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Insurance Co. v. Weide

76 U.S. 677 1869-12 1,610 Words
Full Case Caption
Insurance Company v. Weide
Official & Parallel Citations
9 Wall. 677 · 76 U.S. 677 · 19 L. Ed. 810
Court & Volume
Supreme Court of the United States · 76 U.S.

Syllabus & Case Posture

Insurance Company v. Weide.

1. Whether or not on the transfer of a case from a State court to a Federal court, under the 12th section of the Judiciary Act, a new declaration should be filed, is a question of practice and not a subject for error.

2. In a suit against an insurance company for the value of goods lost in the burning of a store, day-books and ledgers, whose correctness as showing the amount and value of the goods is testified to by the person proving them, are, in connection with his testimony, competent evidence, though they would not be so by themselves, to show such value.

8. Where a witness in such a suit, when examined in chief, testifies apparently to the correctness of an abstract made from papers burnt in the fire, and is cross-examined upon the subject of that correctness, the party cross-examining cannot, whore he has not caused the cross-examination to be brought up on the bill of exception, object, on a question, on error as to the admissibility of the abstract, that the witness has not testified sutficiently to the correctness. He should have caused the cross-examination to appear on the bill if he wish to show this.

4. Its correctness being assumed, the abstract is good as secondary evidence.

Error to the Circuit Court for the District of Minnesota.

Opinion of the Court — Mr. Justice NELSON

Primary Opinion

Mr. Justice NELSON

delivered the opinion of the court.

As the first question raised. If there was any irregularity in not filing a new complaint or declaration, it was too late, after the defendant had taken issue upon the complaint, to take advantage of it. The question, however, whether a new complaint, or declaration, should have been filed on a removal of the cause from a State court, is one of practice, and not the subject for which error will lie.

As to the second question, the admissibility, of the evidence received by the court. There can be no doubt but the day-books and ledger, the entries in which were testified to be correct by the persons who made them, were properly admitted. They would not have been evidence, per se, but with the testimony accompanying them all objection's were removed.

So, in respect to the memorandum on the fly-leaf of the ledger. It was made by one of the witnesses, taken from inventories, present at the time it was made, but which had been subsequently destroyed by the fire. Those inventories, if they had been in existence, would have been the best evi dence, and, unless their loss was accounted for, must have been produced. But, being lost, parol evidence of their contents was admissible, as secondary evidence, and so was the memorandum taken from them, for the like reason. As we understand the evidence in the case, the correctness of the entry was testified to. The witness was cross-examined, among other things, as to the correctness of it. The testimony is not given, but, if the evidence of the witness had not been satisfactory, it should have been placed upon the record.

In Merrill v. The Ithaca and Owego Railroad Company, it was held that when original entries are produced, and the person who made them, and knew them at the time to be true, testified that he made the entries, and that he believed them to be true, although at the time of testifying he had no recollection of the facts set forth in the entries, such evidence is admissible, as primd facie evidence for the jury. In this ease, Mr. Justice Cowan, who delivered the opinion of the court, examined most of the authorities, English and American, on the subject. The same doctrine is also sustained by the case of Guy v. Mead.

The learned counsel for the plaintiff in error is mistaken in supposing that the witness Joseph Weide did not testify to the correctness of the facts stated in the memorandum. As already stated, this very point was made the subject of cross-examination, and, if the witness failed to testify to it, the fact should have been set forth in the record, as it was most material for the defendant. The witness had stated on his examination-in-ehief, that he made the abstract in July, 1866, from the inventories for several years previous to the fire. Nothing else being shown, the inference is that it was correctly made: hence the cross-examination on this point to show the contrary. "We think that the memorandum was properly admitted, and that the judgment should be

Affirmed.

Wood v. Ambler. 4 Selden, 170.

16 Wendell, 586.

22 New York, 465-6.

Cited By Later Decisions (3)

Public Domain Federal Judicial Work (17 U.S.C. § 105) · Harvard Law School Caselaw Access Project (CAP).