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Life Insurance v. Francisco

84 U.S. 672 1873-10 3,140 Words
Full Case Caption
Life Insurance Company v. Francisco
Official & Parallel Citations
17 Wall. 672 · 84 U.S. 672 · 21 L. Ed. 698
Court & Volume
Supreme Court of the United States · 84 U.S.

Syllabus & Case Posture

Life Insurance Company v. Francisco.

1. "When, under the terms of a policy of life insurance, the representatives of the party assured are to furnish, within a certain time after the death of the assured, “ due proof of the just claim of the assured,” — if the party claiming the insurance-money have within the time, furnished answers written out in the presence of the insurers’ agent, to certain printed questions usually furnished by the insurer, for the purpose of seeing whether the elaim'is just or not, and the insurer roceive.and keep the questions and answers without any suggestion that-such preliminary proofs are insufficient, either in form or substance, — the cour.t, on a suit for' the insurance-money, has no right to' determine as matter of law, that the questions and answers do not establish the justice of the plaintiff’s claim, and that the plaintiff is not entitled to a verdict. Questions and answers so given furnish some evidence that the claim is just; and the matter is proper for the jury even though the contents of the paper do not as yet appear.

2. A rule of court that “íd causes tried by a jury, any special charge or instruction asked for by either party, must be presented to the court in writing, directly after the close of the evidence, and before any argument is made to the jury, or it will not be considered,” is a reasonable rule; and the enforcement or disregard of it is matter of discretion with the court making it, and, therefore, not the subject of a writ of error.

3. Where a medical man testifies that the “ disease ” of a person who had died, and on whose death a claim for insurance was made, “had been indigestion, torpid liver and colic, and that he died of acute hepatitis,” and several other persons, the acquaintances of the deceased, testify that they had never known him to bs unwell, or if so more than very slightly, and that they considered'him to he a healthy man, an instruction to the jury that the evidence was not sufficient to enable the plaintiff (who was suing for the insurance-money on a policy of life insurance, previous to the grant of which the decedent had answered in reply to the usual questions that he had “ no sickness or disease,”) to recover, was held to have been rightly refused; and that the-jury were rightly instructed that it was for them to determine whether the deceased had been afflicted with any sickness or disease, within the meaning of the terms as used in his answers to questions put to him prior to the issue of the policy.

Error to the Circuit Court for the District of California; the case being thus:

Dolores Francisco sued the-Manhattan Life Insurance Company upon a contract of insurance, made February 5th, 1867, upon the life of her husband. The husband died twenty-four days afterwards; that is to say on the'1st of March; 1867, and before the policy actually issued. There were two conditions in thp policy, which would have been issued bad Francisco lived-:

Opinion of the Court — Mr. Justice STRONG

Primary Opinion

Mr. Justice STRONG

delivered the opinion of the court.

The evidence that preliminary proof of the death of Francisco and of the justice of the claim of the assured were given to the defendants ninety days before the suit was brought was quite sufficient to go to the jury. The proofs were in forms, blanks for which had been furnished by the insurers, and the forms were, filled up in the presence of their agent. He received them without objection, ánd it does not appear that at any time before the trial of the case it was ever suggested to the assured that the proofs were' insufficient, either in form or in substance. Clearly, therefore, it was not for the court to instruct the jury that the plaintiff,was not entitled to a verdict. It seems to have been the idea of the defendants that the statements of the witnesses by whom the preliminary proofs were made did not establish the justice of the plaintiff’s claim. But whether they did ór not was a question which the court had no right to determine as a conclusion pf law. They furnished, at least, some evidence that the claim was just, and. this they ■would have furnished had'they contained nothing more than averments that-the defendants- had agreed to insure, and that the person whose life was insured had died. The first assignment of error is, therefore, not sustained.

The second is equálly without merit. After the ease had been summed up, and when the court was about to charge the jury, the defendants offered to submit prayers for instructions,-but. the court refused to receive them, assigning as a reason that the offer was too late. This is alleged to have been an error. What the prayers were, whether the instructions asked were pertinent to the case or not, or whether they could rightfully have been' given had they been received, we- are not informed. They were not incorporated in the bill of exceptions, and they ,do not appear in the record. But, assuming that they were such as the court ought to have given had they been presented in time, there was no error- in refusing to. receive them after the case had been argued to the jury. The rule of the court then existing was as follows: “ In causes, civil or criminal, tried by a jury, any special charge or instruction asked for by either party must be presented to the court, in writing, directly after the close of the evidence "and before any argument is made to the jury, or they will not be considered.” This is a reasonable rule, intended to guard as wrnll the court as the opposite party against sudden surprise. It does not deprive either party of a right to the opinion of the court upon any material propositions which he may desire to have presented to the jury. It merely regulates the exercise.of that right.' The rule exists in very many courts, and it has been found necessary in the administration of justice. No doubt a court may, notwithstanding, the rule, in its discretion,'receive prayers for instructions even after the general charge has been given to the jury, but neither party can claim as a 'right a disregard of the ordinary rules of practice in the court. There is nothing inconsistent with this to be( found in the case cited. On the contrary, whether a court shall enforce such a rule, or depart from it, is treated in that case as a matter resting in the discretion of the court. That it is-competent for courts to adopt such a rule has often been decided, and once, at least, if not ofteu'er, in California.

The remaining errors have been assigned to the charge of the court. The principal defence set up at the trial was that in the application for insurance false answers had been given to the questions propounded by the defendants. Those questions were, in substance, whether the person whose life was proposed for insurance had had certain diseases, or, during the next preceding seven years, any disease, and the answers giveu were that he had not. It was in reference to this that the court instructed the jury it was for them to determine from the evidence whether the person whose life was insured had, during the time mentioned in the questions propounded on making the application, any affliction that could’ properly be called a sickuess or disease, within the meaning of the term as used, and said, “ for example, a man might have a slight cold in the head, or a slight headache, that in no way seriously affected his health or interfered with his usual avocations, aud might be forgotten in a week or a month, which- might be of so trifling a character as not to constitute a sickness or a disease within the meaning of the term as used, and which the party would not be required to mention in answering the questions. But again, he might have a cold or a headache of so serious a character as to be a sickness or disease within the meaning of those terms as used which it would be his duty to mention, and a failure to mention which would make his answer false.”

There is no just ground of complaint in this’instruction, either considered abstractly or in its application to the evidence in the case. It was, in effect, saying that substantial truth in the answer was what was required. If, therefore, the defendants have been injured it was by the verdict of the jury rather than by any error of the court.

Judgment affirmed.

People v. Williams, 32 California, 280

People v. Sears, 18 California, 635.

Cited By Later Decisions (4)

Public Domain Federal Judicial Work (17 U.S.C. § 105) · Harvard Law School Caselaw Access Project (CAP).