Wood v. Owings
Syllabus & Case Posture
GABRIEL WOOD, original defendant, v. WILLIAM OWINGS AND JOB SMITH, assignees of William Robb, a bankrupt, original plaintiff.
A deed of lands in Maryland, signed, sealed, and delivered on the 30th of May, and knowledged on the 14th of June, is to be considered as made on the 30th of May; and its acknowledgment on the 14th of June will not cause it to be such a deed as is contemplated in the bankrupt act which came into operation on the 2d of June.
Error from the fourth circuit court sitting at Baltimore.
This was an action on the case, for money had and received by Wood to the use of Robb, the bankrupt.
Judgment below was entered by consent, subject to the opinion of the court on a case stating the following facts, viz.
On the 30th of May, 1800, Robb being in possession of his household furniture, and having two vessels and no other property, on the high seas, signed, sealed, and delivered, a deed to Charles Garts and Gabriel Wood, trustees in behalf of themselves and other creditors of Robb, therein particularly named, and such others of his creditors as should by a certain time assent to the terms of the trust; by which deed, Robb, in consideration of five shillings, and towards payment of the debts due to the particular creditors therein named in the first place, and in the next place of such of his creditors as should agree to the terms of the trust ; grants, bargains, sells, &c. to Garts and Wood, all his estate, real, personal, and mixed, and choses in action, &c. in trust to sell the same and collect the debts, &c. and on receipt of the money, to retain in the first place the amount due to Garts and Wood, for money lent, &c. then to pay the debts due to the other creditors particularly named, and then to pay the debts due to such of his other creditors as should, within a certain time, agree to the terms of the trust; and if there should be a surplus to pay it over to Robb. That this deed was acknowledged on the 14th June, 1800.—That Robb did not on the said 30th of May, 1800, deliver to Wood, his books, but they remained in Robb’s possession. That the vessels were not conveyed to Wood by any other conveyance than that before mentioned. That Robb continued in possession of his household furniture, books of accounts, and all his papers, until the suing out of the commission of bankruptcy, except the policies of insurance on the vessels, which were delivered to Wood at the time of delivering the deed. That Robb considered Wood as having a right to take possession of the books and papers, and personal estate, at any time after the delivery of the deed, but did not then expect to be obliged to stop business; on the contrary, that he actually went on with the hope of retrieving his affairs until the 20th June, 1800. That Robb was a trader before and after the 1st of June, 1800 ; that at the time of signing, sealing, and delivering of the said deed, he was the legal proprietor of a lot of ground in the state of Maryland, as assignee of a term of 99 years, renewable forever, and was also possessed of personal property, and had debts due to him; that Garts and Wood, and the other persons in the deed particularly named, were credi tors of Robb ; and that there were other creditors besides those particularly preferred in the deed. That a commission of bankruptcy issued against Robb on the 12th July, 1 800, founded on the execution and acknowledgment of the said deed, under which Robb was declared a bankrupt, and his effects were assigned to the plaintiffs, Owings and Smith, by a deed of assignment on the 1st of May, 1801. And that the action is brought to recover all monies received by Wood, in virtue of the said deed to Garts and Wood. If on the above state of facts the plaintiffs were entitled to recover, then judgment was to be entered for the plaintiffs for 3000 dollars; but if, &c. then judgment of non pros.
Opinion of the Court — The chief justice
Primary OpinionThe chief justice
delivered the opinion of the court:
This is a writ of error to a judgment of the circuit court of the fourth circuit sitting at Baltimore, in the following case.
On the 30th of May, 1800, William Robb, who was then a merchant carrying on trade and merchandize, in the state of Maryland, signed, sealed and delivered to Gabriel Wood, an instrument of writing, purporting to convey to the said Gabriel, his real and personal estate in trust, to secure him from certain notes and acceptances made by him, on account of the said Robb, and afterwards, in trust for other creditors in the deed mentioned. This deed was acknowledged on the 14th of June; and was then enrolled according to the laws of Maryland.
On the 12th of July, 1800, a commission of bankruptcy was sued out, founded on the execution of the deed above mentioned, and the said William Robb, being declared a bankrupt, his effects were assigned to William Owings and Job Smith, who brought this suit against Gabriel Wood, to recover the money received by him under the deed aforementioned.
Judgment was confessed by the defendant below, subject to the opinion of the court on a case stated, of which the foregoing were the material facts.
The Court gave judgment in favor of the assignees, to which judgment a writ of error was sued out by the present plaintiff.
The only question made by the counsel was, whether the deed, stated in the case, was an act of bankruptcy.
On the 4th of April, 1800, congress passed an act to establish an uniform system of bankruptcy throughout the United States, which declares, among other things, that any merchant who shall, after the first day of June next succeeding the passage of the act, with intent unlawfully to delay or defraud his creditors, make or cause to be made any fraudulent conveyance of his lands or chattels, shall be deemed and adjudged a bankrupt.
It was admitted, in the argument, that this deed, if executed after the 1st day of June, would have been an act of bankruptcy, but that being sealed and delivered on the 30th of May, it was not within the act, which only comprehends conveyances made after the 1st of June.
For the defendants in error, it was contended, that, by the laws of Maryland, a deed is not complete until it is acknowledged, and therefore this conveyance was made on the 14th of June, when it was acknowledged; and not on the 30th of May, when it was sealed and delivered.
The Maryland act alluded to was passed in 1766, and declares, “that after the first day of May next, no estate “of inheritance or freehold, or any declaration or limi-“tation of use, or any estate for above seven years, shall "pass or take effect, except the deed or conveyance, by which the same shall be intended to pass or take effect, “shall be acknowledged in the provincial court, or before " one of the justices thereof, in the county court, or be-"fore two justices of the same county where the lands, "tenements, or hereditaments, conveyed by such deed “or conveyance do lie, and be also enrolled, &c. within “six months after the date of such deed or convey-“ance.”
The 5th section gives the conveyance, so acknowledged and enrolled, relation to the date thereof.
It is a well established doctrine of the common law, that a deed becomes complete, when sealed and delivered. It then becomes the act of the person who has executed it, and whatever its operation may be, it is his deed. The very act of livery, which puts the paper into the possession of the party for whose benefit it is made, seems to require the construction that it has become a deed.
The question now made to the court is, whether the act of the legislature of Maryland has annexed other requisites to an instrument of writing conveying lands, without the performance of which, not only the passing of the estate, intended to be conveyed, is arrested, but the instrument itself, is prevented from becoming the deed of the person who has executed it.
Upon the most mature consideration of the subject, the opinion of the court is, that the words, used in the act of Maryland, which have been recited, consider the instrument as a deed, although inoperative ’till acknowledged and enrolled.
The words do not apply to the instrument, but to the estate that instrument is intended to convey.
Since then the bankrupt law of the United States does not affect deeds made prior to the 1st of June, 1800, and this deed was made on the 30th of May, 1800, the court is of opinion, that the rights, vested by the deed, (whatever they might be) are not divested in favor of the assignees of the bankrupt, and therefore, that they ought not to have recovered in this case.
Judgment reversed-and judgment of non pros to be entered.