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Wadsworth v. Warren

79 U.S. 307 1870-12 3,024 Words
Full Case Caption
Wadsworth v. Warren
Official & Parallel Citations
12 Wall. 307 · 79 U.S. 307 · 20 L. Ed. 402
Court & Volume
Supreme Court of the United States · 79 U.S.

Syllabus & Case Posture

Wadsworth v. Warren.

A. sued B. for rent as a co-losses with 0.; B., admitting bis mere signature, sot up in defence 'that he bad signed the lease with the express understanding between him and A. that one D. would also sign it; -that D. refused to sign it, and that it was then proposed by A. to have 0. in the place of A.; but that be, B., positively objected to having bis name on a lease with C.; that thereupon A. said that it would make'no differ'ence, for that he would release B. 0. now signed. Some evidence tended to prove these facts and some to prove a different state of focts The court submitted it to the jury whether there had been any acceptance of the lease by B. Held that this was equivalent to submitting to them'whether the instrument had been delivered at all as the deed of B., and tlmt this was a proper submission; and that it wasyiot equivalent (ás contended by the plaintiff in error) to submitting whether the deed had been delivered and accepted by B. on condition that he should be released afterwards; a submission which it was admitted by the court would not stand on the same footing.

Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois.

The action in, the court below was in covenant and brought by Wadsworth, who resided in New York but owned property at Chicago, against J. B. Warren and W. Fleming, to recover rent upon a written lease of the same, alleged to have been executed by the said Warren and Fleming.

. Fleming being a bankrupt, Warren alone defended. He appended to his plea denying that he oioed the money demanded, a notice that he would give in evidence on the trial that he and one Osgood agreed, with John Do.Noven, the agent of the plaintiff, to rent the property mentioned, and that he signed the lease with the express understanding that Osgood should also sign it; that after he, Warren, signed the lease De Noven sent it to Wadsworth, the plaintiff, in New York,-where it was executed by the plaintiff and returned to De Noven to bo executed by Osgood, but that Osgood refused to execute it; that afterwards Fleming agreed with DcNoven, as agent of the plaintiff, to take the premises for the same time and upon the same terms that the defendant and Osgood bad agreed to take them; that when the lease was signed by Fleming the defendant objected to having his name on the lease with Ffeming; that De Noven said it would make no difference, that he would release the defendant on the back.of the lease; that he wanted to use the lease signed by the plaintiff and Warren, as-it would obviate the necessity of sending to New York to get the plaintiff to sign a new lease; that De Noven delivered the lease to Fleming alone; that the defendant never'took possession- of the property demised, and never, paid or was tailed' upon for rent until after the bankruptcy of Fleming; that the defendant, never consented to be jointly bound with Fleming, or to be bound at all by-the covenants in the lease, and that it was expressly understood between the defendant and De Koven that “ he would, as agent of plaintiff', release defendant on the back of the lease before be delivered the' same to Fleming.”

The lease showed the signatures and seals of Warren (the defendant), Fleming (the bankrupt), and Wadsworth (the landlord and plaintiff), and their names were also inserted without erasures or interlineations in the body .of it. It was dated the 20th of April, 1867.

Opinion of the Court — Mr. Justice STRONG

Primary Opinion

Mr. Justice STRONG

delivered the opinion of the, court.

Were this case before us on a motion for a new trial we might feel constrained to send it back to another jury. ■ But it has been brought here by a writ of error, and we cau, therefore, reverse the judgment only for errors of law apparent in the record.

The testimony respecting the circumstances attending the transaction in question is contradictory. On the part of the defendant it is that he refused to accept the lease without having Osgood bound with him; that the plaintiff’s agent 'agreed to take Fleming in his and Osgood’s place, and agreed that when Fleming signed the contract ho would indorse on it a release of Warren, saying it Avould avoid the necessity of sending'a new lease to Wadsworth, the plaintiff, for his signature. On the other hand the plaintiff’s agent denies that he promised to release Warren, and states that he told him he was the only man he looked to for the rent. lie states .further that the defendant brought Fleming to him, that both signed the lease and a duplicate thereof, and that the duplicate Avas delivered to Fleming and the defendant. The lease is dated April 20th, 1867, and on the duplicate retained by the plaintiff’s agent there appears an assignment of all his interest in the lease by the defendant to Fleming. This assignment is dated April 27th, 1867, but it was evidently made on the day on which Fleming’s signature to the lease Avas made, for there is no evidence that the duplicate retained by the plaintiff’s agent Avas ever seen by the defendant after Fleming signed it. Coupling this with the evidence that He Koven, the plaintiff’s agent, had agreed to take Fleming in the place of Osgood aud Warren, and had said that signing the instrument in the manner in which it was signed, would avoid the necessity of sending a new lease to WadsAvorth, the lessor, for his signature; coupling it also with the other evidence, given by the defendant himself, that he did not accept the lease, or deliver the deed, we think it was a question to be submitted to the jury whether the contract had ever been consummated, or, in other words, whether it had been delivered and accepted as the contract of the defendant. It was not, therefore, erroneous to refuse the instruction prayed for, namely, “that the jury, upon the evidence given, should find the issue for the plaintiff.”

The other prayer of the plaintiff for instruction was substantially granted. The court, Avhen speaking of the alleged promise of De Koven to' release Warren from the lease, said it Avas a verbal promise not executed, and, “ if such was the agreement, Warren would have to look to He Koven for a breach of it, and would have no defence here.” And again’ the court said: “ The mere verbal promise of De Koven to release Mr. Warren would not be a good defence here, I think, but would leave Warren to turn over on De Koven for a breach of promise.”

Tlie remaining exceptions taken to the charge cannot be sustained.' It may be admitted, as contended for, by the plaintiff in error, that when a deed has been delivered, and the delivery has been accepted, a verbal agreement between the parties, made at the time of the delivery, or previous thereto, that one of them should be released from the covenants contained in the deed, cannot defeat an action at law brought for an alleged breach of those covenants; but the charge of the court was in harmony wdth this doctrine. It may also be conceded that there can be no conditional delivery of a deed to the grantee, or covenantee, therein named; but nothing in the charge intimated that there could he. The question submitted to the jury was, whether there had been any acceptance of the lease by the defendant. This was equivalent to submitting the inquiry, not whether the deed had been delivered on condition that Warren should be released afterward, but whether it had been delivered at all as the deed of the defendant. That such a submission was proper, in view of the evidence, we have already said.

Judgment affirmed.

Cited By Later Decisions (2)

Public Domain Federal Judicial Work (17 U.S.C. § 105) · Harvard Law School Caselaw Access Project (CAP).