Mandeville v. Riddle
Syllabus & Case Posture
MANDEVILLE AND JAMESON v. JOSEPH RIDDLE AND CO.
In Virginia, an indorsee of a promissory note can not maintain an action against a remote indorser, for want of privity.
Error from the circuit court of the district of Columbia sitting at Alexandria, in an action on the case brought by the defendant in error for money had and, received, which was the only count in the declaration; and to which the defendant pleaded the general issue.
The evidence offered and admitted to support the declaration was a promissory note made by Vincent Gray, dated at Alexandria on the 2d of March 1798, by which he promised to pay sixty days after date to the order of Mandeville and Jameson 1500 dollars for value received, negotiable at the bank of Alexandaia. This note was indorsed by Mandeville and Jameson to James MβClenachan, and by him to Joseph Riddle and co. the defendants in error. The protest of a notary public made on the fifth May 1798, attesting that he had on that day demanded payment of the note of the maker, who refused, and of Mandeville and Jameson the first indorsers, who also refused, and that James M'Clenachan the other indorser did not dwell in his district. The record of a suit on the same note brought by Joseph Riddle and co. on the 14th of June 1798, against Vincent Gray, the maker, prosecuted to final judgment and execution, upon which execution he was committed to jail and took the oath of an insolvent debtor and was discharged, on the 6th of February 1799.
The present action was commenced in July 1801.
A bill of exceptions was taken by the defendants below, stating these facts, and that they prayed the opinion of the court,
Opinion of the Court β The chief justice
Primary OpinionThe chief justice
delivered the opinion of the court.
β The only question in this case is, Whether an action β of indebitatus assumpsit can be maintained by the assignee β of a promissory note made in Virginia, against a re- β mote assignor.
β The act of the Virginia assembly which makes notes β assignable, gives the assignee an action of debt in his own β name against the maker of the note, but is silent with β respect to the claim of the assignee against the assignor. β It was therefore long a doubt whether the assignor be- β came liable on his mere assignment, without any special β agreement, for the contents of the note, in the event β of the insolvency of the maker. This doubt has at β length been settled in Virginia, so far as to declare the β liability of the assignor on such assignment; but not the β amount for which he is liable. It seems to be yet a ques- β tion whether he is answerable for the sum mentioned in β the note, or for only so much as he received for it, β provided he shall be able to prove the sum actually re- β ceived. It is also a question whether the assignee can β have recourse to any other than his immediate assignor.
β As the act of assembly gives no right to sue the as- β signor, such an action can only be maintained on the β promise which the law implies from the assignment, and β consequently can only be sustained by and against the β persons to and from whom the law implies such a pro- β mise to have been made. As the assignment is made to β a particular person, the law implies a promise to that β person; but it raises no promise to any other. There β is no fact on which to imply such promise.
β In the language of the books, there is a privity be- β tween the assignor and his immediate assignee; but no β privity is perceived between the assignor and his remote β assignee. The implied promise growing out of the in- β dorsement, is not considered as having been made as- β signable by the act of assembly, and therefore the as- β signee of that promise can not maintain an action of β indebitatus assumpsit on it.
β It is therefore the opinion of the court that this ac- β tion is not maintainable and that the judgment ought β to be reversed.β
See note (A.) in the appendix to this volume of reports.