Heckler v. Redbud Hospital District
Syllabus & Case Posture
HECKLER, SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES v. REDBUD HOSPITAL DISTRICT
No. A-32.
Decided July 24, 1985
Opinion of the Court â Justice Rehnquist, Circuit Justice.
Primary OpinionJustice Rehnquist, Circuit Justice.
Applicant, the Secretary of Health and Human Services (Secretary), asks that I stay an order entered by the United States District Court for the Northern District of California pending disposition of her appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. This suit began as a challenge by the operator of a single hospital, Redbud Hospital District (Red-bud), to its Medicare reimbursement rate. In addition to affording Redbud itself preliminary relief, the District Court, in a âpreliminary injunctionâ dated July 30, 1984, and a âmodificationâ of that injunction dated June 14, 1985, required the Secretary to promulgate, by July 1, 1985, nationwide regulations providing hospitals like Redbud with rights to immediate administrative review and enhanced reimbursement for inpatient services. On June 28, 1985, a two-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit denied the Secretaryâs request for an emergency stay. On July 1, 1985, the Secretary published the regulations in question âunder protest.â 50 Fed. Reg. 27208, to be codified in 42 CFR § 412. Absent a stay, these regulations will go into effect on August 1, 1985. After considering both the Secretaryâs application and Red-budâs response, I have decided to grant in part and deny in part the Secretaryâs request for a stay.
Section 1886(d) of the Social Security Act, added by the Social Security Amendments Act of 1983, Pub. L. 98-21,97 Stat. 152, 42 U. S. C. §1395ww(d) (1982 ed., Supp. I), established a prospective payment system (PPS) for Medicare payment to hospitals furnishing inpatient services to Medicare beneficiaries. Under this system, payment is made at a predetermined rate for each hospital discharge. The rate is based in part on a âhospital specificâ rate, which in turn is based on the hospitalâs actual operating costs during a particular âbase year.â See 42 U. S. C. § 1395ww(d)(l) (1982 ed., Supp. I). The Secretary has delegated to âfiscal intermediariesâ the responsibility for calculating the hospital-specific rate for each of the hospitals participating in the Medicare program.
Redbud, the operator of a sole community hospital in Cleardale, California, brought this suit against the Secretary on June 26, 1984, challenging the fiscal intermediaryâs determination of Redbudâs hospital-specific rate. Redbud alleged that it would suffer losses of approximately $20,000 per month unless its hospital-specific rate were adjusted to reflect recent capital improvements completed after the close of its base year. In its prayer for relief, Redbud requested (1) a declaratory judgment that the Secretary must allow the intermediary to adjust Redbudâs hospital-specific rate to account for costs not reflected in the base year, (2) a preliminary and permanent injunction barring the Secretary âfrom implementing Medicare reimbursement to Redbud under PPS unless such reimbursement accounts forâ those costs, and (3) an order requiring the Secretary âto instruct the intermediary to account for [those] costs.â Redbud did not seek the promulgation of nationwide regulations.
The Secretary moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that Redbud had not obtained a final agency determination properly subject to either administrative or judicial review, and that the court therefore had no jurisdiction over Redbudâs claim. Apparently in response to this motion, Redbud then requested a hearing before the Provider Reimbursement Review Board (Board) to review the intermediaryâs refusal to make the requested adjustments to Redbudâs hospital-specific rate. On July 17, 1984, the Board sent a response stating that, pursuant to a ruling of the Health Care Financing Administration, 49 Fed. Reg. 22413 (1984), it was âunable to acceptâ Redbudâs request for a hearing because that request was premature. On July 30, 1984, the District Court denied the Secretaryâs motion to dismiss, holding that it had âjurisdiction under 42 U. S. C. § 1395oo to review the Boardâs decision of July 17, 1984.â The District Court went on to state that it âalso has jurisdiction under the All Writs Act to issue an injunction maintaining the status quo in this case pending agency action. â Relying on these jurisdictional findings, the District Court then entered a âpreliminary injunctionâ that âremandedâ the case to the Secretary with instructions to promulgate âregulations or written policiesâ that (a) âtake into accountâ the âextraordinary and unusual costs not necessarily reflected in a hospitalâs base year costsâ; (b) âtake into account the special needs of hospitals serving a disproportionate number of Medicare and low-income patientsâ; (c) âtake into account . . . the special needs of sole community hospitals and the unique effects of their status upon the hospital-specific rateâ; and (d) âprovide for timely and reasonable reviewâ of intermediary estimates of hospital-specific rates under the PPS program. As to Redbud itself, the District Court ordered Redbudâs intermediary to âreconsiderâ its estimate of Redbudâs hospital-specific rate
âin light of regulations promulgated in accordance with the foregoing.
âPending compliance with this order and until further order of the court, defendant is enjoined from imposing the pre-payment system upon [Redbud] or otherwise reducing [RedbudJâs current level of reimbursement.â
No date was set for compliance with the âpreliminary injunction.â
In the spring of 1985, the parties filed a number of motions in the District Court, all of which were heard on May 20, 1985. Redbud asked, inter alia, that the court modify the âpreliminary injunctionâ by requiring the Secretary to publish, by July 1, 1985, the âregulations or written policiesâ described in the courtâs original order. The Secretary moved to dissolve the injunction, renewing her argument that the District Court lacked jurisdiction.
At the May 20 hearing, the District Court stated that it would grant Redbudâs motion âto modify the preliminary injunction.â On June 14, 1985, the District Court entered an order stating that â[t]he following paragraph will be added to this courtâs July 1984 order:
âThe Secretary shall publish these implementing regulations in the Federal Register as an interim final rule by no later than July 1, 1985, effective August 1, 1985. A 45-day comment period shall follow publication of the interim final rule. The regulations shall be published in the Federal Register as a final rule no later than October 1, 1985.â
The obligation of a Circuit Justice in considering the usual stay application is âto determine whether four Justices would vote to grant certiorari, to balance the so-called âstay equities,â and to give some consideration as to predicting the final outcome of the case in this Court.â Gregory-Portland Independent School District v. United States, 448 U. S. 1342 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., in chambers). In this case, however, the Secretary is not asking for the usual stay of a judgment of the Court of Appeals pending the disposition of a petition for certiorari in this Court. She asks instead that I grant a stay of the District Courtâs order pending appeal to the Ninth Circuit when the Ninth Circuit itself has refused to issue the stay. As is often noted, ââa stay application to a Circuit Justice on a matter before a court of appeals is rarely granted.ââ Atiyeh v. Capps, 449 U. S. 1312, 1313 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., in chambers) (quoting Pasadena Board of Education v. Spangler, 423 U. S. 1335, 1336 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., in chambers)). Nevertheless, for the reasons set out below, I believe that the present case is sufficiently unusual to warrant granting a partial stay of the District Courtâs order.
In arguing for a stay, the Secretary contends that there is a âstrong probabilityâ that the District Courtâs order will be overturned on one of three distinct grounds. First, she claims that the District Court exceeded its jurisdiction in reaching the merits of Redbudâs claim for additional reimbursement. Even if the Boardâs July 17, 1984, ruling that Redbudâs administrative claim was premature is a judicially reviewable final decision under 42 U. S. C. § 1395oo(f) (1982 ed., Supp. I), the scope of the District Courtâs review was limited to the Boardâs own jurisdictional determination. Second, the Secretary argues that the District Courtâs use of a âpreliminary injunctionâ to compel âpublication of nationwide regulations is unprecedented, unwarranted, and a clear abuse of the courtâs power to fashion preliminary relief.â And third, the Secretary asserts that in deeming the regulations in question mandated by Congress the District Court âclearly misconstruedâ the relevant provisions of the Medicare statute.
However the Ninth Circuit may decide these questions on appeal, I am not at all certain that four Members of this Court would be inclined to review either the âfinalityâ of the Boardâs July 17, 1984, ruling or the District Courtâs conclusions on the merits. I do believe, however, that the District Courtâs use of a âpreliminary injunctionâ to require the Secretary to issue regulations of nationwide application would prompt at least four Members of this Court to grant review should the Court of Appeals affirm that aspect of the District Courtâs order.
Federal district courts have jurisdiction under 42 U. S. C. § 1395oo(f) (1982 ed., Supp. I) to review âany final decision of the Boardâ in suits brought by providers of Medicare services such as Redbud. Judicial review under § 1395oo(f) is sharply circumscribed, however, see, e. g., V. N. A. of Greater Tift County, Inc. v. Heckler, 711 F. 2d 1020, 1024-1027 (CA11 1983), and I am persuaded that the section does not authorize the kind of sweeping âpreliminaryâ relief awarded by the District Court here. Nor do I believe that such relief is authorized, as the District Court thought, by the All Writs Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1651(a), which encompasses a limited judicial power to preserve the status quo while administrative proceedings are in progress and to prevent impairment of the effective exercise of appellate jurisdiction. See FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U. S. 597, 603-604 (1966). The District Courtâs requirement that the Secretary promulgate new nationwide regulations cannot possibly be justified as necessary to preserve the status quo. Redbudâs interest in maintaining the status quo is protected by that part of the District Courtâs order, which I do not stay, that enjoins the Secretary from applying the prospective payment system to Redbud or âotherwise reducing [Redbud]âs current level of reimbursementâ without making the requested adjustments. In its complaint Redbud did not even seek regulatory reform. Nor can I view the regulations as in any way necessary to the effective exercise of appellate jurisdiction. The District Courtâs July 30, 1984, and June 14, 1985, orders, in combination, are a far cry from âthe usual âprohibitoryâ injunction which merely freezes the positions of the parties until the court can hear the case on the merits.â Heckler v. Lopez, 463 U. S. 1328, 1333 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., in chambers). Plainly, I think, the District Court has inappropriately used its âpreliminary injunctionâ as a vehicle for final relief on the merits. University of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U. S. 390, 395 (1981).
The new regulations will at least require significant readjustment in the administration of PPS and will therefore cause hardship to the applicant. More important, the District Courtâs requirement that the Secretary promulgate new regulations is plainly not necessary to protect Redbudâs interests in this litigation. I think the âstay equitiesâ favor the applicant.
Accordingly, I grant the application of the Secretary to stay the preliminary injunction of the District Court, as modified, pending determination of the Secretaryâs appeal by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, but only insofar as the injunction orders the Secretary to promulgate and apply nationwide regulations. In all other respects the application for a stay is denied.