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Pelham v. Way

82 U.S. 196 1872-12 2,217 Words
Full Case Caption
Pelham v. Way
Official & Parallel Citations
15 Wall. 196 · 82 U.S. 196 · 21 L. Ed. 55
Court & Volume
Supreme Court of the United States · 82 U.S.

Syllabus & Case Posture

Pelham v. Way.

When, under the act of July 17th, 1862, “ to suppress insurrection, to punish treason and rebellion, to seize and confiscate the property of rebels, .and for other purposes,” the libel and monition have been framed in such a way, and the marshal lias served his process in such a way, that notwithstanding the completion of the proceeding and a sale in form, intended to divest the rebel of his property, the property has not, after all, been divested in law, and the rebel’s rights remain uninjured, he cannot in an action against the marshal for a false return recover more than nominal damages.

Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Indiana.

An act of Congress, approved July 17th, 1862, and entitled “ An act to suppress insurrection, to punish treason and rebellion, to seize and confiscate the property of rebels, and for other purposes,” among other things, provided, .“ that if any person within any State or Territory of the United States other than those named as aforesaid after the passage of this act, being engaged in armed rebellion against the government of the United States, or aiding or abetting such rebellion, shall not, within sixty days after public warning and proclamation duly given and made by the President of the United States, cease to aid, countenance, and abet such rebellion, and return to his allegiance to the United States, all the estate, property, money, stocks, and credits of such person, shall be liable to seizure as aforesaid, and it shall be the duty of the President to seize and use them as aforesaid, or the proceeds thereof;” and further, “that to secure the condemnation and sale of any such property, proceedings in rem shall be instituted in the name of the United States,” in the District Court; and that the proceed:ing shall conform as nearly as may be to proceedings in admiralty and revenue eases; “ and if said property, whether real or personal, shall be found to have belonged to a person engaged in rebellion, or who has given aid or comfort thereto, the same shall be condemned as enemies’ property.”

The President of the United States, by proclamation duly made on the 25th day of July, A.D. 1862, issued public warning to all persons contemplated by the said provision, and the sixty days therein specified expired on the 23d day of September, A.D. 1862. .

This act had twice at least been the subject of construction in this court. It came up once in Pelham v. Rose where this court itook a distinction betweeu the evidence of a credit and the credit itself; and held that when the debtor had given to his creditor a promissory note, and that note was in existence, and the thing proceeded against, it was necessary to the legal service of any monition that the marshal should seize and take it into his possession and control. The corollary was, that when the note, at the commencement of and during the pendenee of proceedings to confiscate was beyond the jurisdiction of the marshal, there was no due service and no confiscation.

Opinion of the Court — Mr. Justice STRONG

Primary Opinion

Mr. Justice STRONG

delivered the opinion of the court.

That the errors assigned are unfounded is very plain, if the record of confiscation in the District Court is not a bar to the recovery by the plaintiff of the debt formerly due to him from Lewis Pelham, and which was evidenced by the note dated March 1, 1862. The decree in that case is doubtless conclusive of all matters then adjudicated upon, and, as it was a proceeding in rem, the subject is to be ascertained from the record, from the information, the monition, and from the marshal’s return. If they show that the “credit,” or the debt due from Lewis Pelham to the plaintiff, was attached, and if the decree was upon the title to that credit, the plaintiff has been divested of his interest therein, and divested in.consequence of the marshal’s false return. On the other hand, if the information, the monition to the marshal, his return, the decree of the court, and the marshal’s sale, all relate to another subject, not to the “debt” or “ credit,” then the plaintiff’ has . not been divested of the credit, and he has sustained no appreciable injury in consequence of the falsity of the marshal’s return. Undoubtedly a debt or a credit was capable of seizure under the confiscation acts, and of subsequent condemnation and sale. This, we ruled in Miller v. The United States, and we then showed how property in action could be seized and brought within the jurisdiction of the court. But the question here is whether the debt was seized, or whether the subject of the seizure, and the consequent libel, was only an evidence of the debt, a thing capable of actual manipulation and delivery. That it was the latter an inspection of the record, and the decision of this court in Pelham v. Rose, sufficiently establish. The libel was against a promissory note, particularly describing it, and it was that, not the debt of which it was evidence, that was claimed to have been forfeited. The monition was against the promissory note, and nothing else. The marshal was commanded to attach the note and detain the same in his custody. It made no allusion to any right in action. The marshal’s return was that he had arrested the property (described in the monition). The decree of the court was that the note should be exposed to sale, and the sale was of the property mentioned in the libel and in the decree. Plainly, a debt is distinguishable from any instrument of evidence of the debt. This was the vjew taken of the case in Pelham v. Rose. The language of this court then was as follows: “In the case at bar a visible thing, capable of ph}’sical possession, is the subject of the libel. It is the promissory note of Pelham which constitutes the res against which the proceeding is instituted, and not a ‘credit,’ or debt, which the note is supposed by the defendant’s counsel to represent.” For this reason it was held that to effect its seizure it was necessary for the marshal to take the note into his actual custody and control. That case determined that the arrest returned by the marshal was not a seizure of the debt, and consequently the debt was not confiscated. It follows that the plaintiff has shown no injury sustained by him which entitles him to more than nominal damages.

Judgment affirmed.

11 Wallace, 268.

9 Id. 103.

Cited By Later Decisions (1)

Public Domain Federal Judicial Work (17 U.S.C. § 105) · Harvard Law School Caselaw Access Project (CAP).