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Chilton v. Braiden's Administratrix

67 U.S. 458 1862-12 1,066 Words
Full Case Caption
Chilton vs. Braiden's Administratrix
Official & Parallel Citations
2 Black 458 · 67 U.S. 458 · 17 L. Ed. 304
Court & Volume
Supreme Court of the United States · 67 U.S.

Syllabus & Case Posture

Chilton vs. Braiden’s Administratrix

1. Purchase-Unoney is treated by Courts of Equity as a lien on the land sold where the purchaser has taken no separate security, and this is on the principle that one who gets the estate of another should not in conscience be allowed to keep it without paying for it.

2. This rule applies with as much force to the case of a purchase by a married woman as to any other case.

3. The disabilities imposed upon married women are intended for their protection, and the law will not allow them to be used as - the means of committing fraud.

Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Columbia.

The appellee, Margaret Lyons, administratrix of Elizabeth Braiden, deceased, on February 12th, 1857, filed her bill in the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia for the sale of part of square No. -226, in the City of Washington, to enforce the payment of the purchase money due therefor, against Agnes R. Hazard, a married woman, — who had purchased on the credit of her separate estate. O. E. P. Hazard, her husband, and Sam’l Chilton, her trustee, were joined with her as defendants.

Opinion of the Court — Mr. Justice GRIER.

Primary Opinion

Mr. Justice GRIER.

When one person has got the estate of another, he ought not, in conscience, to be allowed to keep it without paying thé consideration. It is on this principle that Courts of Equity proceed as between vendor and vendee. The purchase money is treated as a lien on the land sold, where the vendor has taken no separate security. In the present case this lien has not been defeated by alienation to a bona fide purchaser, or any subsequent lien of creditors. The issue taken in the answer concerning the respondents’ ability to pay out of her separate estate is wholly immaterial except to give probability to the allegation that she had paid the consideration. The only, defense taken in the answer to the claim of the bill is an alleged leceipt in full or discharge for the purchase money.

The deed does not acknowledge the payment of the consideration, and the answer admits that no consideration was paid at the time of its delivery. The issue between the parties turned wholly on the genuineness of a receipt or discharge purporting to have been executed and delivered by Elizabeth Braiden on the 12th of September, 1856. The Court ordered an issue to try this question at law, and the jury found “ That Elizabeth Braiden did not execute and deliver said receipt or discharge, and that it was not the genuine receipt of said Elizabeth Braiden.” The Court, in the exercise of their discretion, refused to grant a new trial of this issue. As it appears to us that the evidence justified the verdict, we see-no error in'the decree cf the Court. It did not condemn the defendant to pay the consideration out of her separate estate, but orders the houses to be sold to pay the purchase money, unless before a certain time the defendant shall pay the amount due.

Neither the answer of the party, nor the argument of counsel, allege any good reason, why a married woman should be permitted to take property without paying for it, more than another. The disabilities thrown round her by the law, are for her protection — not to enable her to commit fraud.

Decree affirmed, with costs.-

Cited By Later Decisions (4)

Public Domain Federal Judicial Work (17 U.S.C. § 105) · Harvard Law School Caselaw Access Project (CAP).