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Rutherford v. Geddes

71 U.S. 220 1866-12 1,400 Words
Full Case Caption
Rutherford v. Geddes
Official & Parallel Citations
4 Wall. 220 · 71 U.S. 220 · 18 L. Ed. 343
Court & Volume
Supreme Court of the United States · 71 U.S.

Syllabus & Case Posture

Rutherford v. Geddes.

1. Depositions cannot be used on the trial of a suit in admiralty, which were taken in another suit concerning the same subject-matter, where the party against whom they are offered was not a party to the suit in which they were taken, nor privy to any such party, and had no right to cross-examine the witnesses.

2. Nor can depositions be read in admiralty any more than at common law, without some sufficient reason being shown why the witness was not produced at the hearing.

Appeal from a decree in admiralty rendered by the Circuit Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana.

’ The appellant, Butherford, was, in 1850, the owner of the steam propeller Stanton, and had put her in charge of the towboat Diana, which was to tow her to sea from Hew Orleans. The Diana proceeded down the Mississippi with her tow, the Stanton, and on the 23d of January a collision took place between the Diana and the steamship Ohio-, coming up the river. The Stanton was struck and sunk, and the Diana greatly injured.

Immediately afterwards, Rutherford, as owner of the Stanton, and the Independent Towboat Company, as owner of the Diana, brought suit in the District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, against the Ohio, to recover damages, but in both failed to recover.

Opinion of the Court — Mr. Justice MILLER,

Primary Opinion

Mr. Justice MILLER,

delivered the opinion of the court.

On the trial of this case in the District Court the libellant procured a decree in his favor mainly upon testimony-found in certain depositions offered by him. To the admission of these depositions in evidence, the defendants objected, and when the objection was overruled they carried the case by appeal to the Circuit Court.

The Circuit Court excluded the depositions, and if the action of that court was correct in this respect, there can be no doubt that its decree dismissing the libel was the necessary result of the case as it stood on the remaining testimony.

The depositions relied on by appellant, were properly ruled out, for the reason that they were taken without notice to defendants, in another suit to which defendants were not parties, and in which they had no right or opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. Hor were defendants in any manner privies to either party in the former suit, in which the depositions had been taken. This alone, it is well settled, is a sufficient reason for their exclusion.

But when, to this consideration, it is added, that no reason is shown why the witnesses were not introduced in person, it is quite clear that the Circuit Court was right in rejecting the depositions.

The decree of the Circuit Court dismissing the libel is, therefore,

AEEIRMED.

Cited By Later Decisions (1)

Public Domain Federal Judicial Work (17 U.S.C. § 105) · Harvard Law School Caselaw Access Project (CAP).