Ex parte Jordan
Syllabus & Case Posture
Ex Parte Jordan.
Subsequently to a decree pro confesso; additional parties were, by leave of the court, permitted to intervene as defendants, in. the same manner and with like effect as if named in the original and supplemental bills. The case was then referred to a' master, who computed, ascertained, and reported the amount of indebtedness, &c.; whereupon the court, after finding certain facts and overruling the exceptions, of such intervening parties to his report, passed a final decree, but denied their right to an appeal therefrom. Held, 1. That they had that riglit. 2. That, to enforce it, a mandamus lies from this court.
Application for.a mandamus to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York, to compel the allowance of an appeal from its ■ decision.
The New York, Oswego, and Midland Railroad Company, July 1, 1869, executed a mortgage on its railroad, &c., to secure an issue of bonds amounting to 18,000,000. Stevens, Opdyke, & Hewitt, trustees under this mortgage, on or about Nov. 1, 1873, commenced a suit for its foreclosure in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York. To this suit the railroad company, Delos DeWolf, trustee, William H. Macy, trustee, and the Mercantile Trust Company, trustee, were originally the only defendants. Receivers were appointed Nov. 18,1873; and on the same day, for the purpose of providing money to pay debts owing to employés, and for certain other specified objects, the receivers were authorized to issue from time to time certificates of indebtedness to an amount not exceeding in the aggregate $1,425,000, bearing interest at the rate of seven per cent per annum, and, unless previously discharged, to be paid out of the moneys realized upon the foreclosure equally with any other liabilities incurred by them in the administration of their receivership. Dec. 23, 1873, a further-issue of like certificates was authorized, for the purchase.of equipment and the payment of rental on leased lines.
In due time an order was regularly entered, taking the bill as confessed. The receivers from time to time filed .their accounts; and these were referred to a master, who reported thereon April 29, 1875. Upon the filing of this report the following direction was given by the circuit judge: “ The report may be confirmed, but at present I think, no further order should be entered.”
June 29, 1875, Conrad N. Jordan, Henry Amy, Edward Livingston, Frederick P. James, John P. Crosby, and Nathaniel A. Cowdrey, holders, or the representatives of holders, of bonds secured by the mortgage, filed a petition. for leave to intervene in the prosecution or defence of the suit, for the protection of the interests they represented. Upon this petition the following order was made, June 30, 1875: —
Opinion of the Court — Mr. Chief Justice Waite
Primary OpinionMr. Chief Justice Waite
delivered the opinion of the court.
We think that an appeal should have been allowed in this case. The petitioners were defendants in the suit when the final decree was rendered. They'were directly interested in what was then decided. The allowance of an appeal under sect. 692, Rev. Stat., follows of course, if prayed for by one who has the right to it. The language of the statute is, “ shall be allowed,” which means “ must be allowed,” when asked for by one who stands in such relation to the cause that he can demand it. The question upon such an application is not what .will be gained by an appeal, but whether the party asking it can appeal at all.
It is true that the petitioners were not parties to the suit until after the bill wa§ taken as confessed; but it is clear that a decree pro eonfesso did. not end the case, because before the final decree was rendered it was found necessary to have a reference to a master, “ to compute, ascertain, and report.” Before the master could comply with this order proof had to be taken; and the original time given him to report was extended for that purpose. When this reference was made, the petitioners were-defendants and actors in respect to the litigation. They certainly had the right to contend before the master, and to except to his report. This they did; and their exceptions were overruled. Even the report of the master did not put the case in a condition for a final decree. • The amount due upon the bonds and coupons had still to be ascertained. . That was done by the court, and stated in the decree. Against these findings, certainly, the petitioners were in a condition to contend, and, if to contend below, to appeal here. It will be time enough to consider what relief they can have under their appeal when the ease comes up.
While complaint is made of interlocutory orders entered in the progress of the cause, the appeal lies and was asked only from the final decree. Whatever comes here comes through such an appeal. When the case gets here, the petitioners may not be allowed to go behind orders actually made by the court as to the administration of the property before they were admitted to defend, but the case was certainly open to them, when they came in, as to all other matters involved.
The exceptions of the petitioners were not 'filed until after the expiration of one month from the time of filing the master’s report. Under equity rule 88 the complainants could have insisted upon a confirmation of the report by reason of this default at the next rule-day after it occurred. But they did not see fit to do so. The exceptions were received out of time without objection, and acted upon by the court. This was a waiver of the default.
A writ of mandamus will be issued directing the Circuit Court to allow the appeal asked for, as of Oct. 2, 1876, and it is so * Ordered.