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Ex parte Flippin

94 U.S. 348 1876-10 1,147 Words
Full Case Caption
Ex Parte Flippin
Official & Parallel Citations
94 U.S. 348 Β· 24 L. Ed. 194
Court & Volume
Supreme Court of the United States Β· 94 U.S.

Syllabus & Case Posture

Ex Parte Flippin.

1. This court cannot, by mandamus, compel an inferior court to reverse a decision . made by it in the exercise of its legitimate jurisdiction.

2. McCargo v. Chapman, 20 How. 555, so far as it conflicts with this doctrine, disapproved.

Petition for a writ of mandamus to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Tennessee.

Talmadge E. Brown, having a decree in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Tennessee against the city of Memphis, made’ application on the law side of .that court .for a mandamus requiring the- city and its mayor and general council to levy and collect a tax for the payment of the amount due him. In this application the name of the person then holding the office of mayor was given, and also the names of the persons who constituted the general council. An alternative writ was issued; and the parties named all appeared by the city attorney, and showed cause against the application. March 30,1875, a final judgment was entered in the cause, β€œ by which it was ordered and adjudged that a peremptory writ of mandamus should issue, commanding the city of Memphis and its said general council to proceed each year, for the then ensuing three years, 1875,1876, and 1877, to levy a tax, in addition to all other taxes allowed by law to be levied; sufficient in amount to realize $125,000 each year for the years 1875 and 1876, and for the year 1877 to realize a sum sufficient to pay whatever sum might then remain unpaid of the said, decree. It was further ordered that the clerk of said court, whenever the said Brown should request the same, should issue each .year, during the years 1875, 1876, and 1877, respectively, a peremptory writ of mandamus, in accordance with said judgment, to be served on the city of' Memphis and its mayor and general council, in the manner prescribed by law.”

Flippin became mayor of the city, and the other petitioners members of the general council, Jan. 15, 1876. The clerk of the court, at the request of Brown, issued, May 24, a peremptory writ, returnable the fourth Monday in November, directed to the city and to the petitioners by name, as mayor and members of tbe general council, requiring tbem to levy tbe adjudged tax for the year 1876. Nov. 27, 1876, tbe petitioners moved tbe court β€œ to set aside and quasb ” tbis writ, for tbe reason, in substance, tbat tbey were not parties to tbe judgment upon wbicb it was issued. Tbis motion was denied Dec. 14, 1876 ; and tbe court, by proceeding against tbe petitioners for contempt in fading to obey tbe writ, is now endeavoring to compel tbem to perform the duties wbicb tbe judgment enjoined upon the city and its mayor and general council.

Opinion of the Court β€” Me. Chief Justice Waite

Primary Opinion

Me. Chief Justice Waite

delivered the opinion of the court.

The writ of which the petitioners complained was one of execution to carry into effect the judgment in the original suit for the mandamus. β€œ The jurisdiction of a court is. not exhausted by the rendition of its judgment, but continues until the judgment is satisfied.” Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 23. β€œ Process subsequent to judgment is as essential to jurisdiction as process anterior to judgment, else the judicial power would be incomplete and entirely inadequate to the purposes for which it was conferred by the Constitution.” Riggs v. Johnson County, 6 Wall. 187. But if the court has jurisdiction to issue process, it has necessarily jurisdiction to decide as to its appropriate form. Here the process has been issued; and the court, upon motion, has decided that it was good in form, and ought not to be quashed. Of this decision the petitioners complain, and seek to have it reversed. This we cannot do by mandamus. Under that form of proceeding we may compel an inferior court to decide upon a matter within its jurisdiction and pending before it for judicial determination, but we cannot control its decision. Neither can we in that way compel the inferior court to reverse, a decision which it has made in the exercise of its legitimate jurisdiction. That is the office of a writ of' error or an appeal, in cases to which such proceeding applies, but not of a writ of mandamus. If there is any thing in the case of McCargo v. Chapman, 20 How. 555, to the contrary of this, it is disapproved. Petition denied.

Precedents Cited (6)

Cited By Later Decisions (7)

Public Domain Federal Judicial Work (17 U.S.C. Β§ 105) Β· Harvard Law School Caselaw Access Project (CAP).