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Chicopee Bank v. Philadelphia Bank

75 U.S. 641 1869-12 3,847 Words
Full Case Caption
Chicopee Bank v. Philadelphia Bank
Official & Parallel Citations
8 Wall. 641 · 75 U.S. 641 · 19 L. Ed. 422
Court & Volume
Supreme Court of the United States · 75 U.S.

Syllabus & Case Posture

Chicopee Bank v. Philadelphia Bank.

. Although a bill payable at a particular bank, be physically, and in point of fact, in the bank, still, if the bank be wholly ignorant of its being there — ns when, ex. gr., a letter in which the bill was transmitted when, brought from the post-office to the bank has been laid down with other papers on the cashier’s-desk, and before being taken up or seen by the cashier has slipped through a crack in the desk, and so disappeared — the1 fact of the bill being thus physically present in the bank does not make a presentment.

And this is so, although the acceptor had no funds there, did not call-to pay the bill, and in fact did not moan to pay it anywhere.

2. In such a case, therefore, the holder cannot look to prior parties, even though, by having been informed after inquiry by him, that'the bill had not been received at the collecting bank, they could have inferred that it had not been paid at maturity by the acceptor.

3. A court having fairly submitted to a jury the evidence in a ease, and charged as favorably to a party as he could properly have asked, may, in the exercise of its discretion, refuse a request by .that party to charge as to which sido the burden of proof belongs.

4. An accidental loss or disappearance in a bank of a bill sent to it to collect, from the bank’s not taking sufficient care of letters brought to it from the mail, carries with it a presumption of negligenpe in the bank; and on a suit against it, the burden of proof is on the bank to explain the negligence:

Opinion of the Court — Mr. Justice NELSON

Primary Opinion

Mr. Justice NELSON

delivered the opinion of the court.

The case was put to the jury, whether or not the loss of the-bill, and consequent inability of the collection bank to take the proper steps against the acceptors to charge the prior parties, was attributable to negligence, and want of care on the part of the- Chicopee Bank, and that, if it was, the bank was responsible. The jury found for the plaintiffs.

In cases' where ;the drawee accepts the bill, generally, in order to charge the drawer or indorser, the holder must present tfie paper, when due, at his place of business, if he has one, if not, a£ his dwelling or residence, aud demand payment7; and, if the.'money is not paid, give due notice to the prior parties. If he accepts the bill, payable at a particular place, it must be presented at that place, and payment demanded. In these instances, as a general rule, the bill 'must be present when the demand is made, as in case of payment the acceptor is entitled to it as his voucher. When .tlie bill is made payable at a bank, it has been held that the presence of the bill in the bank at maturity, with the fact' that the acceptor had no funds there, or, if he had, were not to be applied to payment of the paper, constitute a sufficient presentment and demand; and, if the bill is the property of the bank, the presence of tlje paper there need not be proved, as the presumption of law is, that the paper was in the bank,. and the burden rests upon the defendant to show that the acceptor called to pay it.

Iii the present case, it is argued that the bill was in the Chicopee Bank at the time of its maturity, and, as the' acceptors had no funds there, a sufficient presentment and demand were made, according to the law merchant. It is true the bill was there physically, but, within the sense of this law, it was no more present at the bank than if it had been lost in the street by the messenger on his way from the post-office to the bank, and had remained there at maturity; and this loss, which occasioned the failure to take the proper steps, or, rather, in the present case, to furnish the holder with the proper evidence of the dishonor of the paper, so as to charge the prior parties, and enable him to have recourse against them, is wholly attributable, according to the verdict of the jury, to the collecting bank. In the eye of the law merchant there was no presentment or demand against the acceptors; and, as a consequence of this default, the holder has lost his remedy against the drawer and indorser, which entitles him to one against the defendant. /The radical vice in the defence being the failure to prove a presentment and demand upon the acceptors at. the maturity of the bill, the question of notice is unimportant.

But, if it had been otherwise, the notice itself was utterly, .defective. That relied on is the answer of the defendant to the telegram of the plaintiff of the 20th February, which was, that the bill had not yet been received. This was after its maturity, and it simply advised the holder and payee indorser, to whom the information was communicated the same day, that the drawer and indorser were discharged from any liability on the paper. It .showed that the proper steps had not been taken against the acceptors to charge them.

Some criticism is made upon the refusal of the court below to charge, as to which side the burden of proof belonged, in respect to the question of negligence and want of care, after the paper came into the hands of the defendant. No objection is taken to the. charge itself, upon this question, and, indeed, could not have been, as the point was submitted to the jury as favorably to 'the defendants as could have been asked. We think the court, after having submitted fairly the evidence on both sides bearing upon the question, had a right, in the exercise of its discretion, to refuse the request.

■If, however, the court had inclined to go further, and charge as to the burden of proof, it should have been that it belonged- to'the defendant. The loss of the bill by the bank carried with it the presumption of negligence and want of care; and, if it was capable of explanation, so as to rebut this presumption, the facts and circumstances were peculiarly in the possession of its officers, and the defendant was bound to fhrnish it. Where a peculiar obligation is cast upon a person to take cafe of goods intrusted to his charge, if they are lost or damaged while in his custody, the presumption is that the loss-or damage was occasioned by his negligence, .or want of care of himself or of his servants. This presumption arises with respect to goods lost or injured, which have been deposited in a public inn, or which had beeu intrusted to a common carrier. But the presumption may be rebutted.

Judgment aeeirmed.

Chitty on Bills, p. 305 a, 353, Springfield ed. 1842; 1 Parsons on Notes and Bills, pp. 363, 421, 437; Byles on Bills, p. 251 and note; Fullerton v. Bank of United States, 1 Peters, 604; Bank of United States v. Carneal, 2 Id. 543; Seneca Co Bank v. Neas, 5 Denio, 329; Bank v. Napier, 6 Humphry, 270; Folgar v. Chase, 18 Pickering, 63.

Dawson v. Chamney, 5 Q. B. 104; Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Lord Raymond, 918; Day v. Riddle, 16 Vermont, 48; 1 Phillips on Evidence, Oowen’s & Hill's Notes, p. 633.

Public Domain Federal Judicial Work (17 U.S.C. § 105) · Harvard Law School Caselaw Access Project (CAP).