United States v. Schooner Peggy
Syllabus & Case Posture
UNITED STATES v. SCHOONER PEGGY.
A final condemnation in an inferior court of admiralty, where a right of appeal exists and has been claimed, is not a definitive condemnation within the meaning of the 4th article of the convention with France, signed Sept. 30, 1800.
The court is as much bound as the executive to take notice of a treaty, and will reverse the original decree of condemnation (although it was correct when made) and decree restoration of the property under the treaty made since the original condemnation.
Error to the circuit court for the district of Connecticut, on a question of prize.
The facts found and stated by judge Law, the district judge, were as follow:
β That the ship Trumbull, duly commissioned by the β President of the United States, with instructions to take β any armed French vessel or vessels sailing under autho- β rity, or pretence of authority from the French republic, β which shall be found within the jurisdictional limits of β the United States, or elsewhere on the high seas, &c. as set β forth in said instructions; and said ship did on the 24th β day of April last (April 1800) capture the schooner Peg- β gy, after running her ashore a few miles to the westward β of Port au Prince, within the dominions and territory of β General Toussaint, and has brought her into port as set forth in the libel, and it further appears that all the facts, β contained in the claim, are true; whereupon this court β are of opinion that as it appears that the said schooner β was solely upon a trading voyage and sailed under the β permission of Toussaint with dispatches for the French β government, under a convoy furnished by Toussaint, β with directions to touch at Leogane for supplies, and β that the arms she had on board must be presumed to be β only for self defence; neither does it appear she had ever β made, or attempted to make, any depredations, and that β she was not such an armed vessel as was meant and in- β tended by the laws of the United States should be sub- β ject to capture and condemnation; and that the situa- β tion she was in, at the time of capture, being aground β within the territory and jurisdiction of Toussaint, she was β not on the high seas, so as to be intended to be within β the instructions given to the commanders of American β ships of war: Therefore, adjudge said schooner is not β a lawful prize, and decree that said schooner with her β cargo be restored to claimant.β
Opinion of the Court β The Chief Justice
Primary OpinionThe Chief Justice
delivered the opinion of the court.
In this case the court is of opinion that the schooner Peggy is within the provisions of the treaty entered into with France and ought to be restored. This vessel is not considered as being definitively condemned. The argument at the bar which contends that because the sentence of the circuit court is denominated a final sentence, therefore its condemnation is definitive in the sense in which that term is used in the treaty, is not deemed a correct argument. A decree or sentence may be interlocutory or final in the court which pronounces it, and receives its appellation from its determining the power of that particular court over the subject to which it applies, or being only an intermediate order subject to the future control of the same court. The last decree of an inferior court is final in relation to the power of that court, but not in relation to the property itself, unless it be acquiesced under. The terms used in the treaty seem to apply to the actual condition of the property and to direct a restoration of that which is still in controversy between the parties. On any other construction the word definitive would be rendered useless and inoperative. Vessels are seldom if ever condemned but by a final sentence. An interlocutary order for a sale is not a condemnation. A stipulation then for the restoration of vessels not yet condemned, would on this construction comprehend as many cases as a stipulation for the restoration of such as are not yet definitively condemned. Every condemnation is final as to the court which pronounces it, and no other difference is perceived between a condemnation and a final condemnation, than that the one terminates definitively the controversy between the parties and the other leaves that controversy still depending. In this case the sentence of condemnation was appealed from, it might have been reversed, and therefore was not such a sentence as in the contemplation of the contracting parties, on a fair and honest construction of the contract, was designated as a definitive condemnation.
It has been urged that the court can take no notice of the stipulation for the restoration of property not yet definitively condemned, that the judges can only enquire whether the sentence was erroneous when delivered, and that if the judgment was correct it cannot be made otherwise by any thing subsequent to its rendition.
The constitution of the United States declares a treaty to be the supreme law of the land. Of consequence its obligation on the courts of the United States must be admitted. It is certainly true that the execution of a contract between nations is to be demanded from, and, in the general, superintended by the executive of each nation, and therefore, whatever the decision of this court may be relative to the rights of parties litigating before it, the claim upon the nation if unsatisfied, may still be asserted. But yet where a treaty is the law of the land, and as such affects the rights of parties litigating in court, that treaty as much binds those rights and is as much to be regarded by the court as an act of congress; and although restoration may be an executive, when viewed as a substantive, act independent of, and unconnected with, other circumstances, yet to condemn a vessel, the restoration of which is directed by a law of the land, would be a direct infraction of that law, and of consequence, improper.
It is in the general true that the province of an appellate court is only to enquire whether a judgment when rendered was erroneous or not. But if subsequent to the judgment and before the decision of the appellate court, a law intervenes and positively changes the rule which governs, the law must be obeyed, or its obligation denied. If the law be constitutional, and of that no doubt in the present case has been expressed, I know of no court which can contest its obligation. It is true that in mere private cases between individuals, a court will and ought to struggle hard against a construction which will, by a retrospective operation, affect the rights of parties, but in great national concerns where individual rights, acquired by war, are sacrificed for national purposes, the contract, making the sacrifice, ought always to receive a construction conforming to its manifest import; and if the nation has given up the vested rights of its citizens, it is not for the court, but for the government, to consider whether it be a case proper for compensation. In such a case the court must decide according to existing laws, and if it be necessary to set aside a judgment, rightful when rendered, but which cannot be affirmed but in violation of law, the judgment must be set aside.