Allen v. Massey
Syllabus & Case Posture
Allen v. Massey.
1. Under the statute of frauds of Missouri, as interpreted by the highest court of that State, an interpretation which this court will follow, a sale of household furniture in a house occupied jointly by vendor and vendee, both using the furniture alike, and there being no other change of possession than that the vendor, after going around with the vendee and looking at the furniture and agreeing on the price, turned it over to the vendee and executed a bill of sale before a notary, both parties then, after the sale, occupying the house and using the furniture exactly as before, is void as against the vendor’s creditors.
2. An assignee in bankruptcy may pursue the property thus attempted to be transferred, and, as auxiliary to its recovery, ask that the sale by the bankrupt be annulled.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for the District of Missouri; the case being thus-:
The fourteenth section of the Bankrupt Act of March 2d, 1867, enacts that the judge of the District Court or the register in bankruptcy shall assign all the estate, real and persona], of a bankrupt to his assignee in bankruptcy, and that such assignment shall vest in the assignee all the said estate, and all the property conveyed by the bankrupt in fraud of his creditors, and that the assignee may sue for the same.
And the statute of frauds of Missouri enacts, that “ every sale by a vendor of goods and chattels in his possession, or under his control, unless accompanied by delivery within a reasonable time (regard being had to the situation of the property), and be followed by an actual and continued change of possession, shall be held to be fraudulent and void as against the creditors of the vendor or subsequent purchasers in good faith.”
Opinion of the Court — Mr. Justice FIELD
Primary OpinionMr. Justice FIELD
delivered the opinion of the court.
The sale was, within the terms of the statute, fraudulent and void as against Downing’s creditors. It was not accompanied by any delivery of the property, and was not followed by any change of possession. The property consisted of furniture used in a house occupied jointly by Downing and his vendee and her husband, and it remained in the same condition, and was used by all three precisely in the same manner after the sale as previously. There was no outward sign manifested, nor indicia exhibited, nor notice given, which could apprise the community of any change of ownership. The object of the statute is to prevent parties from being misled by apparent ownership of property where real ownership does not exist, but where a secret transfer has been made to another. This object would be defeated if a sale like the present one could be upheld. In the case of Claflin v. Rosenberg where the vendor had become the clerk of the purchaser, the Supreme Court of Missouri held that the possession iyhich the purchaser was required to take of the property sold, in order to render the sale valid under the statute, must be open, notorious, and unequivocal, such as would inform the public, or those who were accustomed to deal with the party, that the property had changed hands, and that the title had passed from the vendor to the purchaser; observing at the same time that possession of this kind excluded the idea of a joint or concurrent possession with the vendor. The statute being a local one, applying only to sales in Missouri, this court will follow the construction given to it by the highest court of the State.
. The assignee of Downing’s estate was authorized, by the express terms of the fourteenth section of the Bankrupt Act, to pursue.the property thus attempted to be transferred, and, as .auxiliary to its recovery, to ask that the sale of the bankrupt be annulled.
Decree affirmed.
42 Missouri, 439.