Partridge v. Insurance Co.
Syllabus & Case Posture
Partridge v. The Insurance Company.
1. An agent of an insurance company who had been engaged in a State different from that where it was situated, in soliciting business for it, and getting fixed commissions on all premiums which actually came into his hands — his right to all which was not questioned in the suit — being a little put out at other agents being sent into the same State, inquired of the company by letter what his “ status ” was, “ if the State agency is open to the trial of candidates?” To this the company replied in writing : “ Tour status is simply this — you are working up a business for yourself, and are paid the highest commissions which we pay.” Held, the agent being afterwards discharged from the company’s service, that he could not prove by witnesses that the phrase in the company’s letter had a technical meaning, and that there was a usage between insurance companies and their agents in the place where the agency was that all agents should have the right to solicit and cause policies to be issued according to the published rules of the company, .and to collect all premiums on renewal thereof during the time the policy was in force, and that if the agent was discharged without sufficient cause, and against-his will, he was entitled to be paid immediately the present value of his commissions, calculated by the actuarial rule used to value policies. The ground of the holding was that the language of the letter was neither ambiguous nor technical, and that to suffer such evidence to go in would have established by parol a new term to a written contract.
2. Where, in proceedings in State courts, the laws of a State allow a set-off pleaded to be interposed and tried in the same suit with the claim against which it is pleaded, the same thing may be done when the suit is brought or transferred into the Federal courts from them.
Error to the Circuit Court for the District of Missouri.; the case apparently having been thus:
In January, 1867, one Winslow being agent for the State of Missouri of the Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Company of Hartford, Connecticut, in the business of soliciting persons to insure and keep insured in that compauy, Partridge made an arrangement with him to go into partnership with him in the agency; and Winslow having written to the company accordingly, the company in reply tell him that there was a Mr. Jones — “now the company’s agent for Minnesota, and a man second to none in the West for energy and sound judgment” — who was very sanguine that he could make arrangements with him, Winslow, for a systematic and thorough “working” of the two States, which would prove mutually beneficial. And that “ without meaning to be understood as saying one word against Mr. Partridge —on the contrary, not seeing why matters cannot be arranged so as to have him also as one of the workers for the company — the company would advise Winslow to hold on and wait a little before making any permanent arrangement.”
Jones coming to St. Louis soon after this, he, Winslow, and Partridge entered into an arrangement by which Wins-low retired, leaving .Jones and Partridge partners in the State agency. Jones in a short time went to Hartford, and was sent by the company on business in Iowa, &c., leaving Pai’tridge alone in Missouri. Partridge went on as he had been going on from his first arrangement with Winslow, in soliciting people.who had not previously been insured to insure themselves in the company and in getting renewals of such policies as had been made previous to his coming in and had now run out.
Opinion of the Court — Mr. Justice MILLER
Primary OpinionMr. Justice MILLER
delivered the opinion of the court.
The question did not arise whether the custom which the plaintiff offered to prove could have been proved as the measure of his compensation, in the absence of any express contract, because the plaintiff had introduced in evidence a letter from the defendant in reference to this compensation, under which he said he had acted in taking the policies for which he now claimed the additional commission. There was no question as to the amount, or percentage, or premium, which was to be paid under this letter. The plaintiff stated that he had retained a certain percentage, which \w.as that allowed by the company. The testimony' was not offered to show what was the highest commission paid by the company.
It appears to us, as it did to the Circuit Court, that the testimony offered would have established a new and distinct term to the contract. It would have established a contract very different from the written one introduced by plaintiff. The language of the letter was neither ambiguous nor technical. It required and needed no expert, no usage to discover its meaning. To have admitted the usage offered in evidence in this case would have been to make a contract for the parties differing materially from the written one under which they had both acted for some time.
The tendency to establish local and limited usages and customs in the contracts of parties, who had no reference to them when the transactions took place, has gone quite as far as sound policy can justify. It places in the hands of corporations, such as hanks, insurance companies, and others, by compelling individuals to comply with rules established for the interests alone of the former, a power of establishing those rules as usage or custom with the force of law. When this is confined to establishing an implied contract, and the knowledge of'the usage is brought home to the other party, the evil is not so great. But when it is sought to extend the doctrine beyond this, and incorporate the custom into an express contract whose terms are reduced to writing and are expressed in language neither technical nor ambiguous, and therefore needing no such aid in its construction, it amounts to establishing the principle that a custom may add to or vary or contradict the well-expressed intention of the parties made in writing. No such extension of the doctrine is consistent either with authority or with the principles which govern the Jaw of contracts.
A question is raised in this court not raised in the Circuit Court as to the right of the defendant to recover, by way of set-off or cross-action against the plaintiff’, a 6um of money in his hands as agent of the plaintiff, which was admitted to be due, if plaintiff’s claim was not established. The amount was admitted by plaintiff, and no objection was made to pleading it as a set-off. Therefore, none can be made here. But if the point were open to inquiry, it is settled by the case of West v. Aurora City, that defendants in the Circuit Courts of the United States can avail themselves of the laws which prevail in the State concerning the right of set-off generally. It would be a most pernicious doctrine to allow a citizen of a distant State to institute in these courts a suit against a citizen of the State where the court is held and escape the liability which the laws of the State have attached to all plaintiffs of allowing just and legal set-offs and counter claims to be interposed and tried in the same suit and in the same form.
Judgment affirmed.
6 Wallace, 139.