United States v. Fisk
Syllabus & Case Posture
United States v. Fisk.
“Bankers” who sell the Federal securities no otherwise than for the United States ar.d for themselves, and who, therefore, do not sc-U them for others or for a commission, are not liable to pay the duties imposed by the 99th section of the Internal Bevc-nue Act, of June 80, 18G4, imposed upon '• brokers and bankers doing business as broker» ”
The “Internal Revenue Act,” of 30th June, 1S64, “to provide ways and means for the support of government, and for other purposes,” declares, by its 99th section, as follows:
“ All brokers and bankers doing business as brokers, shall be subject to pay the following duties and rates of duty upon the sales of merchandise, produce, gold and silver bullion, foreign exchange, promissory notes, stocks, bonds, or other securities, and shall also be subject to all the provisions of the act for making returns, assessments, and collection of the duties.”
The ninth paragraph of the 79th section of the same act says:
“ Brokers shall pay $50 for each license. Every person, firm, or company (except such as hold a license as banker), whose business it is as a broker to negotiate purchases or sales of stocks, exchange, bullion, coined money, bank notes, promissory notes, or other securities, shall be regarded as a broker [and shall make oath or affirmation that all their transactions are made for a commission], provided that any person holding a license as a banker shall not be required to take out a license as a broker.”
Opinion of the Court — Mr. Justice G-KIEB,
Primary OpinionMr. Justice G-KIEB,
delivered the opinion of the court.
In the construction of statutes, it is the duty of the court to ascertain the clear intention of the legislature. In order to do this, courts are often compelled to construe “ or” as meaning “ and,” and again “ and” as meaning “ or.”
The purpose and intent of the legislature, in the amendment made to the ninth paragraph, was evidently not to change the correct definition given of the term “ broker,” and to make it mean that every man who sold his own stock was a broker, and liable to pay fifty dollars for a license. The obvious purpose of the amendment was to compel brokers to render an account of all sales made, whether for themselves or others, and to pay the duty on them. As is often the case in statutes, though the intention is clear, the words used to express it may be ill chosen.
The evil intended to be remedied by the amendment was transparent. If the amendment had been properly expressed, it should have been added as a proviso to the 99th section, which relates to the rates of duty to be paid on sales made in the stock-market by brokers or others licensed and doing business as such, and in the preceding case the court have so construed it.
Now, a banker pays a much higher license tax than a broker, and is permitted to “prosecute or carry on” the business or profession of a broker without paying any further license; but if he prefers, he may not combine that business with his own. The 110th section prescribes the duties to be paid by a banker. It is not amended so as to require him to render an account of his purchases or sales of government stocks for himself. The case before us, therefore, presents no other question than the construction of the 99th section. It enacts that “all brokers and bankers doing business as brokers shall be subject to the following duties,” &c.
Now, in order to subject a banker to the duties prescribed by this section, we are asked to interpolate the important word “ not,” and to construe it as including bankers who do not, as well as those who do transact “ business as brokers.”. This would not be a construction of the statute, but an amendment thereof in direct contradiction of its language. This we do not feel at liberty to make.
Judgment affirmed.