SCOTUS-Cases.net

Drury v. Foster

69 U.S. 24 1864-12 4,393 Words
Full Case Caption
Drury v. Foster
Official & Parallel Citations
2 Wall. 24 · 69 U.S. 24 · 17 L. Ed. 780
Court & Volume
Supreme Court of the United States · 69 U.S.

Syllabus & Case Posture

Drury v. Foster.

A paper, executed, under seal, for the husband’s benefit, by husband and •wife, acknowledged in separate form by the wife, and meant to be a mortgage of her separate lands, but with blanks left for the insertion of the mortgagee’s name and the sum borrowed,-and to be filled up by the husband, is'no deed as respects the wife, when afterwards filled up by the husband and given to a lender of money, though one bond fide and without knowledge of the mode of execution. The mortgagee, on cross-bill to a bill of foreclosure, was directed to cancel her name.

Foster, of Minnesota, being about, to- engage in some enterprise, and wanting money, asked bis wife, wbo owned, in ber separate right, a valuable tract of land in tbat State, to mortgage it for bis benefit. - "Wbat exactly was said or promised did not appear. However' Foster afterwards went to a notary, wbo exercised, as it seemed,.tbe business of a scrivener also, and directed bim to draw a mortgage of tbe property, with bimself and wife as mortgagors, but leaving the .name of the mortgagee, and the sum for which the land was mortgaged, in blank. This tbe magistrate did. Foster acknowledged the: deed, at the magistrate’s office, in this shape, and tbe magistrate then took tbe instrument to Mrs. Foster, at ber husband’s bouse, tbat she might sign and acknowledge it in tbe same shape. When tbe magistrate took the. mortgage to her thus to executé, Mrs. Foster said, “she was fearful tbat tbe speculation which ber husband was going into would not come out .right; that she did not like to mortgage that place, but that be wanted to raise a few hundred dollars, or several hundred dollars, or something to tbat effect,” — tbe magistrate, wbo was the witness that gave tbe testimony, did not recollect tbe exact expression which she used, — - “ and tbat she did not like to refuse bim, and tbat so she consented to sign tbe mortgage.” Mrs. Foster, having signed tbe instrument in this blank shape, tbe notary, under bis band and seal, certified, in form, tbat tbe husband and wife, “the signers and sealers of tbe foregoing deed,” bad personally appeared before bim, and acknowledged the signing, and sealing thereof to be their voluntary act and deed, for tbe. uses. and purposes expressed;” and that the wife, “being examined separate and'apart from her said husband, and the contents of 'the foregoing deed made known to her by me, she then acknowledged that she executed the same freely, and without fear or compulsion from any one.” ■ Such form of separate acknowledgment, it may be well.to say, is required by statute, in Minnesota, to .give any effect to a feme covert's deed. After taking the wife’s acknowledgment, the notary gave the instrument to her husband. He, finding the complainant, Drury, willing to lend as much as $12,800 upon the property, himself -filled up the blanks with the name of Drury, as mortgagee,- and with the sum just mentioned as the amount for which the estate was mortgaged. In this, form the instrument was delivered to Drury, who, knowing nothing of the facts, advanced the money in go$>d fait]}, and put his mortgage on record. There was no evidence that the wife derived any benefit from the ’money advanced, or that she ever knew that such a large sum was advanced.

On a bill of foreclosure brought four years afterwards by Drury against Foster and wife, in the Federal Court for Minnesota, the defence was, that the mortgage was not the wife’s deed; á defence which the court below thought good as to her. It accordingly dismissed the bill as regarded her, giving a decree, however, against the husband. ■ The correctness of its action as regarded the wife was the question, ón appeal, here.

Mr. Peclchamfor Drury, themortgagee:

All 'Will admit that it .is not easy to conceive of. a case 'addressing itself more to a sense of .equity. Drury, without a circumstance to excite suspicion, and relying upon a mortgage regular upon Its face, advanced a large sum in perfect, good faith. • He supposed, too, as was natural, that the mortgagors were acting in equal good faith. Mrs. Foster deliberately, and with understanding, put it into the power of her husband to obtain the loan. Will she be permitted, at this late day, in conjunction with her husband, to disavow her acts, and thus, in effect, defraud an innocent third party whom she has been chiefly instrumental in bringing into his present position ? Even if Mrs. Foster were entirely innocent’in the premises, and was the victim of the fraud of her husband, yet either she or the plaintiff must suffer loss in the present case; and no principle is better settled than that where loss must fall upon one of two innocent parties,- it must be borne by that one who is most in fault. There is no reason for exempting the wife from the operation of this rule. On the contrary, in transactions between the husband and wife and third parties, there is the strongest reason for applying the principle. It would be against public policy, and expose transactions relative to real estate to hazard, to allow a married woman, to screen herself from the consequences of her own acts under the circumstances of the 'present case. Such a doctrine would subordinate all other interests to those of married women.

Opinion of the Court — Mr. Justice NELSON

Primary Opinion

Mr. Justice NELSON

delivered the opinion of the court.

By the laws of Minnesota, an acknowledgment of the-execution of a deed before the proper officers, privately and apart from her husband, by a feme covert, is an essential prerequisite to the conveyance of her real estate or any interest therein. And she is'disabled-from executing or acknowledging á deed by procuration, as she cannot make a power of attorney. These disabilities exist by statute and the common law for her protection, in consideration of her dependent condition, and to guard her against undue influence and restraint.

Now, it is conceded, in this case,-that the instrument Mrs. Foster signed and acknowledged was not a deed or mortgage; that, on the contrary, it was a blank paper; and that in order to make it available as a deed or mortgage, it must be taken, to have been signed and. acknowledged with the design to have the blanks filled by the husband, or some other person, before the delivery. We agree — if she was competent to convey her real estate by signing and acknowledging the deed in blank, and delivering the same to an-agent, with'an express- or implied authority to fill up the-blank and perfect the eonveyance-^-that its validity could not well be controverted. Although it was, at one time doubted whether a parol authority was adequate to authorize an alteration or addition to a sealed instruir ent, the 'better ppinion, at this day, is that the power is sufficient,

But there are two insuperable objections to this view in the present case. First, Mrs. Foster was disabled in law from delegating a person, either in writing or by parol, to fill up the blanks and deliver the mortgage; and, second, there could be no acknowledgment of the deed within the requisitions of the statute until the blanks-were filled and the instrument complete. ■ Till then there was no deed to be acknowledged. The act of the feme covert and of the officers were nullities, and the form of acknowledgment annexed as much waste paper as the blank mortgage itself, at the time- of signing.

It is insisted, however, that Mrs. Foster should be estopped from denying that she had signed and acknowledged the' mortgage. . The answer to this is, that to permit an estoppel to operate against her would be a virtual repeal of the statute that extends to. her this protection, and a,lso a denial of the disability of the common law that forbids-the conveyance of her real estate by procuration.' It would introduce into the law an entirely new system of conveyances of the real property of feme coverts. Instead of the transaction being a real one in conformity with established law, conveyances, by signing and acknowledging blank sheets of paper,- would be the only formalities requisité. The consequences of such a system are apparent, and need not be stated.

There is authority for saying, that where a perfect deed has been signed and acknowledged before the proper officer, an inquiry into the examination of the feme covert, embracing the requisites of the statute, as constituting the acknowledgment, with a view to contradict the writing, is inadmissible; that acts of the officer for this purpose are judicial- and conclusive. We express no'opinion upon the soundness of this doctrine, as it is not material in this case. The case before us is very different. There is no defect in the form of the acknowledgment, or in the private examination. No inquiry is here made into them. The defect is in the deed, which it is not made the duty of this officer to write,_ fill up, or examine, and for the legal validity of which he' is ■ no way responsible. The two instruments are distinct. The deed may be filled up without any official authority, and may be good or bad. The acknowledgment requires such authority. The difficulty here is not in the form of the acknowledgment, but that it applied to a nonentity, and was, therefore, nugatory. The truth is, that the acknowledgment in this case might as well have been taken and made on a separate piece of paper, and at some subsequent period attached by the officer, or some other person, to a deed that had never been- before the feme covert. ' The argument in support of its validity would be equally strong.

Our opinion is that, as it respects Mrs. Foster, the mortgage is not binding on her estate.

"We may regret the misfortune of the complainant from the conclusion at which we have arrived; - but it seems to us impossible to extend the relief prayed, for by the bill of foreclosure, without abrogating the protection which the law for ages has • thrown around the estates of married women. Losses of the kind may be guarded against, on the part of dealers in real estate, by care and caution; and we think that this burden should be imposed on them, rather than that a .sacrifice should be made of the rights of ,a class who are dependent enough in the business affairs of life, even when all the privileges with which the law surrounds them are left unimpaired.

DECREE AEEIRMED.

N. E. A decree made below, on a cross-bill ordering the mortgagee to cancel the wife’s name on the .mortgage, was affirmed here. The cross-bill set up, substantially, the facts disclosed in the answer to the original bill; and the proofs taken in each case were the same.

Cited By Later Decisions (3)

Public Domain Federal Judicial Work (17 U.S.C. § 105) · Harvard Law School Caselaw Access Project (CAP).