Semple v. Hagar
Syllabus & Case Posture
Semple v. Hagar.
1. When a want of jurisdiction is patent, or can be readily ascertained by an examination of the record in advance of an examination of the questions on the argument of the merits, this court will entertain and act upon a motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction.
2. Where two parties held patents for land from the United States, under Mexican grants, both of which included the same lands in part, and one of the parties brought a suit in a State court to vacate the patent of the other, to the extent of the conflict of title, and the State court refused to entertain jurisdiction of the question, and dismissed the complaint, this court has no jurisdiction, under the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act, to review the judgments.
Semple filed a bill against llagar in one of tlie State courts of California. The bill alleged that he, the complainant Semple, bad obtained a patent from tbe United States for a tract of land, based upon a Mexican grant for tbe same land, known as tbe “ Coins” grant; that tbe land so granted bad been surveyed by the United States, and included certain lands enumerated; that tbe defendants claimed part of tbe same land under a Mexican grant known as tbe “ Jimeno” grant, for which a patent had also been issued by tbe United States to tbe defendants; that tbe surveys of tbe said grants overlapped; that the grant of tbe “ Jimeno” tract bad been obtained by fraud and was a cloud on tbe complainant’s title. The prayer of tbe bill was that tbe court might declare “ tbe said fraudulent grant, commonly called tbe ‘ Ji-meno Rancho,’ void, and of no effect, as issued upon false suggestions, and without authority of law.”
Tbe defendant demurred to this bill, setting forth nine several grounds of demurrer, and among them these:
1st. That tbe court bad no jurisdiction of tbe subject of tbe action.
Opinion of the Court — Mr. Justice GRIER,
Primary OpinionMr. Justice GRIER,
delivered the opinion of the court.
In all cases of a motion to dismiss the writ of error for want of jurisdiction, the court must necessarily examine the record to find the questions decided by the State court. But in many cases the question of jurisdiction is so involved with the other questions decided in the case, that this court cannot eliminate it without the examination of a voluminous record, and passing on the whole merits of the case. In such instances, the court will reserve the question of jurisdiction till the case is heard on the final argument on the merits.
In the case before us, the want of jurisdiction is patent; it requires no investigation of a long bill of exceptions. It was not decided by the court below on its merits, if it had any. It furnishes no reason for a postponement of our decision of the question.
If, in such cases, the court would postpone the consideration of the question of jurisdiction, we would put it in the power of every litigant in a State court to obtain a stay of execution for three years, or more, by a frivolous pretence that it comes within the provisions of the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act. In many States, all the land titles originated in patents from the United States; and if every question of boundary, of descent, of construction of wills, of contracts, &c., and which may arise in State coui’ts, may be brought here on the mere suggestion that the- party, against whom the State court gave their judgment, derived title under a patent from the United States, we should enlarge our jurisdiction to thousands of cases, and increase, unnecessarily, the burdens of this court, with no corresponding benefit to the litigant. It is plain that, in such cases, there is not “ drawn in question the validity of a treaty, or statute of, or an authority exercised under, the United States.”
"We have here a very brief record, and, on the facts of the case, we cannot shut our eyes to the total want of jurisdiction, under the twenty-fifth section, or any other section of the Judiciary Act.
It is plain, that if the court had assumed jurisdiction, and had declared the defendant’s patent void, for the reason alleged in the bill, the defendant would have had a case which might have been reviewed by this court, under the twenty-fifth section, and one on which there might have been a question and difference of opinion. But it is hard to perceive how the twenty-fifth section could apply to a judgment of a State court, which did NOT decide that question, and refused to take jurisdiction of the cay matter is too plain for argument.
Motion grant