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Miller v. Tiffany

68 U.S. 298 1863-12 5,085 Words
Full Case Caption
Miller v. Tiffany
Official & Parallel Citations
1 Wall. 298 · 68 U.S. 298 · 17 L. Ed. 540
Court & Volume
Supreme Court of the United States · 68 U.S.

Syllabus & Case Posture

Miller v. Tiffany.

In an action for the price of goods which the purchaser by his own agerts examined and selected, and which he himself afterwards received and kept without objection, it is no defence that the price as agreed on was above that of the market; there having been neither fraud, misrepresentation, noi warranty in the case.

A person contracting for the payment of interest may contract to pay it either at the rate of the “place of contract,” or at that of the “place of performance,” as one or the other may be agreed on by himself and the creditor; and the fact that the rate of the place at which it is agreed that it shall be paid is higher than the rate in the other place, will not expose the transaction to the imputation of usury, unless the place agreed on was fixed for the purpose of obtaining the higher rate, and to evade the penalty of a usurious contract at the other place.

Tiffany filed a bill against Miller and wife, in tbe Circuit Court for tbe District of Indiana, to foreclose a mortgage wbicb tbe last-named persons bad given to Palmer, a merchant of New York, and Wallace, an attorney at law of Cleveland, Obio, as assignees of two insolvent firms; wbicb mortgage they, tbe said Palmer and Wallace, bad assigned to bim, tbe complainant.

Tbe facts of tbe case were essentially these: Two mercantile firms, closely connected with each other and in part composed of tbe same persons — one in Cleveland, Ohio, and one in New York City — being unfortunate in business, had made an assignment of their effects, dry goods chiefly, to these two persons, Wallace and Palmer; Palmer being a large creditor of tbe firms. About $50,000 worth of tbe goods were at Cleveland under Wallace’s charge, and about $73,000 worth in New York, under Palmer’s.

In this state of things, Miller, a German trader, resident at Fort Wayne, in Indiana, who bad a valuable, unincumbered real estate in that State, but who was largely in debt and much embarrassed for ready money, employed two personal friends, Turner and Rufner, to go to New York and raise bim money. They went there in February, 1858, and after making, according to Rufner’s account, “ desperate efforts, for at least four weeks, by publication in tbe Herald and Tribune/’ fell in with a broker, named Anthony, who introduced them to Palmer. The result was, that Palmer entered into a treaty to sell Miller $20,000 worth of that part of the assigned goods in New York, at six months’ credit, and to receive in payment for them a mortgage, on Miller’s real estate in Indiana, payable in five years; the mortgage to provide, however, that if there should be any default in paying the interest, the principal should become due at once. Palmer wrote, on the 15th of February, 1858, to Wallace at Cleveland what he had agreed on, requested him to go to Fort Wayne in Indiana, examine the property and title, and if satisfied with both to have the papers prepared; after which the goods should be delivered to Miller or his agents. Wallace, accordingly, went to Fort Wayne, in Indiana, and being satisfied with the security, a note for the term mentioned was given by Miller, with interest at ten per cent., payable, not in New York, where Palmer lived, and where the goods were bought, nor yet in Fort Wayne, the residence of Miller, but in Cleveland (at the Commercial Branch Bank there), the residence of Wallace, with the current rate of exchange on New York. Matters being thus concluded, Bufner, the friend of Miller, went to New York and selected the goods out .of the assigned stock there. They were then shipped to Fort Wayne, where Miller received them.

Opinion of the Court — Mr. Justice SWAYNE

Primary Opinion

Mr. Justice SWAYNE

delivered the opinion of the court

Two defences to the mortgage are relied upon :

1. That the- goods sold to'the defendant, which formed the consideration of the note secured by the mortgage, were worth largely less than the amount for which the note was given. It is claimed, therefore, that there has been a partial failure of consideration.

The evidence upon the subject is conflicting. It has failed to establish to our satisfaction the fact alleged. Fraud or misrepresentation by the vendor is neither averred nor proved. It is in proof that the goods were carefully examined by the agents of Miller before they were bought, and that they were selected when the purchase was made. They were sold at the regular prices of the establishment. It does not appear that Miller made any objection, either to the prices or quality, when he received them; or that he ever made any objection, until it was set up in his answer in this case, more than a year after the goods were delivered to him.

The objection comes too late. The sanctity of contracts cannot thus be trifled with. The common law, unlike the civil law, does not imply a warranty from a full price. Where there is neither fraud nor warranty, and the buyer receives and retains the goods, without objection, he waives the right to object afterwards, and is finally concluded. In such cases the rule of caveat empior applies.

2. The defence chiefly relied upon is usury. The result of our inquiry upon that subject must depend upon the lex loci that governs the contract.

Palmer and Wallace, the payees of the note, were the assignees of an insolvent firm, which did business under one name in New York, and under another at Cleveland, Ohio. Palmer resided at New York and Wallace at Cleveland. About $50,000 worth of the goods, covered by the assignment, were at the former city, and about $75,000 worth at the latter. The negotiation for the sale was commenced by Palmer and concluded by Wallace. The note is as follows: [His Honor here read the mortgage-note, already described.] Miller lived in Indiana. The note and mortgage were executed in that State. The mortgaged premises are situated there. Wallace was present at the execution of the securities. They were transmitted to Palmer, at New York, and the goods were thereupon shipped thence to Indiana* The note and mortgage have been assigned to the appellee.

We lay out of view the imputation upon Palmer and Wallace, of a fraudulent purpose to evade by shift or device the usury statute of Indiana or New York. It is wholly unsupported by the evidence. They were acting in a fiduciary character, and could have had no motive to engage in such a transaction. There is no reason to believe that such a conception entered into their minds. On the other hand, we are by no means satisfied that it was not the deliberate purpose of Miller, when the arrangement was made, to involve them in the toils of this defence, and if possible to escape with the goods without paying anything for them. Our business, however, is to ascertain and apply the law of the case. We shall not discuss the evidence bearing upon the ethics of his conduct.

“ The general principle in relation to contracts made in one place to be performed in another is well settled. They are to be governed by the law of the place of performance, and if the interest allowed by the law of the place of performance is higher than that permitted at the place of contract, the parties may stipulate for the higher interest without incurring the penalties of usury.” The converse of this proposition is also well settled. If the rate of interest be higher at the place of the contract than at the place of performance, the parties may lawfully contract in that case also for the higher rate.

These rules are subject to the qualification, that the parties act in good faith, and that the form of the transaction is not adopted to disguise its real character. The validity of the contract is determined by the law of the place where it is entered into. Whether void or valid there, it is so everywhere.

When these securities were executed the statute of Ohio of the 14th of March, 1850, upon the subject of interest, was in force. According to its provisions parties might lawfully contract for any rate of interest not exceeding ten per cent, per annum. The contract of Miller was therefore valid.

Decree aeeirmed with costs. .

Hargous v. Stone, 1 Selden, 73.

See ante, p. 299,' note.

Andrews v. Pond, 13 Peters, 77, 78; Curtis et al. v. Leavitt, 15 New York, 92; Berrien v. Wright, 26 Barbour, 213.

Depeau v. Humphrey, 20 Howard, 1; Chapman v. Robinson, 6 Paige, 634.

Andrews v. Pond, 13 Peters, 78; Mix et al. v. The Madison Ins. Co., 11 Indiana, 117; Corcoran & Biggs v Powers et al., G Ohio State, 19.

Cited By Later Decisions (6)

Public Domain Federal Judicial Work (17 U.S.C. § 105) · Harvard Law School Caselaw Access Project (CAP).