Gregg v. Moss
Syllabus & Case Posture
Gregg v. Moss.
1. A judgment will not be reversed for the rejection of testimony, whether it was in strict principle admissible or not, where the rejection worked no harm to the party offering it.
2. Whether the evidence before a jury does or does not sustain the allegations in a case is a matter wholly within the province of the jury, and if they find in one way, this court cannot review their finding.
8. A. lent to B. & C. certain sum of money, whether for themselves or for a firm of which all parties were members, was a matter not clear. The money was, however, in fact, put in the firm by B. & O. An agree- ’• ment was subsequently made, by all the partners, reciting that some had advanced money beyond their shares, and agreeing that each should make a statement of what he had advanced, and that the accounts so rendered and agreed upon should remain capital stock, and that partner’s stock in the partnership. On the trial evidence being given, on the one hand, tending to show that in a statement furnished by A. in professed pursuance of the agreement, he had not included this money lent to B. & C., and on the other that at the time of the agreement he had agreed that he would put it in, an instruction was held to be correct which told the jury, that if at the time of the agreement between the partners, A. had assented to treat this money as an advance and to fund it, B. & O. would not remain personally liable on the original loan, if it had in truth been made to them personally; and that the fact that A. did not include the amount in his statement of advances made was not material, provided, as already said, that at the time of the agreement he had in fact agreed to include it. .
Error to the Circuit Court for the Northern District of Illinois; the case, as assumed by the court from a bill of exceptions covering thirty 8vo. pages, in long primer type, without any assignment of errors, having been thus:
Richard Gregg sued W. S. Moss, in assumpsit, on this instrument; Kellogg, the party signing it with Moss, having been wholly insolvent.
Opinion of the Court — Mr. Justice MILLER
Primary OpinionMr. Justice MILLER
delivered the opinion of the court.
This cause has been submitted to us on printed arguments on each side, with replies and counter-replies, none of which contains any regular assignment of errors, as required by the twenty-first rule of this court. The record presents a bill of exceptions of thirty printed pages of testimony, which is certified to be all that was given on the trial, and the arguments address themselves to the entire merits on this evidence.
¥e have felt very much inclined'to dismiss the writ of error or affirm the judgment without an attempt to look up the questions of law which might possibly be involved in the record, for the number of cases coming to this court in which the bill of exceptions embodies all the evidence offered, and counsel, tempted by this, argue before us the whole case as ff the verdict concluded nothing, requires a decisive remedy.
As far as we are. able to see there are but two questions of law raised by the reeord.
The first relates to the exclusion of a single item of evidence offered by the plaintiff, and the second to the charge of the court.
The plaintiff having-proved the signatures to the letter of December. 23d, 1856, and that the sum mentioned in it was received by Mr. Kellogg, offered in the further progress of his case to prove by a competent witness that only a few minutes after Kellogg had obtained the money he told the witness that be had received the money from the plaintiff", and had. “fixed Elder .off,” and that Elder had gone home. The exclusion of this testimony is the occasion of the first bill of exception.
We have a learned argument on the vexed question of the admissibility of the deelai’atio'ns of one partner, or joint obligor, against the other. But we are of opinion that the ruling of the court presents no error which should reverse the judgment, because its rejection worked no harm to the plaintiff. The execution of the paper was not denied, nor was it coptroverted, except by the general form of the pleading, that Kellogg had received the money. It had already been proved by several other witnesses and was at no time made a point in the case. The whole controversy before the jury turned on the question whether the money so received was advanced by Gregg on the credit of Kellogg and Moss alone, and if so, whether he had afterwards agreed to convert it into capital. The admission of Kellogg that he had received the money from Gregg gave no light- on either -of these questions. The judgment should not be reversed for the rejection of this testimony, whether it was in strict legal principle admissible or not.-
The brief of the plaintiff proceeds to argue that the evidence before the jury does not sustain either of the. allegations of advancing the money to the partnership, or the agreement of’ the plaintiff to convert it into capital, of the partnership. With this we can have nothing to do. " It was the province of the jury to determine whether eithéf of these allegations was proved, for either of them was a valid defence to this action, and they have found in favor of defendant.
It is argued, however, that the instructions of the court on this branch of the subject were erroneous — to the prejudice of the plaintiff
We have examined carefully the points of the charge objected to as well as the other parts of it, and, without elaborating the matter, we are of opinion that it puts this, the turning-point of the case, to the jury on fair grounds, and we can see no objection to the legal propositions stated by the court and excepted to by counsel.
Judgment aeéirmed.