Stansbury v. United States
Syllabus & Case Posture
Stansbury v. United States.
1. The act of August'23d, 1842, declaring that no officer of the government drawing a fixed salary, shall receive additional compensation for any service, unless it is authorized by law, and a specific appropriation made to pay it, is not repealed by the twelfth section of the Act of August 26, the same year.
2. An agreement by the Secretary of the Interior to pay a clerk in his department for services rendered to the government by labors abroad — the clerk still holding his place and drawing his pay as clerk in the Interior — was, accordingly, held void.
Appeal from, the Court of Claims, the case being thus:
A statute of the United States, passed August 23, 1842, enacts as follows:
“ No officer, in any branch of the public service, or any other person, whose salary, pay, or emoluments, is, or are fixed by law or regulations, shall receive any additional pay, extra allowance, or compensation, in any form whatever, for the disbursement of public money, or any other service or duty whatever, unless the same shall be authorized by low, and in the appropriation therefor explicitly set forth, that it is for such additional pay, extra allowance, or compensation.”
Opinion of the Court — Mr. Justice DAVIS
Primary OpinionMr. Justice DAVIS
delivered the opinion of the court.
The appellant insists that the written promise of the Secretary to pay him the value of his services, is a binding obligation on the government. But this is not so, for ho authority of law existed for the promise. The secretary could not pay the claim, because there was'n.o appropriation to pay it, and he was not authorized by Congress to create an agency to perform the service in question. lie undoubtedly acted in good faith with Stausbury, and supposed that Congress would approve the mode he adopted for obtaining useful information, and ratify^ his proceedings; and J¿s promise, under the circumstances, must be considered as a dependent one, to take effect, if Congress appropriated money.to enable him to comply with it. Congress having failed to make the appropriation, the secretary was justified in refusing to pay the claim.
But he was justified in hie refusal on another ground. The payment of the claim was forbidden by positive law.
The second section of the act of August 23d. 18.42, declares that no officer of the government, drawing a fixed salary, shall receive additional compensation for any service, unless it is authorized by law and a specific appropriation made to ■pay it. When Stansbury was appointed in 1851, this law was in force, and afforded notice to all employees of the government, of the policy of Congress on the subject to which it relates. The law was passed to remedy an evil which had existed, of detailing officers with fixed pay to perform duties outside of their regular employment, and paying them for it, when the government was entitled, without this double pay, to all their services. The law prohibited, and was intended to do so, the allowance of such claims as these, madé by public officers, for extra compensation, on the ground of extra services.
But. the appellant insists, if the above act embraced.clerks in' the departments, its operation has been withdrawn from them by the twelfth section of the act of 26th of August, 1842. It is difficult to see how this conclusion is reached, because this section refuses to pay clerks or other officers in the departments for doing the duties of other clerks or officers, and refuses, further, to pay them for extra services of any kind.
There is no inconsistency between the provisions of the two acts, which were passed within few-days of each other, and were parts of a system, intended for the guidance of those in the employ of the government. These provisions .furnished notice to all in authority, that in no event could clerks in the departments be paid for doing the work of their fellow-clerks, nor could they be paid for any other service, unless it was authorized by law, and followed by an appropriation to pay for it.
Stausbury’s appointment was not authorized by law, nor was there any appropriation to pay for the services which he ■ expected to render the department.
It follows, therefore, that the transaction between Secretary Stuart and himself was in violation of the statute, and cannot be the foundation of an action.
Judgment affirmed.