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Blanchard v. Brown

70 U.S. 245 1865-12 2,082 Words
Full Case Caption
Blanchard v. Brown
Official & Parallel Citations
3 Wall. 245 · 70 U.S. 245 · 18 L. Ed. 69
Court & Volume
Supreme Court of the United States · 70 U.S.

Syllabus & Case Posture

Blanchard v. Brown.

In Illinois, and under its statutes relating to ejectment, when a question of fraud in obtaining a title to real estate has been submitted, in a suit in ejectment, to a jury, and determined against the party setting it up, such party, notwithstanding the nature of the action, cannot go into equity and ask relief there, setting up essentially the same frauds, and sustaining them by the same evidence that he relied on to make out his case in the suit in ejectment at law,

The doctrine of Miles v. Caldwell (2 Wallace, 35), a case from Missouri, giving the same conclusive effect to a verdict and judgment in ejectment as to verdicts in other actions — the form of the ejectment not being fictitious — held applicable in Illinois, and under its statutes.

Various judgments had been given against a debtor in Chicago owning real estate there; among them one in favor of Lyman. Execution issued in April, 1847, and on it, in April, 1848, the premises were sold to Blanchard.

A certain Hart had also obtained judgment against the same party. Execution issued in 1845; but was not returned into the clerk’s office until 1852. The execution, it seemed, recited a judgment of the Cook County Court of Common Pleas; a court not at the time in existence; that court having been created by act of legislature only in 1848; and the name of the court in which the judgment was really given, — to wit, the “ Cook County Court,”- — having in that act been changed to it. An alias was subsequently issued on the same judgment, and the land sold for $71 to Brown; its actual value, at the time, being about $2000, or, as was alleged, even $4000.

Blanchard being in possession, Brown brought ejectment against him. Both parties, of course, claimed under the same judgment debtor, and by virtue of their respective judgments and execution sales; the judgment under which Blanchard claimed being junior to the one on which Brown rested his title, and judgments being liens in Illinois according to their priority. Blanchard set up, as his ground of defence on this ejectment, that the sale under the judgment in favor of Hart, and under which Brown sought to dispossess him, was a fraudulent sale, made to defeat subsequent encumbrancers, and, accordingly, that Brown had no title. -To show the fraud, evidence was given of the value of the properly compared with the price for which it sold; that it was sold in a body, instead of having been sold, as it might naturally and much more profitably have been, in a divided form; that false representations were made as to the encumbrances on it, the representations having been that it was largely encumbered when it was not so; that no proper notice of the sale had been given, the advertisement which gave the notice having announced only that the sale would be on a day named, “ between 9 o’clock a.m. and sunset.”

Opinion of the Court — Mr. Justice DAVIS

Primary Opinion

Mr. Justice DAVIS

delivered the opinion of the court.

The common-law form of the action of ejectment does not prevail in Illinois. There the action is without fictions, and is between the real parties in interest, and for the possession of a specific estate, and damages for its detention. On account of the fictitious character of the common-law action of ejectment, a judgment was not a complete bar, as in other actions. But in Illinois, by statute, it is declared, “ that every judgment in the action of ejectment, rendered upon a verdict, shall be conclusive as to the title established, in such action, upon the party against whom the same is rendered, and all persons claiming from, through, or under such pai’ty, by title accruing after the commencement of such action.” One verdict alone was not deemed satisfactory by the legislature. The ancient reverence for the tenure by which lands are h4d had its influence, and the unsuccessful party, of right, is entitled to one new trial, and the court can, if satisfied that justice will thereby be promoted, grant a second. After this the litigation is ended, and the verdict and judgment have the same conclusive effect as in other actions. In Missouri, a judgment in ejectment is also a bar to any othei action, between the same parties, on the same subject-matter; and this court, in the ease of Miles v. Caldwell, in construing a statute, no broader than the Illinois enactment, h°M that whatever is conclusive of the title to land in the courts of a State, is equally conclusive in the Federal cornts; that it is, in fact, a rule of property. ' A perfect solution is, therefore, given to this case when it is ascertained what was tried and determined in the ejectment suit. The evidence on this point is so full as to leave no room for doubt.

Blanchard did not resist Brown’s recoveiy in the action of ejectment on the sole question of paramount legal title, which he had the right to do, and then endeavor to get rid of it in chancery on the question of superior equities. He chose rather to risk his whole defence in the impeachment of B .-own’s title for fraud, and because the sale was vitiated by ii regularities and the property sacrificed. Having failed before the jury, he is estopped from investigating the same matters in another jurisdiction. He waived his right to have the question of fraud litigated in a court of chancery, when he presented it, as a defence to the action at law. And the defence was legitimate and proper, for such questions of fraud and irregularity as were raised could be disposed of as well at law as in chancery.

A grossly inadequate price is, under some circumstances, evidence of fraud, and a fit subject of inquiry by a jury, in determining the validity of a sale made under legal process. If the sale on the Hart execution was not made for the purpose of satisfying the judgment, but fraudulently to defeat subsequent encumbrancers, and Brown was not a bond fide purchaser for value, then his title was bad; and it was equally bad, if the irregularities were such as to render the sale void.

Evidence was given on all these matters, and was never withdrawn from the consideration of the jury. In fact the whole record shows that Blanchard claims equitable relief on substantially the same grounds, and sustained by the same evidence that he relied on to defeat the action of ejectment. The decision in Miles v. Caldwell is, therefore, applicable. In that case, as in this, the question of fraud had been submitted to the jury, and determined against the complainant; and this court held that he was barred by the proceedings in ejectment, and could not raise anew in chancery the same questions that were heard at law.

Decree affirmed with costs.

2 Wallace, 44.

Cited By Later Decisions (1)

Public Domain Federal Judicial Work (17 U.S.C. § 105) · Harvard Law School Caselaw Access Project (CAP).