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Brown v. Tarkington

70 U.S. 377 1865-12 1,605 Words
Full Case Caption
Brown v. Tarkington
Official & Parallel Citations
3 Wall. 377 · 70 U.S. 377 · 18 L. Ed. 255
Court & Volume
Supreme Court of the United States · 70 U.S.

Syllabus & Case Posture

Brown v. Tarkington.

Promissory notes given for a balance found due on settlement in a transaction itself forbidden by statute and illegal, or for money lent to enable a party to pay bills which the person taking the promissory notes had himself assisted, in violation of statute, to issue and circulate, cannot be enforced.

2. The fact that such promissory notes are given for a balance found due, or to enable a principal party in the illegal transaction to pay notes that have got into public circulation and are unpaid, does not purge them from the infirmity which belonged to the original vicious transaction.

3. Where a deposition, after a motion on grounds set forth has been unsuccessfully made at one term to suppress it, as irregularly taken, is at another read on trial without objection or exception, it cannot be ob jected to here on the grounds that were made for its suppression, or at all.

This was a writ of error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Distinct of Indiana.

The case was this: The suit was brought by Brown, the plaintiff in error, to recover against Tarkington and others, defendants, the amount of four promissory notes, and another small sum, in the aggregate exceeding twelve thousand dollars. The defendants were stockholders in the Bank of Tekama, in the Territory of Nebraska, organized under a charter granted by the legislature, February 13, 1857. The notes were signed by its president, S. L. Campbell.

Opinion of the Court — Mr. Justice NELSON

Primary Opinion

Mr. Justice NELSON

delivered the opinion of the court.

"We perceive no valid objection to the charge given by the learned judge below. It referred to the facts with great particularity and accuracy. The principle of law which it laid down is familiar, and the evidence in the ease called for its application. The illegality of the charter of the bank, and of the organization under it, as well as the business of banking conducted through its means, were matters not in controversy upon the evidence. The only material question open was, whether or not the plaintiff was pariiceps criminis ? If he was, he was disabled, under the maxim, to recover. The law leaves the party thus situated where it finds him. If either has sustained loss by the bad faith of his associates, it is but a just punishment for the illegal adventure.

To the argument of the counsel for the plaintiff — that admitting the banking transactions to be illegal, yet that the settlement of the balance and giving notes for the same purged the new promise, as he calls it, from the original taint — the answer is, that the new promise is founded upon the illegal consideration; a debt or demand growing out of the illegal transactions: and is as infirm*, in the eye of the law, as the implied promise that existed previous to the giving of the notes.

There were several prayers for instructions on the part of the plaintiff, which were refused in the form presented. Most of them were irrelevant and immaterial, and neither even alluded to the ground upon which the case was placed before the jury. The court embraced in its charge all that was material or pertinent in the instructions prayed for.

It is also insisted for the plaintiff that the deposition of S. L. Campbell, the president of the bank, was improperly admitted on account of an irregularity in taking it under the act of Congress. It appears that a motion had been made, at a previous term of the court, to set aside this deposition on the ground stated; which was denied. On the trial, when the deposition was offered, no objection was made to it. The question, therefore, is not in the bill of exceptions; on the contrary, if any valid objection existed, it was waived by not taking advantage of it at the trial.

[See Orchard v. Hughes, 1 Wallace, 73; Brooks v. Martin, 2 Id. 70.—Rep.]

Judgment affirmed.

Cited By Later Decisions (7)

Public Domain Federal Judicial Work (17 U.S.C. § 105) · Harvard Law School Caselaw Access Project (CAP).