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Montgomery v. United States

82 U.S. 395 1872-12 2,181 Words
Full Case Caption
Montgomery v. United States
Official & Parallel Citations
15 Wall. 395 · 82 U.S. 395 · 21 L. Ed. 97
Court & Volume
Supreme Court of the United States · 82 U.S.

Syllabus & Case Posture

Montgomery v. United States.

1. B., a loyal citizen of the United States, at New Orleans, had heen, prior to the rebellion, agent of a planter, J., who during the rebellion was a rebel, in the rebel region and lines, within which his plantation was. B. had been in the habit before the war of making advances to J. to assist him in getting forward his crops; and by an agreement with J. was to have a lien on the crops for the advances, and a power to sell for repayment. After the war broke out, B., at New Orleans (now reduced to the possession of the Federal government), describing himself as “agent” of J., agreed to sell to M., a British subject, also domiciled in New Orleans, a crop on which he had made advappes above its value, belonging to J., and then on his said plantation : describing the property as J.’s, and not in any way referring to his own lien on or interest in it. Held that the sale was void, as being a trading with a public enemy.

2. Every kind of trading or commercial dealing or intercourse, whether by transmission of money or of goods, or orders for the delivery of either, between two countries at war, directly or indirectly, or through the intervention of third persons or partnerships, or by contracts in any form looking to or involving such transmission, is void.

Appeal from tbe Court of Claims; the case being thus: R. H. Montgomery, a British subject domiciled in New Orleans before and during the war of the rebellion, after the capture of that city by the forces of the United States, in April, 1862, made a written agreement with J. W. Bur-bridge, a loyal person residing in that city, doing business as Burbridge & Co., and the factor and agent of one Leo Johnson, a planter, residing at that time in the parish of La Fourche, Louisiana, and within the enemy’s lines; by which Burbridge & Co., as “ the agents of the said Johnson, declared that they had sold, and thereby did sell unto the said R. H. Montgomery, ‘ the following crop belonging to said Johnson, on his plantation, in the parish of La Fourche, near La Fourche Crossings, to wit: 605 hogsheads of sugar, 700 barrels of molasses, and 300 barrels of rum, at the following prices, to wit: For the sugar, at 4J cents per pound; for the molasses, at 20 cents per gallon; and for the rum, at 50 cents per gallon, the weight and quantity to be determined at the time and upon the delivery thereof in New Orleans.’ ”

Montgomery paid to Burbridge & Co. $5000, the receipt whereof was declared in the agreement to be thereby acknowledged, “ and accepted as so much on account of the first sugar, molasses, or rum delivered to him, said Montgomery, as aforestated; the balance to be paid by said Montgomery at each future delivery of said sugar, molasses, and rum.” The sum of $9000 was paid afterwards.

Burbridge, on the day of the contract, signed an order directing the overseer of Johnson’s plantation “ to deliver to the order of the said R. H. Montgomery the entire crop of sugar, molasses, and rum contained in the sugar-house, purgeries, &e., on the said plantation, the same,” said the order, “ having been sold to him this day.”

Opinion of the Court — Mr. Justice STRONG,

Primary Opinion

Mr. Justice STRONG,

delivered the opinion of the court.

"Whether the contract under which the appellant claims to have become the owner of the sugai’, molasses, and rum was so far executed that, without more, it would have passed the property, had it been legal,it is unnecessary to consider; for we are of opinion that, whether executed or executory, it was illegal and void. It was a clear case of trading with a public enemy. The subject of the contract was personal property within the Confederate lines. It was a crop at the time on the' plantation of Leo Johnson, in the parish of La Fourche, near La Fourche Crossings. It belonged also to Johnson, who was then domiciled in the enemy’s territory, and who was himself an enemy. This is expressly stated in the contract itself. The appellant’s right, therefore, is founded upon an attempted purchase, during the war, from an enemy, of enemy’s property, in direct violation not only of the laws which always prevail in a state of . war, but also in violation of the acts of Congress. It is vain to contend that any right can be acquired under such a contract.

It is true the sale was negotiated by agents of Johnson, living outside of the enemy’s territory, but it was not the less his act because it was done by those acting under his authority. Nothing is clearer, says President Woolsey, than that all commercial transactions of whatever kind (except ransom contracts), with the subjects, or in the territory of the enemy, whether direct or indirect, as through an agent or partner who is neutral, are illegal and void. This is not inconsistent with the doctrine that a resident in the territory of one belligerent may have in times of war an agent residing in the territory of the other belligerent, to whom his debtor may pay the debt, or deliver property in discharge of it. Such payments or deliveries involve no intercourse between enemies. The present case exhibits a transaction not wholly within enemy’s territory, but a sale from an enemy to a friend. If that can be made through an agent, then the rule which prohibits commercial intercourse is a mere regulation of the mode of trade. It may be evaded by simply maintaining an agency in the enemy's territory. In this way every pound of cotton or of sugar might have been purchased by Northern traders from those engaged in the rebellion. Perhaps the rule is stated too broadly in Woolsey’s Commentaries, and in many elementary books, but it is certain that “every kind of trading or commercial dealing or intercourse, whether by transmission of money or of goods, or orders for the delivery of either between two countries (at war), directly or indirectly, or through the intervention of third persons or partnerships, or by contracts in any form looking to or involving such transmission,” are prohibited. The contract in this case contemplated the delivery of the sugar, molasses, and rum at New Orleans, then within the Federal lines. There, on its being weighed and measured, payment was to be made to Johnson’s agents. If this be allowed, the enemy is benefited and his property is protected from seizure or confiscation.

It has been argued that because Burbridge & Co., the agents, had a lien upon the property for advances made by them, and had also a power to .sell for the repayment of their advances, the sale which was made ought not to be regarded as a sale by Johnson. Yet the only authority they bad to sell at all, resulted either from express power given to them by the owner, or from the relation to him in which they then stood. They might have sold their lien, or the debt secured by it; and had they done so, the sale -would have involved no trading with the enemy. But they undertook to sell Johnson’s property, describing it as such in the instrument of sale, and describing themselves as Johnson’s agents. Very dearly, in effect, the parties to the transaction were the appellant and a public enemy. For this reason the judgment is

Affirmed.

International Law, § 117.

Kershaw v. Kelsey, 100 Massachusetts, 561.

Precedents Cited (1)

Cited By Later Decisions (3)

Public Domain Federal Judicial Work (17 U.S.C. § 105) · Harvard Law School Caselaw Access Project (CAP).