Insurance Co. v. Young's Administrator
Syllabus & Case Posture
Insurance Company v. Young’s Administrator.
A., of San Francisco, aged twenty-six, applied, on the 5th of June, 1867, to the agent there of a New York life insurance company to insure his life, the money to be payable “ at forty-five, or death,” and the policy to take effect from date of the application. The agent acknowledged the receipt of $99.30 as the first quarterly premium, with a proviso that “said application shall be accepted by the company; but should the same be declined or rejected by said company, then the full amount paid by A. will he returned to the applicant on the production of this receipt.” In fact A. did not pay any money at this time, but only gave a promissory note for the $99.30, which note he never, at any time, paid.
Upon the trial, the court below (to which the case was submitted without the intervention of a jury, under the act of March 3d, 1865, which enacts that the court may, by agreement of parties, find the facts, and that the finding shall have “ the same effect as the finding of a jury”), found, as a fact, that the company “ accepted ” the application and sent a policy to its agent; “ but that the policy did not in terms agree with the memorandum as to date and time of payment.” The policy sent made the quarterly payment $96.60 (a difference in A.’s favor), and the policy was antedated so as to run from the 5th day of April, 1867; a day which the policy showed was the applicant’s birthday. This variation was of course against his interest. Accompanying the policy sent to the agent were two receipts for premiums, executed by the company in New York, one as of the 5th of April, 1867, and the other as of the 5th of July, 1867, under which receipt was a “Notice to policyholders,” that unless premiums were paid on or before the day they became due, the policy was forfeited and void; that agents were not authorized to make, alter, or discharge contracts, or waive forfeitures; that payments of premiums to agents were not valid unless receipts were given, signed in New York by the officers of the company, the local agents to countersign them as evidence of payment; and that all premiums were payable in New York. The policy and these receipts reached the agent at San Francisco on the 2d of August, having been executed in New York, probably twenty-three to thirty days before. The agent countersigned them, and on the 8th (six days after receiving it) wrote to A., then absent from home, informing him that his policy had arrived, and asking whether he would have it sent to him or held subject to his order. It did not appear whether A. received or did not receive the letter. On the 21st of August he was shot (becoming at once insensible), and died on the 20th of September. Held, that owing to the change of terms in the policy from those contemplated by A., the applicant, the acceptance by the company was a qualified acceptance which A. was not bound to accept; that there having been no evidence that he did accept it the company was not bound.
Error to the Circuit Court for the District of California, in which court the administrator of McPherson Young, of San Francisco, sued the Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York (a company incorporated by the State of New York but having a general agent, one H. S. Homans, at San Francisco, and an office there for the transaction of life insurance business) to recover $5000, which the administrator alleged had been insured by the said company on the life of his decedent and not paid.
The case was submitted to the court under the act of March 3d, 1865, without the intervention of a jury. This act enacts that parties may submit issues of fact in civil cases in this way; that the finding of the facts by the court may be general or special, “ and shall have the same effect as the verdict of a jury.” And it adds that “ when the finding is special the review may extend to the determination of the sufficiency of the facts to support the judgment.”
The case, as found by the court was thus:
Opinion of the Court — Mr. Justice S WAYNE
Primary OpinionMr. Justice S WAYNE
delivered the opinion of the court.
The question presented for our determination is whether the findings warrant the judgment. The facts found lie within a narrow compass.
Several, objections, some of them technical, have been taken by the counsel for the plaintiff in error to the judgment rendered. "We shall confine our remarks to on i of them. It is fundamental, and goes to the right, justice, and law of the case. The receipt of the 5th of June was the initial step of the parties. It reserved the absolute right to the company to accept or reject the proposition which it contained. There was a necessary implication, that if it •were accepted the response and acceptance were to be by a policy, in conformity with the terms specified in the receipt as far as they extended, and beyond that, in the usual form of such instruments as issued by the company. But it was clearly within the power of the company, under the condition expressed, wholly to reject the application, without giving any reason; or to accept the proposition with such modifications of the terms specified, and of the usual conditions of such policies, as it might see fit to prescribe. The entire subject was both affirmatively and negatively within its choice and discretion. The acceptance was a qualified one, and there was none other.
It was by a policy departing from the terms specified in the receipt in the particulars before mentioned but containing as to the conditions imposed otherwise, nothing beyond what was usual in such cases. At this stage of the-business, the company was not bound according to the receipt, because it had not agreed to a part of the terms specified, and those terms were material and of the essence of the proposition. Clearly the company never did agree to those terms. What it would have done if the applicant had refused, as he might have done, to take th<? policy it is not material to consider.' It is enough that the company did not so agree.
This court has no power to make such an agreement for it. The indispensable element of the consent of one of the parties is shown not to have existed. The contrary appears by the policy transmitted to the agent. The consent of the applicant appears, but that alone is unavailing. That fact, in any sound legal view of the ease, is as if it were not. In tbe analysis of the case the receipt, for the reasons stated, must be laid out of view.
This brings us to the examination of the controversy as respects the policy of insurance. Here the position of the parties is reversed. The applicant assented to the proposition contained in the receipt, but the company did not. The company assented to the policy, but the applicant never did. The mutual assent, the meeting of the minds of both parties, is wanting. Such assent is vital to the existence of a contract. Without it there is none, and there cau be none. In this case it is not established by any direct proof, and there is none from which it can be inferred. This is not controverted. If it be alleged there was fault on the part of the agent, for which the company is responsible, in not communicating promptly and fully with the applicant upon the arrival of the policy, there are several answers to the imputation. Such fault, viewed in any light, cannot be taken as the legal equivalent of the assent of the applicant to the terms of the policy. But no such fault is shown. The applicant knew that the company was not bound, and would not be bound until it chose to become so, and that it had the right to do what it did. It was his duty to keep up the necessary communication with the agent by calling upon him when the answer from the office in New York might have been expected to arrive, and if he intended to be absent, by giving the agent his address during his absence, and taking from him a promise to communicate the result as soon as the reply was received.
It does not appear that he took any step whatever in this way. Neither lie nor his personal representative, therefore, had any reason to complain. If he had received notice of the proposition made through the policy it would have been at his option to give or refuse his assent. He was certainly in nowise bound until such assent was given. Until then, there could be no contract on his part, and if there was none on his part, there could be none on the part of the company. The obligation in such cases is correlative. If there is none on one side there is none on the other. The requisite assent must be the work of the parties themselves. The law cannot supply it for them. That is a function wholly beyond the sphere of judicial authority. As the applicant was never bound, the company was never bound. The policy was, therefore, no more a contract than the receipt. Both had the same fatal defect, the want of the assent of one of the parties.
Even where the parties supposed they had agreed and it turned out there was a misunderstanding as to a material point, the requisite mutual assent as to that point being wanting, it was held that neither was bound.
The deceased paid nothing. The contest is an effort on that side to gather where he had not sown. The law involved is expressed by the phrase “ it takes two to make a bargain.”
In this view of the case, irrespective of the other considerations which have been urged upon our attention, we hold that the facts found do not warrant the conclusion reached.
Judgment reversed, and the case remanded, with directions to enter a judgment
In favor oe the plaintiff in error. '
Baldwin & Forbes v. Mildeberger, 2 Hall, 176, a case at law; Coles v. Browne, 10 Paige, 526, a case in equity; see also Calverley v. Williams, 1 Vesey, Jr., 210, and Crane v. Partland, 9 Michigan, 493