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Gwinn v. Buchanan, Hagan, & Co. ex rel. William Holliday & Co.

45 U.S. 1 1846-01 1,185 Words
Full Case Caption
William M. Gwinn, Marshal, Plaintiff in error, v. Buchanan, Hagan, & Co., for the use of William Holliday & Co.
Official & Parallel Citations
4 How. 1 · 45 U.S. 1 · 11 L. Ed. 849
Court & Volume
Supreme Court of the United States · 45 U.S.

Syllabus & Case Posture

William M. Gwinn, Marshal, Plaintiff in error, v. Buchanan, Hagan, & Co., for the use of William Holliday & Co.

A plaintiff has a right to direct a deputy-marshal to receive a certain description of money in satisfaction of an execution.

But the deputy-marshal then acts as agent of the plaintiff, and not as agent of. the marshal.

If, therefore, the plaintiff, when he does this, gives to the deputy-marshal other instructions, which are disobeyed, the marshal himself is not responsible, but the plaintiff must look to the deputy.

This case was brought up, by writ óf error, from the Circuit Court of the United States for the. District of Mississippi.

A judgment was obtained in that, court, at May tern', 1839, by the. defendants in error agáinst Ephraim Gwinn and Jemes Ballance, for the sum of $ 2,679*88, with interest at the rate of eight per cent., from the 27th of May, 1839, until paid, and costs.

Opinion of the Court — Mr. Chief-Justice TANEY

Primary Opinion

Mr. Chief-Justice TANEY

delivered the opinion of the court.

As .a general principle, it is undoubtedly true, that the marshal is responsible fcr the acts of his deputy in the execution of process ; and if the deputy had taken the funds mentioned in .the testimony without any orders from the . plaintiffs, or their attorney, ancbretUrned the execution satisfied, tne plaintiffs would not have been bound to accept these, funds in discharge of their judgment, and might have insisted on the full amount from the marshal in gold and silver.

But it is clear, that the plaintiffs had a right to accept in payment of their execution whatever they thought proper. The deputy-marshal was bound to obey their directions-upon that subject ;'and neither the deputy nor the marshal can be held responsible to the plaintiffs for any loss they may sustain by reason of an act done in pursuance of their own instructions.

But the plaintiffs seem to suppose that the authority given to the deputy was not pursued, and that the payment of the money to them without delay was a condition annexed to the authority, which had been disregarded by the deputy. But however tins may be, as between him and the plaintiffs, the act or omission of the deputy in that respect cannot make the marshal himself liable. Gwinn knew nothing of the directions given by the plaintiffs’ attorney. So far as Ferguson was acting as deputy-marshal, he had no right to receive, in payment of the debt, any thing but gold and silver. He had no authority from the marshal to take any thing else. But when the plaintiffs interfered, and directed him to receive the funds above mentioned, he was, in receiving such funds, not acting under the authority of the marshal as his deputy, but as agent of the plaintiffs; . And if, in executing the power they gave him, he disobeyed their instructions, they must look to him, and not to the marshal, who knew nothing of these instructions, had no concern with them, and who cannot, therefore, upon principles of law or equity, be held responsible for the manner in which they were executed.

The judgment of the Circuit Court must, therefore, be reversed; with costs.

Public Domain Federal Judicial Work (17 U.S.C. § 105) · Harvard Law School Caselaw Access Project (CAP).