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Gibson v. Chouteau

75 U.S. 314 1868-12 1,488 Words
Full Case Caption
Gibson v. Chouteau
Official & Parallel Citations
8 Wall. 314 · 75 U.S. 314 · 19 L. Ed. 317
Court & Volume
Supreme Court of the United States · 75 U.S.

Syllabus & Case Posture

Gibson v. Chouteau.

1. It is necessary to the jurisdiction of this court, under the 25th section of the Judiciary Act, that the record show, either by express words or necessary legal intendment, that one of the questions mentioned in that act was before the State court, and was decided by it.

2. Neither the argument of counsel nor the opinion of the court below can be looked to for this purpose.

3. Where there are other questions in the record, on which the judgment of the State court might have rested, independently of the Federal question, this court cannot reverse the judgment.

On. motion to dismiss a writ of error to the Supreme Court of Missouri. The case purported to be brought, here, under the 25th section of the Judiciary Act, which gives this court jurisdiction to review judgments in the highest court of a State, where there has been drawn in question the validity of.an authority exercised under the United States, and the decree is against such validity, or where there is drawn in question the construction of any statute of, or commission exercised under the United States, and the decree is against the title, right, or privilege, or exemption specially set up; or, where there is drawn in question the validity of a statute of, or an authority exercised under any State on the ground of their being repugnant to the laws of the United States, and the decision is in favor of such their validity..

The record showed that, the plaintiff' below, who was also plaintiff* here, filed his petition in the Land Court of St. Louis, to recover of the defendants a tract of sixty-four acres of land. The petitions stated that Mrs. Mary McRee was, prior to August 20th, 1862, invested with the title by ike United Slates, and that on the day mentioned, she conveyed the same to him.

Opinion of the Court — Mr. Justice MILLER

Primary Opinion

Mr. Justice MILLER

delivered the opinion of the court

The record presented to the Supreme Court questions the validity of Mrs. McRee’s title, the transfer of her titlé to plaintiff, the trust asserted by which plaintiff’s title enured to the benefit of defendants, and the statute of limitations. On all these the court below must have found for plaintiff, for such a finding was essential to his recovery. The first judgment of the Supreme Court affirming the judgmeut of the Land Court must also have found all these issues for the plaintiff.

We arc asked now to hold that the second judgment of the Supreme Court, which reversed that of tiie Laud Court, was founded on the question of limitation. If we look to the language used in the judgment of the court in setting aside its judgment of affirmance and granting a rehearing, or in the final judgment of reversal, we can see nothing to justify that inference.

Tins court has decided, in the case of Rector v. Ashley, following Williams v. Norris, that the opinion of the court cannot be resorted to for the purpose of showing that a question of Federal cognizance was decided by the State court. In the present case it is said that the application for a rehearing was based exclusively on the question of the statute of limitation. That which is here called a motion for a rehearing is merely an argument of counsel setting forth numerous decisions of the courts, and many reasons of counsel why the statute should be held to be a bar; and it insists that this question had not received sufficient attention at the hands of the court. It is not easy to see how this argument can be regarded as a part of the record of the ease.' It can have no better claim to be so regarded than the opiuion of the court, which accompanies the record.

If, however, it could be treated as part of the record) it. affords no conclusive evidence that the reheftring was granted on that ground.

But if we could infer that the rehearing was granted because the court was of opiuion that it had not well considered that question, it is to be remembered that the' reargument took place four months afterwards, that there is nothing to show what might then have been presented by counsel on either side, or what might have been considered by the court, for the case was fully opened, by setting aside the former judgment, to every consideration which cóuld rightfully influence the decision. It is hardly a reasonable inference, under these circumstances, that the court did decide the case on the question of the statute of limitation, and certainly it does not appear that the case was uecessarily decided on that quostiou, or that the proposition was essential to the judgment.

It is our opinion, therefore, that under the repeated decisions of this court, this record presents no case of which we have jurisdiction. The writ of error is therefore

Dismissed.

6 Wallace, 142.

12 Wheaton, 117.

Cited By Later Decisions (6)

Public Domain Federal Judicial Work (17 U.S.C. § 105) · Harvard Law School Caselaw Access Project (CAP).