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Douglass v. Douglass

88 U.S. 98 1874-10 2,339 Words
Full Case Caption
Douglass v. Douglass, Administrator
Official & Parallel Citations
21 Wall. 98 · 88 U.S. 98 · 22 L. Ed. 479
Court & Volume
Supreme Court of the United States · 88 U.S.

Syllabus & Case Posture

Douglass v. Douglass, Administrator.

1 Under the statute of Maryland, passed in 1785 (chapter 80, § 14), where, in a replevin suit,- the party from whom the goods were taken is reinstated in his possession by executing a bond, and a bond is given for the restoration of the specified goods, and these goods are delivered to the sheriff on the writ de retumo habendo, issued on a judgment recovered ; this is a satisfaction Of the obligation, though the goods were not in like good order as when the bond was executed.

2. If the obligor has injured them, or culpably suffered them to become injured while they were in his possession, a recovery cannot be had against him on the bond, if the marshal have once taken possession. The marshal’s possession is that of the obligee in the bond. Any redress for such injury must be had by a separate proceeding.

Error to the Supreme Court for the District of Columbia; the case being thus:

By an act of the Assembly of Maryland, in force in the District of Columbia,, provision is made that, upon motion of the defendant in replevin in certain specified cases, the court may order a return of the goods taken in such replevin, to the defendant. In such cases when a return is awarded, it is “upon the said defendant entering into bond, with security to be approved by the court, conditioned for the return of said property, if the same be adjudged by the court.”* This statute being in force, Henry Douglass executed in Washington, D. C., a penal bond of the sort mentioned to William Douglass, in the sum of $11,000. It recited that William Douglass, as administrator, &c., had sued out against Henry Douglass a writ of replevin, under which had been seized and delivered to William, as administrator,certain articles (green-house plants) mentioned in the writ; that Henry had moved the court to return the articles to him-, and that the court ordered their return upon his giving bond as required.

The condition of the bond was as follows:

Opinion of the Court — Mr. Justice SWAYNE,

Primary Opinion

Mr. Justice SWAYNE,

having stated the case, delivered the opinion of the court.

The exceptions taken by the defendant are all well taken. The central and controlling question in the ease is the effect of the seizure of the property by the marshal, and its tender to the plaintiff. He sued out the writ. It went into the hands of the marshal by his procurement. He was the actor in causing its issuance and service. The marshal acted for him. He cannot be permitted to play fast and loose with the process he invoked. The marshal’s possession was his possession. As soon as it was taken the efficacy of the bond touching the return of the property was at an end. The bond stipulated for the return of the property and nothing more in relation to it. We cannot interpolate what the contract does not contain. Our duty is to execute it as we find it, and not to make a new one.

The seizure and tender satisfied the judgment of return and the defendant’s obligation. Neither could be revived by the plaintiff’s refusal to receive the property. The refusal was of no legal consequence.

If the defendant injured the property, or culpably suffered it to become injured while it was in his possession, a remedy must be sought in some other appropriate proceeding. It cannot be had in a suit on the bond.

If no writ de retorno habendo had issued it would have been the duty of the defendant to seek the plaintiff and deliver the property to him if he would receive it. Had the defendant failed to do this, there would have been a breach of the bond and he would have been liable. The action taken by the plaintiff' obviated the necessity of his doing anything in that way.

The judgment is reversed, and the case remanded with directions to issue a venire de novo, and proceed

In conformity to this opinion.

Carrico v. Taylor, 3 Dana, 33.

Cited By Later Decisions (1)

Public Domain Federal Judicial Work (17 U.S.C. § 105) · Harvard Law School Caselaw Access Project (CAP).