Kelsey v. Forsyth
Syllabus & Case Posture
James Kelsey and Thomas P. Hotchkiss, Plaintiffs in Error, v. Robert Forsyth.
The agreement of parties cannot authorize this court to revise a judgment of an ■, inferior court in any other mode of proceeding .than that which the- law pre- - . scribes; nor can the laws of a State, regulating the proceedings of its own courts, authorize a District or Circuit Court sitting in the State to depart from the modes of proceeding and rules prescribed by the acta of Congress.
Therefore, where'the parties to an ejectment suit agreed to waive a trial by jury, and that both matters of law and of fact should be submitted to the decision of the court, and then a bill of exceptions was brought up to this court to ail the r.ulings and decisions of the court below, this court cannot look into errors of fact or errors of law alleged to have been committed in such an irregular proceeding, and the judgment of the court below will be affirmed. '
This case was brought up by writ of error from the Circuit Court of the United States for the northern district of Illinois.
It was an action of ejectment brought by Robert Forsyth, a citizen of Missouri, against Kelsey and Hotchkiss,, to recover certain lots in the county of Peoria.
After some proceedings which it is not necessary to men-. tion in this report, the cause came on for trial at December term, 1854, of the Circuit Court, when the parties filed the following agreement:
Opinion of the Court — Mr. Chief Justice TANEY
Primary OpinionMr. Chief Justice TANEY
delivered the opinion of the court.
This is a writ of error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the northern district of Illinois.
. An action of ejectment was brought by the defendants in error against the plaintiff, for a certain parcel of land described in the declaration, and upon the trial the verdict and judgment were for the plaintiff; a motion was afterwards made to .set, aside the judgment and for a new trial,'and' the judgment was accordingly set aside, and a new trial granted upon the terms mentioned in the transcript.- In the proceedings upon this new trial, the parties agreed to waive a trial by jury, and that both matters of law and of fact should be submitted to the decision, of the court. The case was proceeded in according to this agreement, and the court, as the record states, found the issué in favor of the plaintiff, (Forsyth,) and entered judgment accordingly; and to this decision, and to all the rulings and decisions of the court in the previous stageaof the cause, the defendants (Kelsey and Hotchkiss) excepted, and sued out a,. . writ of error to bring the case before this court.
It will be seen from this statement that in-a common-law action of ejectment the case was submitted to tbe court upon the evidence, without tbe intervention of a jury, leaving it to thd court to decide the* fact, as well as tbe law; upon tbe evidence and admissions before it.. Tbe case, therefore, is the same in principle with that of Guild and others v. Frontin, 18 How., 135. And the doctrine in that case was reaffirmed in Suydam v. Williamson, 20 How., 428, and tbe .grounds upon which it résts fully set forth. It is unnecessary to repeat here what was stated in these two decisions. It is sufficient to say that the agreement of parties nannot authorize this court to revise a judgment of an inferior court in any other mode of proceeding than that which the law prescribes, nor can the laws,of a State, regulating the. proceedings of its own courts, authorize a district or Circuit- Court sitting in- the State to depart from the modes of proceeding and rules prescribed by the acts of Congress. '
The judgment of the Circuit Court must therefore be af-< firmed.