Cammack v. Lewis
Syllabus & Case Posture
Cammack v. Lewis.
A. owing B. $70, by B. ’s advice takes out a policy of life insurance in- $3000' for seven years; he, B., agreeing to pay the premiums during the term. A. dies intestate seven months after the policy is issued, leaving r widow and children. B., the creditor, produces A.’s note to him for $3000, dated on the same day with the policy, but given confessedly without consideration, and also an assignment of the policy to him. There is also found among A.’s, the debtor’s, papers one signed by B. , the creditor (but not by A.), dated three months after the policy had issued and been assigned, by which B.,.the creditor, agrees that in case of A.’s, his debtor’s, death and the payment to him, B., by the insurers, of the full amount of the policy, he will pay to the “ wife of A. (the debtor), his heirs and assigns,” one-third of the amountso received. B., the creditor, having received from the insured the whole $3000, pays the wife, who has not yet taken letters of administration on her husband’s estate, a third, less some small and admitted deductions; which third — ignorant of the full extent of her rights, acting hastily and without consideration, and largely influenced by the advice of one of her husband’s friends, himself ignorant of many facts of the ease— she receives as for her proportion of the sum paid under the policy. She afterwards takes out administration on her husband’s estate; and in her capacity of administratrix sues for the remainder of the $3000. Held—
1st. That, so far as B. was concerned, the policy being one of $3000 to secure $70 was a sheer wagering policy; without any claim to be considered as one meant to secure the debt.
2d. That there being nothing beyond the execution of the note for $3000 to show that A. was a participant in any fraud on the insurers, but on the contrary it. rather appearing that he looked upon B. as a friend to whom he was willing to trust the policy; held further, and as a consequence, that B. was bound to account to A.’s estate for the whole sum, less any deductions for premiums or other just offset; and the assignment of the policy was valid only to that extent. 1
3d. That the third, which the widow received, having been received by her when ignorant of the full extent of her rights, and received hastily, without consideration, and when influenced by the advice of a friend of her husband, while ignorant of many facts of the case, did not conclude her. Independently of this, that if she had a right as administratrix to recover the $3000, the receipt by her of $1000 before she took out administration could not defeat the right.
Appeal from the Supreme Court for the District of Columbia; the case being thus:
Opinion of the Court — Mr. Justice MILLER
Primary OpinionMr. Justice MILLER
delivered the opinion of the court.
If the transaction as set up by Cammack be true, then, so far as he was concerned, it was a sheer wagering policy, and probably a fraud on the insurance company. To procure a policy for $3000 to cover a debt of $70 is of itself a mere wager. The disproportion between the real interest of the creditor and the amount to be received by him deprives it of all pretence to be a bond fide effort to secure the debt, and the strength of this proposition is not diminished by the fact that Cammack was only to get $2000 out of the $3000; nor is it weakened by the fact that the policy was taken out in the name of Lewis and assigned by him to Cammack. This view of the subject receives confirmation from the note executed by Lewis to Cammack for the precise amount of the risk in the policy, which, if Cammack’s account be true, was without consideration, and could only have been intended for some purpose of deception; probably to impose on the insurance company.
Under these circumstances, we think that Cammack could, in equity and good conscience, only hold the policy as security for what Lewis owed him when it was assigned, and such advances as he might afterwards make on account of it, and that the assignment of the policy to him was only valid to that extent.
Whether Lewis was a participant in the fraud, does not fully appear. Such conversations of his as are proved tend to show that he looked upon Cammack as a friend, to whom he was willing to trust the policy assigned, and that he never supposed more would be claimed by Cammack than what he owed him. It is also probable that he believed he would survive the life of the policy, and with the single exception of the note for $3000, given by him without consideration, there is nothing proved against him inconsistent with that view of the matter, and with his fair dealing. At all évents, we do not see such evidence on his part of a corrupt transaction, as to forbid the court from doing justice between his administratrix and Cammack, after the amount secured by the policy has been paid by the company to the latter.
The receipt of the one-third of the insurance money by the complainant does not, we think, under all the circumstances of the case, conclude her as a settlement of the matter in dispute. It is obvious that she was ignorant of the full extent.of her rights; that she acted hastily and without due consideration, and was largely influenced by the advice of Mr. Chandlee, who had been her husband’s friend and adviser, and who was prompted to do what he did by Cammack, while in ignorance of many of the facts of the case.
Besides, the bill in this case, as appears on its face, is brought by her as administratrix, and the receipt by her of the one-third paid on the policy was before any administrator had been appointed. If she has a right to recover all the $3000 as administratrix, it could not be defeated by her receipt of $1000, paid to her in her own right before any administration had been taken out on Lewis’s estate.
On the whole, we are of opinion that the decree of the Supreme Court should be affirmed, and it is
So ORDERED.