Propeller Co. v. United States
Syllabus & Case Posture
Propeller Company v. United States.
A. vessel was let by its owners to the United States for an indefinite period, not less than thirty days, and the government undertook to pay $150 for each day that she might be employed under the contract, and to bear the war risk. In addition to this the value of the vessel was fixed at $40,000, and it was agreed that should she be retained in the service of the United States until the money paid and due on account of the charter should be equal to such value, she should become the property of the United States without further payment, except of such sum as might then be due on account of her hire under the charter. It was further agreed that if at any time during the continuance of the charter the United States should elect to purchase her, they might take her at $40,000, in which case all money paid and due on account of the charter should be applied on account of the purchase. Held that this was not a mere affreightment; that transmission of the ownership of the vessel to the United States was also contemplated; that this transmission was to bo at the option .of the United States ; that in no event were the owners to have more than $40,000 for her, and that this sum might be paid in full by the per diem hire, in Which case the vessel was to become the property of the government so soon as the hire should equal in amount the price named or at such earlier time as the United States might elect to take her at that price. The vessel having accordingly been lost by a war risk, after $11,397.64 had been paid on account of her hire, the government was held hound to pay no more than the difference he tween that sum and $40,000; that is to say, hound to pay no more than $28,602.36.
Appeal from the Court of Claims; the ease being this:
The New Bedford and New York Propeller Company, by a charter-party dated the 5th of April, 1864, chartered a steamer to the United States at $150 per day. The charter-party contained these clauses:
“The war risk is to be borne by the United States, the marine risk by the owner, for a period of thirty days, and as much longer as the service^ of the vessel may be required to be employed in such service as the United States may direct.
“ The vessel is valued at $40,000, and should she be retained so long in the service of the United States that the money paid and due on account of the charter (deducting therefrom the actual cost of running and keeping in repair the said vessel during the said time, together with a net profit of 33 per cent, per annum on said appraised value) shall be equal to said appraised value, then the said vessel shall become the property of the United States without further payment, except such sum as may then be due on account of the services of saiu vessel, rendered under the said vessel-charter.
Opinion of the Court — Mr. Justice STRONG
Primary OpinionMr. Justice STRONG
delivered the opinion of the court.
The agreement between the plaintiffs and the United States was not a mere contract of affreightment. The vessel, it is true, was let to hire for an indefinité period, not less than thirty days, and the charterers undertook to pay $150 for .each and every day she might be employed under the contract, and to bear the war risk, the marine risk being borne by the plaintiffs. But, beyond this, the contract looked to a sale of the vessel to the charterers at a stipulated price. Her value was fixed at $40,000, and it was agreed that should she be retained in the service of the United States until the money paid and due on account of the charter should be equal to such value (after deducting therefrom the cost of running and keeping her in repair, together with a percentage on her appraised value), she should become the property of the United States without further payment, except of such sum as might then be /due on account of her hire under the charter. Another clause in the agreement stipulated, in effect, that at any time during the continuance of the charter, namely, while the vessel was employed by the charterers, and until she should be returned to the owners at New York, the United States might elect to purchase her, they might take her at her appraised value (viz., $40,000), in which case all money paid and due on account of the charter, after making the deductions above mentioned, it was agreed should he applied on account of the purchase. The plain meaning of these stipulations is that transmission of the ownership of the vessel to the United States was contemplated ; that the transmission of ownership was to be at the option of the United States; that in no event were the plaintiffs to have more than $40,000 for her, and that this sum might be paid in full by the per diem hire, in which case the vessel was to become the property of the government so soon as the hire, less the specified deductions, should equal in amount the price named, or at such earlier time aa the United States might elect to take her at that price. The plaintiffs, therefore, were in no contingency entitled to more than the price fixed for the vessel by the contract. Whether received as freight or in direct payment of the stipulated price, all money which was paid them, or became due to them, was consideration for the transmission of title, if the United States chose so to regard it. In effect, therefore, the contract vested an equitable ownership in the defendants, proportioned to the money paid and due under the charter. Had a third party, with knowledge of the agreement, bought the vessel from the plaintiffs, he would doubtless have acquired only a right to the purchase-money i’emainiug unpaid at the time of his purchase, if the charterers had afterwards elected to take the vessel during her retention as purchasers, or had retained her until the freight equalled the price agreed upon.
It is true the United States became insurers against war risks, and the vessel was destroyed by such a risk before the freight earned amounted to the appraised value or price. But as insurers they were only bound to make good the loss the plaintiffs sustained, and as the plaintiffs had agreed t'o sell for $40,000, that loss could not have exceeded what remained unpaid of that sum. It cannot be doubted that, the United States had also under the contract an insurable interest. Suppose both they and the plaintiffs had insured severally for their interests, as they might have done, with another underwriter, could more than $40,000, the value of the vessel, have been recovered on both the policies ? That will not be maintained. Or, suppose the plaintiffs had insured against marine risks, and the vessel had been lost by one of them. By the contract they undertook such risks. If the vessel had been lost on the day before the freight, less the' deductions agreed upon, would have amounted to he» entire value, could the plaintiffs have recovered the whole $40,000, and have retained it, together with the $89,850 paid or due for freight? 'Would not the policy have enured to the benefit of the United States to the extent of the payments made? To hold that it would not would be giving to the contract a most unreasonable construction. And if not, how can the plaintiffs now be entitled to the whole value of the vessel, in addition to all they have received for her hire, as if no part of her price had been paid, or as if the United States had no interest? We think they are not thus entitled. In our opinion the government had an equitable interest in the vessel at the time she was lost, and as the interest of the plaintiffs amounted to no more than $40,000, which sum they have already received, they have no further just claim.
Judgment affirmed.