnation.
Decree of the circuit court affirmed.