Wheeler v. Sage
Syllabus & Case Posture
Wheeler v. Sage.
Where a firm, whose business was “a general produce business,” owned a mortgage or. real estate, which real estate itself the firm was desirous to purchase aader tho mortgage, and intrusted .the subject generally to one of the firm, — held, that the legal obligation of the partner intrusted being only to get payment of the mortgage, he might make an arrangement for his own benefit with a third person, without tho knowledge of his partners, by which such third person should buy the mortgaged estate, giving him, the intrusted partner, an interest in it; and if the mortgage debt was fully .paid by such partner into the firm account, that there was no breach of partnership or other fiduciary relation in ' the transaction; or, at least, that no other partner could recover from him a share of profits made by a sale of the real estate; all parties alike having been originally engaged in a scheme to get the real estate by depreciating its value through a process of entering a judgment for a large nominal amount, and by deceiving or “bluffing off” other creditors.
This was an appeal from the District Court of the United States for the District of Wisconsin; tbe case in that court having been one of a bill in equity, by which the appellant Wheeler sought to charge Sage as his trustee. The material facts, as set forth in the bill, were these: .
On the 12th day of September, 1851, Wheeler, Sage, and Slocum entered into an equal copartnership, to carry on “ a general produce business” in Troy, New York. The firm became the owner of a large debt against Alanson Sweet, of Milwaukee, which was secured by mortgage on valuable real estate. Proceedings to foreclose were commenced #in October, 1854, and a decree passed in November, 1855. Sweet was insolvent, with heavy judgments against him. The parties were desirous of getting a perfect title to the mortgaged premises, their value being, when the mortgage was given, $50,000. In order to do this, it was thought necessary that certain judgments should be purchased and other arrangements perfected, which Sage informed Wheeler and Slocum could be done through a certain Alexander Mitchell, for $10,000. Sage was authorized to perfect the agreement, and to charge Wheeler and Slocum their proportionate amount on the books of the firm. This agreement, or a similar one, was made by Sage with Mitchell, and judgments purchased under it. Without the knowledge of Wheeler, Sage, however, abandoned this agreement, and made one with Mitchell for his own benefit. The mortgaged property was sold, and Mitchell became the purchaser, letting Sage have one-third interest on certain conditions; this being done, as alleged, in violation of the rights and without the knowledge of Wheeler and Slocum. The mortgage debt was fixed at $24,000, two-thirds of which amount was paid over by Sage to Wheeler and Slocum, being, as he said, the best that could be donó, and which was accepted by Wheeler and Slocum on that hypothesis. Enough of the mortgaged property, the bill alleged, had been sold to produce $105,000, leaving unsold what was worth $27,000. ■ The prayer of the bill was, that Sage might be declared to be trustee for Wheeler for one-third of the mortgaged property still held and unsold by Mitchell, and for one-third of the proceeds of what had been sold; and be decreed to account.
Sage, in his answer, admitted that the firm was desirous of becoming the owner in fee of the premises mortgaged, and that it was thought by an expenditure of $10,000 that the object could be attained; and that an arrangement to this effect was contemplated with Mitchell, but became impracticable, and was abandoned: that Mitchell controlled the defence, which was serious and complicated, and it was feared by Wheeler that it might so far prevail as to lessen the amount of the mortgage debt. After considerable negotiation, a basis of settlement was agreed to by the partners and Mitchell, which fixed the amount due on the mortgage at $24,000. The defence was withdrawn, and a decree entered (at the instance of Mitchell) for $33,000, which was to be discharged on the payment of $24,000 by Mitchell, or at his election the decree was to be assigned to him. Mitchell preferred a sale to cut off an intervening claim. Sage admitted that, after the sale, he became interested in one-third of the property, but denied that Wheeler and Slocum have ever had, or were ever entitled to any interest whatever therein, and averred that when the sale was made there was-no subsisting agreement or understanding other than that said Mitchell should pay the amount agreed upon at the time of sale. The answer also denied that the mortgaged premises were of the value stated in the bill, and insisted that enough had not been realized from their sale to pay Sage the sum of $24,000.
A general replication was filed, and proofs were taken. In regard to the plan of getting a “ perfect title” to thé premises, it appeared by these that Sweet had about thirty different judgment creditors (Mitchell holding a judgment for .$18,556.04, and the remaining creditors, exclusive of the Troy firm, for $59,597.78); that the principal item of the mortgaged premises was a warehouse, valued, when the mortgage was given, at $50,000, but of which the rise in value had been so great, that when the bill was filed it had come to be valued by some persons at twice that sum. The firm, accordingly, did not want to receive their money and interest under the proceeding to foreclose, but wanted to get the warehouse itself; of which, indeed, they had been for some time in possession, and which they were now actually occupying, with apparent exercise of ownership. But there were difficulties in the case. Sweet thought that with the rise of this property, which would occur by a railroad about to be made near it, — the Lake Shore Railroad, — he would be able to reinstate his affairs, and his judgment creditors looked to the same possibility as the means of at least getting the amount of their debts. Sweet accordingly threatened to redeem; and the creditors were watching the course of events. The object of "Wheelex-, Sage, and Slocum was, therefore, to get the warehouse itself under their mortgage, and for no more, or for little more, than its principal and interest. The operation was to be performed, in part, by buying in certain judgments at a discount, and in part by •securing Sweet’s acquiescence, in virtxxe of a consideration, to their getting a decree as speedily as possible, and an arranged sort of sale on foreclosure. The following extracts, or parts or copies of lettex’S, selected from a large number in the record, give an idea of the process. The fixm, it appeared, was represented in Troy by Messrs. Sage (M. C.) & Slocum, as E. Sage & Co.; and in Milwaukee by Mr. Wheeler, as Wheeler & Co.
Opinion of the Court — Mr. Justice DAVIS
Primary OpinionMr. Justice DAVIS
delivered the opinion of the court.
The right to recover is placed mainly on two grounds.
First. That Sage, in the absence of any agreement, could not by private treaty become interested in the mortgaged property, to the exclusion of the other partners.
Second. That there was an agreement that Sage should act as the agent of his copartners in perfecting the title to the mortgaged premises; and having violated his agreement and made a private bargain with Mitchell for his individual benefit, he is chargeable as trustee.
Each partner is the agent of his copartners in all transactions relating to partnership business, and is forbidden to traffic therein for his own advantage, and if he does, will be held accountable for all profits. But beyond the line of the trade or business in which the firm is engaged, there is no restraint on his right to traffic. As one partner has no authority to bind the firm outside of their ordinary business, he cannot of course be held liable to account, should he make a profitable adventure in a matter not legitimately connected with the business of the firm. The difficulty generally is, to ascertain what acts are within the scope of the particular trade or business. But in this case there is no embarrassment whatever in the application of the principle. This was a partnership to do a general produce business. It contemplated no dealings in real estate, and each partner was at liberty to buy and sell real estate, and was under no legal liability to account to his copartners. The debt due from Sweet belonged to the partnership, and not the premises mortgaged. To the extent of their debt the partners had an interest in the mortgaged property, and no further. They were interested to have the debt paid, not to pi’oeure title to the mortgaged property. It can readily be seen thal it would be profitable to get a real estate worth $50,000 for $34,000; but how an engagement to do a general produce business could embrace that speculation is not so apparent. Sage’s legal relations to his copartners extended to the procurement of the money due from Sweet. They were neithei more nor less. But it is said that the copartners were desirous, if possible, of obtaining the title to the mortgaged premises, and that Sage undertook the negotiation for them, and made an effective arrangement with Mitchell, which he afterwards relinquished, and secured clandestinely an advantage to himself, to the injury of the other partners, and should, therefore, be held to account for profits.
The evidence in this case, consisting mainly of letters interchanged between Wheeler and Sage, shows clearly enough that a scheme was initiated to get the title to the property, and that Sage was the active agent to perfect it, but for some unexplained reason it failed. The evidence does not prove that Sage made a contract with his copartners to perfect the title, but his engagement was to consummate a contract with Mitchell, if it could be done, by which the object could be accomplished. All parties rested in the belief that the negotiations with Mitchell would be successful ; but from some motive not disclosed in the record, Sage abandoned the idea of buying the property on joint account, and bargained with Mitchell in his own behalf.
Generally, when a party obtains an advantage by fraud, he is to be regarded as the trustee of the party defrauded, and compelled to account. But if a party seeks relief in equity, he must be able to show that on his part there has been honesty and fair dealing. If he has been engaged in an illegal business and been cheated, equity will not help him. “ The Warehouse Case,” as it is somewhere called in the record, is anything but creditable to the parties concerned, and it is surprising that they should have been willing to give publicity to it through a legal proceeding. Sweet was an insolvent debtor, owing Sage, Wheeler & Slocum $24,000, secured on real estate in Milwaukee, which was worth, when the security was given, $50,000, and over $100,000 when the bill in this ease was filed. In 1854 and 1855, when the scheme to perfect the title was in full pi'ogress, the property was appreciating in value. Judgments had been entered against Sweet in favor of Mitchell to the amount of $18,556.04, and in favor of various other creditors for the sum of $59,597.73. Suit to foreclose was commenced, and a vigorous defence interposed. Sweet denied that there was as much due on the mortgage as was set forth in the bill, and he claimed a share of the general business, and that he was entitled to a credit of $12,000 for the rent of the warehouse for three years, during which time it had been occupied by Wheeler & Co. If this defence was successful, they could not hope to “ perfect the title.” The property was too valuable and the venture too great to lie idle and wait the ordinary progress of a suit m chancery. The property must be saved at all events and Sweet’s peace bought. Wheeler writes to Sage, May 5, 1855: “ F. thinks if you can buy Sweet’s peace, that the creditors of Sweet could be bluffed off, by getting a large decree and taking a proper time to sue it, and the price of Sweet’s peace to be contingent to the final adjustment of title.” Again, under date of May 18, he writes to Sage, “ that if. we do not make some arrangement with S. to stop the defence and let us have the decree at this term, we will have to take the money on the mortgage, as the property has risen in value more than 100 per cent, within the last two years, and we want you and Mr. Slocum to come out at once and do something.”
“ To perfect the title” and grasp the coveted prize, the defence must be stopped, Sweet bought off, and the decree enlarged beyond the just sum, so as to “ bluff creditors.” The nearer the decree was to the actual value of the property, the less was the chance of being outbid. To pay value for the property was not embraced in the scheme, but if Sweet was silenced, there would be no difficulty of fixing the decree at a sum which would tend to repress competition, and the decree was actually made for the sum of $33,000, when the amount due was only $24,000. It is true that Sage, in his answer, says that Mitchell had this done from motives of his own. But the correspondence between Wheeler and Sage abundantly proves, that to get a decree for the nominal instead of the real amount due on the mortgage, was one of the main parts of their project.
The court was imposed on, and a combination formed, the object and direct tendency of which was to secure tbe title to the valuable real estate of an insolvent debtor, at the expense and sacrifice.of his creditors.
A proceeding like this is against good conscience and good morals, and cannot receive the sanction of a court of equity. The principle is too plain to need a citation of authorities to confirm it. It is against the policy of the law to help either party in suck, controversies. The maxim, “ in pari delicto votior est conditio defendentis,” must prevail.
Decree affirmed with costs.